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ABSTRACT
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Doctor of Philosophy
by Renato Alexandre da Cruz Silva
We believe that the task of developing large systems requires a formal approach. The
complexity of these systems demands techniques and tool support to simplify the task of
formal development. Often large systems are a combination of sub-components that can
be seen as modules. Event-B is a formal methodology that allows the development of
distributed systems. Despite several benets of using Event-B, modularisation and reuse
of existing models are not fully supported. We propose three techniques supporting the
reuse of models and their respective proof obligations in order to develop specications
of large systems: composition, generic instantiation and decomposition. Such techniques
are studied and tool support is dened as plug-ins by taking advantage of the extensi-
bility features of the Event-B toolset (Rodin platform).
Composition allows the combination of dierent sub-components and renement is
possible. A shared event approach is followed where sub-components events are com-
posed, communicating via common parameters and without variable sharing. By reusing
sub-components, proof obligations required for a valid composition are expressed and
we show that composition is monotonic. A tool is developed reinforcing the conditions
that allow the monotonicity and generating the respective proof obligations.
Generic Instantiation allows a generic model (a machine or a renement chain) to
be instantiated into a suitable development. Generic model proof obligations are reused,
avoiding re-proof and its renement comes for free. An instantiation constructor is de-
veloped where the generic free identiers (variables and constants) are renamed and
carrier sets are replaced to t the instance.
Decomposition allows the splitting of a model into several sub-components in a
shared event or shared variable style. Both styles are monotonic and sub-components
can be further rened independently, allowing team development. Proof obligations of
the original model are split into the dierent sub-components which usually results in
simpler and easier to discharge proof obligations. Decomposition is supported by a prac-
tical tool permitting the use of both styles.
We expect to close the gap between the use of formal methods in academia and
industry. In this thesis we address the important aspect of having tools supporting
well-studied formal techniques that are easy to use by model developers.Contents
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Introduction
This thesis investigates techniques that allow support of formal developments in Event-
B [3, 9]. In particular we focus in reuse of developments, in the avoidance of re-proofs
and respective tool support. We begin by studying other formal languages and the
respective formal support for three techniques: composition, generic instantiation and
decomposition. Afterwards and based on the previous study we apply the use of such
techniques to Event-B. Case studies and respective tool support for each technique are
developed in the Rodin platform, an application targeting developments in Event-B.
1.1 Thesis contribution
1.1.1 Overview
We believe that the development of large, complex and/or critical systems should be
done using formal methodology. The development of such systems usually is complex
and they must be ensured to work as desired avoiding failures that could lead to se-
rious consequences or even life-threatening situations. Formal methods are used to
help the development and modelling of these systems, which itself can be a hard task
to accomplish. Several formal notations can be used for modelling systems. We use
Event-B, a recent formal method with growing popularity used for modelling discrete
systems. Event-B results from an evolution of other formal methods notations like the
B-Method [158] and Action Systems [26]. Event-B is suitable for modelling parallel,
reactive and distributed system and not restricted to software development unlike the
\parent" B-method, including a richer notion of renement. As we are mostly interested
in distributed systems, this seems a suitable notation to be used.
However as a recent notation, Event-B lacks some features and mechanisms. We address
in particular the lack of reusability mechanisms like avoiding proof obligations (POs)
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re-proof. We believe that reusability is very useful specially in large developments and
we address these missing mechanisms.
1.1.2 Contributions
This thesis contributes to the development of systems, in particular large, distributed
systems. It is necessary to envisage mechanisms that simplify the correct development
of large systems according to their specications and having tool support eases such a
complex task. We propose three techniques for Event-B that help the development of
these kind of systems: composition, generic instantiation and decomposition. Individual
models can be composed in a shared event style through the composition technique.
Proof obligations in the individual models can be reused to minimise the proof eort on
the resulting composed model. Through generic instantiation an existing model can be
used as generic and instantiated to be used in other developments. The new instances
inherit the generic properties and respective POs. Decomposition allows the partitioning
of a model into several sub-models as an architecture feature and/or to simplify and more
easily discharge POs. The three techniques support reuse of existing sub-components
taking advantage of their properties (reuse of models and avoiding re-proof). Necessary
POs are dened and simplied using the existing POs associated to the individual sub-
components. The Rodin platform serves as a host for the plug-ins developed to give tool
support to each of the techniques. We present the work developed for these techniques
starting from the theory behind each one of them, the application to case studies and
the extension to tool support.
This chapter introduces the contribution of this thesis and the necessary background to
understand the rest of the document. The technical details start with the introduction of
formal methods in Sect. 1.2. Several formal methods relevant to our thesis are introduced
in Sect. 1.3. Renement is briey covered including a comparison to dierent formal
methods in Sect. 1.4. Section 1.5 introduces the formal method that we use for our work
as well as a brief view of the Rodin platform, the toolset for Event-B. We nish this
chapter by covering the background related to our contribution: composition in Sect. 1.6
and decomposition in Sect. 1.7.
Next we describe in more detail what formal methods are and show some examples.
1.2 Formal Methods
Formal Methods use rigorous mathematical techniques to reason about systems' be-
haviour. It can be applied to software and hardware systems and formal specication
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program is working correctly. Formal methods ensures that a program fullls its for-
mal specication. This is specially important in the development of critical safety sys-
tems [38]. On a top-down development, the application of formal methods can be divided
into 3 steps [5]:
• Creation of requirement documents
• Development of the Abstraction Model (rst model representing a system through
the use of formal notation) and the steps toward the Concrete Model (model which
is closer to what the system will be, but still represented by formal notation)
• Converting the Concrete Model into an Implementation. On a programming soft-
ware project, there already exist tools that automatically do this task.
[5, 7] use some formal methods case studies in industry and discuss how requirement
documents, system models and executable code t on a project's life cycle.
Formal methods can dier in several aspects, like syntax (specication language), seman-
tics or applications. Classications can be drawn from the dierent notations. A possible
classication is to distinguish formal methods in terms of behaviour, i.e. state-based or
event-based approaches [1, 35, 74]:
• State-Based behaviour: the system is described by a sequence of state changes. A
state is a set of assignments to a set of components (frequently variables). This kind
of systems usually are rooted in logic and close to how imperative programming
languages that deal with state. This approach forces a close examination of how
the real system is represented in the model [1, 31]. Examples of formal methods
with a state-based behaviour are Z [173], VDM [105] or B [4].
• Event-Based behaviour: the system is described by a sequence of operations. The
specication is manipulated algebraically while dening the actions [1]. Event-
based systems are used to develop and integrate systems that are loosely coupled
(suitable for large-scale distributed applications). The integrated systems can
communicate by generating and receiving event notications [74]. Examples of
formal methods with a event-based behaviour are CSP (Communicating System
Processes) [92] or CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems) [126].
A state-based system usually changes state through the execution of events. An event-
based approach expresses the evolution of the system by dening the enabled operations.
Event-based view is suitable for message-passing distributed systems while state-based
view is suitable for design of parallel algorithms [42]. Not always it is possible to make
a very clear distinction of these two situations: depending on the viewpoint a formal
notation is seen, it can show both characteristics.6 Chapter 1 Introduction
[112, 113] suggest another classication for formal notations based on common charac-
teristic of modelling languages from a system re-engineering point of view:
• Model based: a system is described by explicitly dening state and operations.
It progresses through the execution of operations that change the system from
one state to another. There is no explicit representation of concurrency and some
functional requirements cannot be expressed (temporal requirements). Several
stated-based formal methods are also model based as are the examples of Z, VDM,
B or Event-B [9].
• Logic based: Logics are used to describe desirable properties of the system such
as specication, temporal or probabilistic behaviour. The validity of these prop-
erties relies on the associated axiom system. The nal executable specication
can be used for simulation and prototype construction. Logic can be augmented
with some concrete programming constructs to obtain a wide-spectrum formalism.
In that case, correctness renement steps are applied during the construction of
such systems. Examples of logic based modelling languages are Hoare Logic [65],
Weakest Precondition Calculus [64], Modal Logic [133] or Temporal Logic [119].
• Algebraic Approach: Explicit denition of operations is given by describing the
behaviour of dierent operations without any denition of state. Like model-based
notations, concurrency it is not explicitly expressed. Examples are OBJ [84] or
LARCH [86].
• Process Algebra Approach: Concurrent systems are explicitly represented.
The system behaviour is constrained by all observable communication between pro-
cesses. Examples are: CSP, CCS, ACP (Algebra of Communicating Processes) [28]
or LOTOS (Language of Temporal Ordering Specication) [98].
• Net based: Graphical languages are combined with formal semantics, bringing
some advantages to system creation/development. Graphical notation are popular
resulting from the simplicity of dening specications for systems without requiring
a deep understanding of the underlaying framework. Examples are: Petri Net [143],
StateCharts [95] or UML-B [170].
The classication of the formal notation helps when deciding which formal methods is
suitable for a particular system development. The next section gives an overview of
other formal methods (related to Event-B or) relevant to our developed work.
1.3 Overview of some formal methods
Event-B is a formal method that allows the specication and modelling of reactive sys-
tems (see Sect. 1.5). Nevertheless other formal methods are available for implementingChapter 1 Introduction 7
dierent kind of systems. We overview some formal methods related to Event-B and in
particular to our work:
• CSP
• VDM
• Action Systems
• Classical B
• Z
These formal notations are briey introduced in the following sections.
1.3.1 Communicating Sequential Processes - CSP
CSP is a process algebra formal method that allows modelling of parallel processing and
interaction between systems [91]. The basic concept in CSP considers a process as a
mathematical abstraction of interactions between the system and its environment. The
behaviour of the system is described through independent Processes in an event-based
view. A set of events in which a process P can engage is called its alphabet, written
P and represents the visible interface between the process and its environment [53].
The processes are constrained in the way they can engage in the events of its alphabet,
using CSP process term language [43]. A process interacts with its environment by
synchronously engaging in atomic events. A sequence of events is described using a
prex operator '→'. For instance, a→P describes the process that engages in the event
a and then behaves as process P. The environment can decide between two processes
using the choice operator '8'. For instance, P 8 Q represents the process that oers the
choice to the environment between behaving as process P or as process Q. There is also
a non-deterministic choice operator 'u': P u Q represents the process that internally
chooses between behaving as P or Q, without any environment control. There are
several operations that can be applied to traces [92] like concatenation, interleaving,
subscripting, reversal among others. We describe here in more detail the concatenation
and interleaving operations as they will be used later on.
Concatenation Let s be a sequence, each of whose elements is itself a sequence.
Then a=s is obtained by concatenating all the elements together in the original order.
A denition can be given by means of the following laws (distributive operator) [92]:
• a=hi = hi
• a=hsi = s8 Chapter 1 Introduction
• a=(s a t) = (a=s) a (a=t)
Interleaving A sequence s is an interleaving of two sequences t and u if it can be split
into a series of subsequences, with alternate subsequences extracted from t and u. For
example s = h1;6;3;1;5;4;2;7i is an interleaving of t and u, where t = h1;6;5;2;7i and
u = h3;1;4i. A recursive denition can be given by means of the following laws [92]:
• hi interleaves (t;u)  (t = hi ^ u = hi)
• s interleaves (t;u)  s interleaves (u;t)
• (hxi a s) interleaves (t;u)  (t 6= hi ^ t0 = x ^ s interleaves (t
0
;u)) _
(u 6= hi ^ u0 = x ^ s interleaves (t;u
0
)),
where t
0
(same for u
0
) is the tail of sequence t (u).
CSP allows the renement of models. The renement depends on the semantic model
of the language which is used [153] and respective granularity:
• Traces renement: The coarsest used relationship is based on the sequences of
events which a process can perform (the traces of the process). A process Q is
a traces renement of another, P, if all the possible sequences of communications
which Q can do are also possible for P. The previous trace renement can be
expressed as P vT Q b = traces(Q)  traces(P).
• Failures renement: A ner distinction between processes can be made by con-
straining events. An implementation can constrain events permitted to block as
well as events that can be performed. A failure is a pair (s;X), where s is a
trace of the process and X is a set of events the process can refuse to perform
at that point (refusal). A state of a process is deadlocked if it can refuse to do
every event and STOP is the simplest deadlocked process. Deadlock is also com-
monly introduced when parallel processes do not succeed in synchronising on the
same event. Failures renement between processes P and Q can be expressed as
P vF Q b = failures(Q)  failures(P).
• Failures-Divergences renement: The failures model does not model processes
that might livelock (i.e., perform an innite sequence of internal actions) and
so may never subsequently engage in a visible event. The failures-divergences
model meets this requirement by adding the concept of divergences. The diver-
gences of a process are the set of traces after which the process may livelock.
This gives two major enhancements: the ability to analyse systems which have
the potential to never perform another visible event and assert this does not oc-
cur in the situations being considered; and use divergence in the specication
to describe \do not care" situations. Formally, after a divergence, a processChapter 1 Introduction 9
is considered as acting chaotically and is able to do or refuse anything. This
means that processes are considered to be identical after they have diverged. A
failures-divergences renement between processes P and Q can be expressed as
P vFD Q b = failures(Q)  failures(P) ^ divergences(Q)  divergences(P).
• Innite traces renement: The innite-traces model of CSP was introduced by
Roscoe [152]. It extends the failures-divergences model by including all possible
innite behaviours of a process. A process model now has components (A;F;D;I)
where A, F and D are as in the failures-divergences model and I is some subset
of Aw, the set of innite sequences of elements of A, the alphabet of the process.
An innite traces renement between processes P and Q can be expressed as
P vFDI Q b = failures(Q)  failures(P) ^ divergences(Q)  divergences(P) ^
infinites(Q)  infinites(P).
The semantics of an expression P is written ((P);FJPK;DJPK;IJPK), or JPK for short.
The semantics function is used to justify the algebraic laws: for expressions P;Q, P = Q
i JPK = JQK [53].
There are some tools available for CSP. FDR2 (Failures/Divergence Renement 2) is a
renement checker for establishing properties of models expressed in CSP. Also ProBE,
an animator for CSP processes, allows the user to explore the behaviour of models
interactively. These two tools are developed by Formal Systems Europe [80]. Adelaide
Renement Checker (ARC) [136] is a CSP renement checker developed by the Formal
Modelling and Verication Group at The University of Adelaide. Occam Transformation
System is an automated tool to assist in carrying out algebraic transformations.
1.3.2 Vienna Development Method - VDM
Vienna Development Method (VDM) is a model-oriented notation developed while a
research group of IBM laboratory in Vienna was working on compiler developments
and language designs. It consists of a formal modelling language,VDM-SL, which is
a combination of data denitions, state variables and a set of operations describing
the specication of systems and state variables invariants veried before and after the
execution of an operation [111]. Unlike other notations like Z or B, VDM has a three
values logic which allows explicit treatment of undenedness. The VDM syntax can be
described using ASCII or mathematic notation. More recently an extension of VDM
was developed, VDM++, supporting object-oriented design, concurrency and capable of
modelling real-time distributed systems [77].
A VDM development is made up of state descriptions at successive levels of abstraction
and implementation steps which link to the state description. The implementation of
an abstract state description Sa by means of a more concrete one Sc describes [111]:10 Chapter 1 Introduction
• either a data reication, i.e. how the state variables of Sc implement the ones of
Sa;
• or an operation decomposition, i.e. how the operations of Sc implement the ones
of Sa into a computer language algorithm (implementation).
While modelling a specication using VDM, in particular for the operations, predicates
precondition and postcondition are written explicitly. The state of variables before
and after an operation usually is dened. To refer to a before value it is used the \~"
decoration on the relevant variable [77]. VDM objects must be validated by proof obliga-
tions [111] and for an operation to be valid, the satisability rule (a sentence is satisable
if there is some interpretation under which it is true) must be met [101]. VDM formal
development uses data reication from abstract to concrete model [equivalent to data
renement] but also uses operation decomposition to develop (abstract) implicit speci-
cations of operations and functions into algorithms that can be directly implemented
in a computer language of choice. In general operation decomposition it is applied after
the data reication [101].
In terms of tools, VDMTools [59] is the leading commercial tool for VDM-SL and
VDM++ developed by CSK Systems. Overture [134] is a community-based open source
initiative aimed at providing free tool support for VDM++ on top of the Eclipse plat-
form. Its aim is to develop a framework for interoperable tools that may be useful for
industrial application, research and education.
1.3.3 Action Systems
Action Systems was introduced by Back and Kurki-Suonio [26]. It provides a general
description of reactive systems, capable of modelling terminating, aborting and innitely
repeating systems. Arbitrary sequential programs can be used to describe an atomic
action. A basic action system P = (A;v;Pi;Pa) consists of a list of labels A, a list of
variables v, a set of labelled statements (actions) Pa = fP j  2 Ag and an initialisation
statement Pi. Each action  2 A is of the form [26]:
action  : g(x) ! y := S(x;y): (1.1)
The action guard g is a condition that the enabling variables x must satisfy for action
 to be enabled. The eect of the action is to assign new values S(x;y) to the update
variables y. Actions are atomic which means that when an action is executing no other
action of the system occurs until the rst action is complete. Taking the view that
an action system engages in an action jointly with the surrounding environment allows
the environment to observe the executed actions and not the state of the action system
itself [41].Chapter 1 Introduction 11
Back and von Wright [27] describe how Action Systems can be used on parallel and
distributed systems in a stepwise manner by giving a behavioural semantics in terms of
execution traces. Back [24] suggests that sequential programs could also be implemented
in a parallel fashion: two or more actions can be executed in parallel, as long as the
(atomic) actions do not have variables in common. Butler [41] exposes a composition
using Action Systems from an event-based point of view based on CSP synchronisation.
Woodcock and Morgan [189] give two proof methods which are sound and jointly com-
plete in terms of CSP failure-divergences semantics for state-based concurrent systems
using the weakest precondition wp approach proposed by Morgan [129]. The weakest
precondition is briey explained below.
Weakest Precondition For guarded command G, command com, and postcondition
Q:
wp(G ! com;Q) b = G ) wp(com;Q):
Whereas wp(com;Q) characterises the states from which com is certain to establish Q,
we need the states from which com could possibly establish Q. Morgan [129] dened
the conjugate weakest precondition as follows:
:wp(com;:Q)
because in those states it is not certain that com will establish :Q. Note that we are
taking the view that an aborting command could possibly establish anything. Therefore
we can say that:
wp(com;Q) b = :wp(com;:Q) (1.2)
Although wp(com;true) implies termination of com, (1.2) shows that wp(com;true)
does not. For any action  let G be its guard. Then
G  wp(;true):
Butler [53] augments Back and von Wright [27] and Woodcock and Morgan [189] works
by dening the semantics of Action Systems in terms of the CSP innite-traces semantic
model:
Denition 1.1. For action system P = (A;v;Pi;Pa),
f[P]g b = (A;Ff[P]g;Df[P]g;If[P]g)
A failure is a pair of the form (s;X), where s 2 A (set of nite sequences of elements of
A) is an event-trace and X  A is a refusal set. If (s;X) is in P after initialisation,then
P could engage in the action trace s and then refuse all actions X. Trace s is a divergence
if Phiis aborts. For an innite trace u 2 Aw (Aw is the set of innite traces for alphabet
A) and Pu b = (i j i 2 NPui), If[P]g) are those u 2 Aw in which the execution of all the12 Chapter 1 Introduction
Phiiu in sequence is possible. Operationally, for this to be possible in some state it must
be the case that state S0 is enabled and that execution of S0 could result in a state in
which S1 is enabled and so on for each Si [53].
Event-B is inspired by Action Systems and as a consequence several similarities can be
drawn (atomic actions, state based, modelling reactive systems) for these two formal
methodologies. More information regarding composition follows in Sect. 1.6.
1.3.4 Classical B
Classical B (or B-Method) [4] created by Abrial is a formal approach for the specica-
tion and development of computer software systems [158] and can be seen as a parent
of Event-B. A system specication is dened by machines that have variables den-
ing the state space. The state progresses with the execution of operations. Operations
can have preconditions, guards (or both) and postconditions. Properties of the sys-
tem can be expressed by means of predicates called invariants. The B-Method can be
seen as both state-based (explicit notion of \state" expressed by variables) or event-
based (operations occurring nondeterministically). The development of models usually
follows a top-bottom style (Event-B inherits this style as seen in Sect. 1.5) where the
most abstract model is simple. More details and complexity are added throughout
stepwise renements. Classical B denes three basic components: abstract machine, re-
nement and implementation. The last component, implementation, is a special kind of
renement machine from which code can be produced, respecting the original abstract
specication. The renement in Classical B is one to one: one abstract operation is re-
ned by one concrete operation and it is not possible to introduce new operations unlike
Event-B. Classical B has been used widely in both academic [169, 17] and industrial
developments [5].
Dierent ways and dierent tools exist for generating the output code like the B-
Toolkit [20] or Atelier B [19]. The B-Method focus on software systems and conse-
quently the nal result - implementation model - although similar to other renement
steps, includes programming constructs for common languages (e.g. C and Ada) with
some restrictions on the used syntax.
1.3.5 Z
The Z notation [173] is a state-based formal method, which uses mathematical tech-
niques to represent and describe computing systems: hardware and software. A system
contains a set of state variables and some operations that change the variables values.
A model that is characterised by the operations is called an Abstract Data Type (ADT)
and Z follows this style. Z can be used to describe object-oriented programs since theChapter 1 Introduction 13
state variables and operations can be compared to instance variables and methods, re-
spectively [100]. Z serves as basis for other notations (for instance, classical B) and
several variants adapted to object-oriented programming (an example is Object-Z [168]
which is an object-oriented extension of Z). Z includes two notations [100]: notation for
ordinary discrete mathematics and notation that provides structure to the mathemat-
ical text - paragraphs. The most important and more used paragraph is a macro-like
abbreviation and naming construct called schema. Z denes the requirements through
the use of mathematic entities such as sets, relations/functions or sequences. A schema
consists of three parts: name which identies the schema and it is used when composed
with other schemas; signature which is a collection of variables introducing data types
and created by declarations and providing a vocabulary for making mathematical state-
ments; predicate (or constraint) that denes relations between signatures elements using
predicates (describing abstractly the eect of each operation in the proposed system).
One of the ways to represent a schema StateSpace is represented here (the shortest one)
[37]: StateSpace b = [x1 : S1;:::;xn : Sn j Inv(x1;:::;xn)]. x1:::xn are state variables,
S1:::Sn are expressions that represent variable types. Inv(x1;:::;xn) are the state in-
variants. Schemas are used to dene the static and dynamic feature of a system. The
static part includes the possible states and rules that should be preserved during the
system execution (invariant clauses). The dynamic part consists of available operations
and changes on the state after the execution of an operation, as well as on relationships
between input and output.
Research has been undertaken to adjust Z to model concurrent systems [37, 76]. Some
of these results are: Fischer's CSP-OZ [75] developed to combine CSP properties with
Object-Z; Circus [186, 185], developed by Woodcock and Cavalcanti providing formal
support for the specication of data, behaviour aspects of concurrent systems and allow-
ing renement through the use of a syntactical approach in opposition to a semantic one;
TLZ [109] developed by Lamport that combines Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [108]
and Z; Taguchi and Araki [179] combine Z and CCS to specify concurrent systems,
among others.
The Community Z Tools (CZT) project [57] is an open source project providing an
integrated toolset to support Z, with some support for Z extensions such as Object-
Z, Circus, and TCOZ. Another Z tool is Fastest [79] which is a model-based testing
tool. The tool receives a Z specication and generates (almost automatically) test cases
derived from the specication. f uzz [175, 174] is Spivey's typechecker for the original
Z language. It includes style les for LaTeX and it is available as part of the Z Word
Tools [180].
All the previous formal methods have something in common: the use of renement to
describe a specication. Renement plays an important role in formal developments in
particular on a top-down style. Initially we have an initial abstract and simplistic view
of the modelled system. Renement allows the introduction of more details in the state14 Chapter 1 Introduction
system respecting the initial abstract view. We discuss more about renement in the
next section.
1.4 Renement
Renement allows the construction of a model in a gradual way, making it closer to
an implementation [15]. At same time, the overall correctness of the system should
be preserved. A property P0 is said to rene a property P if P0 v P. The initial
model is dened as the abstract model. A model that maintains the properties of the
abstract model and adds more details is dened as a concrete model. The states in the
abstract model are linked to the concrete ones. The renement process can be repeated
so it can be applied over a concrete model generating an even more concrete model.
All formal notations presented in the previous sections have the notion of renement
although sometimes named dierently (in VDM it is known as reication). Operations
in B, VDM and Z are \rened" on a one-to-one basis: one abstract operation is rened
by only one concrete operation. Event-B, as it will be seen in the Sect. 1.5, is more
exible as it inherits a renement property from Action Systems and CSP where it is
possible to introduce new events during the stepwise renement steps. Gluing invariants
are predicates used to link the abstract and concrete states. In Event-B, renement can
also be applied to a machine and respective context(s) separately. It is possible to extend
contexts by adding new sets, constants or axioms to an existing context as long as the
abstract context properties are kept [150] (see Sect. 1.5).
Proof obligations are generated and discharged during the renement process to preserve
the abstract properties in the concrete model: concrete events must keep the behaviour
of the respective abstract ones; the new model should not introduce divergence and
the invariants of the concrete model should be preserved for every event enabled (the
semantic of these proof obligations are described in Sect. 1.5.3). New events rening an
implicit event which does nothing (skip) [15] can be added in a renement step. All the
abstract events must be rened in the concrete model. A constraint for the renement
is that the concrete machine should not deadlock before the abstract machine, other-
wise the concrete machine might not achieve what the abstract machine had previously
required. The formalization of the described constraints can be found in [15].
Next section focus on the Event-B language and properties which will help understand
the rest of the document. The renement POs for Event-B are also described in the
following section.Chapter 1 Introduction 15
1.5 Event-B
Event-B is a formal methodology that uses mathematical techniques based on set theory
and rst order logic. It is a notation and method used for modelling discrete systems
resulting from an evolution of other formal methods notations like classical B and Action
Systems. The justications and explanations for such notation can be found in [87].
Event-B is suitable for modelling parallel, reactive and distributed systems and can be
seen as a state-based formal method due to the close relation to classical B. Event-
B models can be developed in the Rodin modelling tool [151, 71] and we discuss it
briey in Sect. 1.5.7. The semantics of a model developed in Event-B is given by means
of its proof obligations (cf. Sect. 1.5.3). These obligations have to be discharged to
show consistency of the model with respect to some behavioural semantics. Abrial [9]
expresses these behavioural semantics as state trace semantics.
An abstract Event-B specication is divided into two parts: a static part called context
and a dynamic part called machine. A context Ctx consists of carrier sets s (similar to
types [15]), constants c, axioms (assertions constraining constants and carriers sets) and
theorems A(s;c) . (Identiers occurring free in a formula are indicated in parentheses).
An example of a context can be seen in Fig. 1.1.
BirthdayBook_C0
context BirthdayBook_C0
constants
p0
d0
sets PERSON DATE
axioms
@axm1 p0   PERSON
@axm2 d0   DATE
end
Page 1
Figure 1.1: Context BirthdayBook C0
A model is dened by a machine M that sees a context Ctx. A machine usually contains
global state variables v as well as invariants and (machine) theorems I(s;c;v) that dene
the dynamic properties of the specication by constraining v. Possible state changes are
described by means of events: when their conditions are satised, optional local variables
(parameters) can be used and state variables may be updated. An example of a birthday
book machine can be seen in Fig. 1.2.
An abstract Event-B specication can be rened by adding more details and becoming
more concrete (see Fig. 1.3 where machine N renes machine M).
Renement allows the introduction of more details in small steps. Otherwise the speci-
cation development would have to be done in one single step with the possible conse-
quence of becoming complicated, hard to reason about (dealing with all the details of16 Chapter 1 Introduction
BirthdayBook_M0
machine BirthdayBook_M0 sees BirthdayBook_C0
variables birthday
invariants
  @inv1 birthday   PERSON   DATE
events
  event INITIALISATION
    then
      @act1 birthday   {p0 d0}
  end
  event AddBirthday
    any p d
    where
      @grd1 p   PERSON
      @grd2 d   DATE
      @grd3 p   dom (birthday)
    then
      @act1 birthday   birthday   {p   d}
  end
end
Page 1
Figure 1.2: Machine BirthdayBook M0
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Figure 3. Machine Reﬁnement and Context Extension
reality are now revealed by the microscope. An even more powerful microscope will reveal more details, etc. A
reﬁned model is thus one which is spatially larger than its previous abstractions.
In correlation to this spatial extension, there is a corresponding temporal extension: this is because the new
variables can be modiﬁed by some transitions, which could not have been present in the previous abstractions,
simply, because the concerned variables did not exist in them. Practically this is realized by means of new events
involving the new variables only (they reﬁne some implicit events doing “nothing” in the abstraction). Reﬁnement
will thus result in a discrete observation of reality, which is now performed using a ﬁner time granularity.
We distinguish two principal uses of reﬁnement, superposition [6] reﬁnement and data-reﬁnement [7]. Super-
position reﬁnement corresponds solely to a spatial and temporal extension of a model. Data-reﬁnement is used in
order to modify the state so that it can be implemented on a computer by means of some programming language.
5.1. Machine Reﬁnement and Context Extension
From a given machine M, a new machine N can be built and asserted to be a reﬁnement of M. Machine M is said to
be an abstraction of N and machine N is said to be a reﬁnement of M or a concrete version of it. Likewise, context
C, seen by a machine M, can be extended to a context D, which is then seen by N. This is represented in Fig. 3.
Note that it is not necessary to extend context C when reﬁning machine M. In this restricted case, machine N
just sees context C as does its abstraction M. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.
The sets and constants of an abstract context are kept in its extension. In other words, the extension of a
context just consists of adding new sets t and new constants d. These are deﬁned by means of new axioms
Q(s,t,c,d). Consequently, no speciﬁc proof obligations are associated with context extension. In this article we
present singleton context extension and context reference to achieve conceptual simplicity. The generalization to
multiple context extension and reference is not difﬁcult and particularly useful in conjunction with decomposition
as presented in Section 6.
The situation is not the same when reﬁning machines. The concrete machine N (which supposedly “sees”
Figure 1.3: Machine and context renement
implementation at once) and most important, hard to understand [88]. Concrete mod-
els are expressed through the renement of events, introduction of new variables w and
consequently the introduction of gluing invariants: invariants that relate abstract and
concrete states (variables). Therefore abstract variables can exist in a concrete model
or disappear and be replaced by a concrete variables. In that case, a gluing invariant
is required to relate the abstract and concrete variable. Abstract contexts can be ex-
tended by concrete contexts allowing the introduction of new carrier sets, constants and
axioms. As an example, see Fig. 1.4 where machine BirthdayBook M0 is rened with
the introduction of a new variable reminder (relation between variable birthday and
a reminding date; the same birthday can have multiple reminding dates). Note that
we do not change the original abstract event: we only \extend" it; the abstract eventChapter 1 Introduction 17
AddBirthday is extended by appending a concrete guard grd4 and a concrete action
act4.
machine BirthdayBook_M1 refines BirthdayBook_M0   
sees BirthdayBook_C0 
 
variables birthday reminder 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 reminder   birthday   DATE 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION 
  then 
    @act2 reminder    
  end 
 
  event AddBirthday extends AddBirthday 
  any r 
  when 
    @grd4 r   DATE 
  then 
    @act4 reminder(p d) r 
  end 
end 
 
Figure 1.4: Machine BirthdayBook M1
Proof obligations arise to verify the consistency of a model. For instance, there are
proof obligations to establish the renement relationship between two machines, and to
establish invariant preservation by the events. We reason about a system specication
through its proof obligations. The reasoning veries that the specication is sound wrt
some behavioural semantic and that system properties are always satised [88]. The logic
used in Event-B is typed set theory built on rst-order predicate logic, and allows the
denition of partial functions. As such, it is necessary that the used proof system handles
well-denedness. In [122], it is shown that it is possible to reason about partiality without
abandoning the well-understood domain of two-valued predicate logic. In that approach,
the reasoning is achieved by extending the standard calculus with derived proof rules
that preserve well-denedness across proofs [116]. The proof calculus outlined in [122]
is the one used to reason in Event-B.
1.5.1 Preliminaries
A full denition of the mathematical language of Event-B may be found in [16]. Here we
give a very brief overview of the structure of the mathematical language to help motivate
the remaining sections and chapters.
Event-B distinguishes predicates and expressions as separate syntactic categories. Pred-
icates are dened in term of the usual basic predicates (>;?;A = B;x 2 S;y  z;
etc), predicate combinators (:;^;_; etc) and quantiers (8;9). Expressions are dened
in terms of constants (0, ?, etc), (logical) variables (x, y, etc) and operators (+, [,
etc). Basic predicates have expressions as arguments. For example in the predicate18 Chapter 1 Introduction
E 2 S , both E and S are expressions. Expression operators may have expressions as
arguments. For example, the set union operator has two expressions as arguments, i.e.,
S [ T. Expression operators may also have predicates as arguments. For example, set
comprehension is dened in terms of a predicate P , i.e., f x j P g [11].
1.5.1.1 Notation
The naming conventions that we use throughout this thesis are shown in the following
tables:
Context Ctx
Constant c
Carrier Set s
Axiom/Theorem A(c;s)
(a) Context Elements
Machine M
Abstract Variable v
Concrete Variable w
(Abstract) Invariant/Theorem I(c;s;v)
(Concrete) Invariant/Theorem J(c;s;v;w)
(b) Machine Elements
Event evt
(Abstract) Parameter p
(Concrete) Parameter q
(Abstract) Guard G(c;s;p;v)
(Concrete) Guard H(c;s;q;w)
Parameter Witness W(c;s;p;q;w;w0)
Variable Witness W(c;s;q;v0;w;w0)
(Abstract) Action S(c;s;p;v;v0)
(Concrete) Action T(c;s;q;w;w0)
(c) Event Elements
1.5.1.2 Types
All expressions have a type which is one of three forms:
• a basic set, that is a predened set (Z or BOOL) or a carrier set provided by the
user (i.e., an identier);
• a power set of another type, P();
• a cartesian product of two types,   
These are the types currently built-in to the Rodin tool [11]. User-dened types can be
denes as carrier sets and the only implicit assumption is that they are not empty [156].
An expression E has a type type(E) provided E satises typing rules. Each expression
operator has a typing rule which we write in the form of an inference rule. For example,
the following typing rule for the set union operator species that S [ T has type (P)
provided both S and T have type P():Chapter 1 Introduction 19
type(S) = P() type(T) = P()
type(S [ T) = P()
This rule is polymorphic on the type variable  which means that union is a polymorphic
operator. It should be noted that an expression of type BOOL is not a predicate. The
type BOOL consists of the values TRUE and FALSE, both of which are expressions.
These are dierent to the basic predicates > and ?. The bool operator is used to
convert a predicate into a boolean expression, i.e., bool(x > y). A boolean expression E
is converted to a predicate by writing E = TRUE. We have that bool(>) = TRUE.
1.5.1.3 Functions
There exists a relation between operators and function application in Event-B. The
type of an Event-B function f is P(type(A)  type(B)). The functionality of a partial
function f 2 A 7 !B is specied with an additional property and a uniqueness condition:
8x;y;y0x 7! y 2 f ^ x 7! y0 2 f ) y = y0
The domain of f, written dom(f), is the set fx j 9yx 7! y 2 fg. Application of f
to x is written f(x) which is well-dened provided x 2 dom(f). Note that f is not
an operator itself: it is simply an expression. The operator involved here is implicit:
it is the function application operator that takes two arguments, f and x. An explicit
operator for a function application could have been written as apply(f;x), where apply
is the operator and f and x are the arguments. But in the Rodin tool, the shorthand
f(x) must be used.
Variables in the mathematical language are typed by set expressions. This means, for
example, that a variable may represent a function since a function is a special case of
a set (of pairs). Variables may not represent expression operators or predicates in the
mathematical language. This means that, while we can quantify over sets (including
functions), we cannot quantify over operators or predicates.
1.5.1.4 Well-Denedness
Ill-dened terms arise in the presence of partial functions. They result from the applica-
tion of functions to terms outside their domain. When ill-denedness is a concern, the
adopted reasoning framework has to cope with it. Dierent approaches exist to reason
in the presence of partial functions. Each of these approaches has its own specialised
proof calculus. In [122], it is shown that it is possible to reason about partiality without
abandoning the well-understood domain of two-valued predicate logic. In that approach,
the reasoning is achieved by extending the standard calculus with derived proof rules
that preserve well-denedness across proofs [116].20 Chapter 1 Introduction
Along with typing rules as dened above, all expression operators come with well-
denedness predicates. We write WD(E) for the well-denedness predicate of expres-
sion E. Table 1.1 gives examples of well-denedness conditions for several operators,
including the function application operator.
Expression Well-Denedness Conditions
F(E) WD(F);WD(E);F 2 x 7 ! y;E 2 dom(F)
F=E WD(F);WD(E);E 6= 0
card(E) WD(E);finite(E)
S [ T WD(S);WD(T)
F mod E WD(F);WD(E);E 6= 0
min(S) WD(S);S 6= ?;9x(8nn 2 S ) x  n))
max(S) WD(S);S 6= ?;9x(8nn 2 S ) x  n))
Table 1.1: Some expressions and respective well-denedness conditions
From the Table 1.1, it can be seen that an expression F(E) is well-dened provided
both F and E are well-dened, that F is a partial function and that E is in the do-
main of F. In the Rodin tool, well-denedness conditions give rise to proof obligations
for expressions that appear in models. The well-denedness conditions are themselves
written as predicates in the Event-B mathematical language. [125] gives the full list of
expression, predicates and respective well-denedness conditions available in the Rodin
tool. A well-dened sequent of the form H `D G is dened as follows:
H `D G b = D(H);D(G);H ` G:
That is, the well-denedness of H and G is assumed when proving H ` G. Generally
speaking, when proving a sequent H ` G, the approach suggests proving its validity as
well as its well-denedness:
WDD : `D D(H ` G)
V alidityD : H `D G
where D(H ` G) is dened as D(8xH )G) such that x are the free variables of H and
G [116]. A proof rule is said to preserve well-denedness (WD) i its consequent and
antecedents only contain well-dened sequents (i.e., `D sequents). For a generic proof
rule where H1 :::Hn (standing for a conjunction), n > 0, are a sequence of (possible
empty) sequents and G is also a sequent, with an optional name r:
` H1 :::Hn
` G
r
then, the same proof rule can be rewritten including the well-denedness conditions (andChapter 1 Introduction 21
the well-denedness operator D [122]) as:
`D D(H1):::D(Hn)
`D D(H1 :::Hn)
^goalD `D H1 :::Hn
`D G
rD
Additional details about the use of well-denedness in a rst order predicate calculus
can be found in [122].
Other works also study the well-denedness of partial functions: Fitzgerald and Jones [78]
discuss a connection between the classical First-order Predicate Calculus(FoPC) and the
Logic of Partial Functions (LPF). It is claimed that theorems in LPF using weak equality
can be straightforwardly translated into ones that are true in FoPC; translation in the
other direction results, in general, in more complicated expressions but in many cases
these can be readily simplied. [18, 120] discuss the semantics of Z in relation to rst
order logic, particularly regarding undenedness and proofs.
With regard to recursive functions, they are not supported in the Rodin platform. The
theory plug-in [115] that allows the extension of the mathematical language [11, 51],
allows the denition of new (possibly recursive) operators as well as the necessary well-
denedness conditions. Nevertheless this is currently work in progress.
Next we extend this initial description by focusing on the kind of events, the types of vari-
ables assignments and parameters. In the end we outline the existing proof obligations
for Event-B models. These details are necessary further on to explain our contributions.
1.5.2 Events
In Event-B, events specify changes to variables and the conditions under which they
may occur. Events occur as soon, and as long, as its ring condition (guards) are set [3].
An event evt is expressed by parameters (local variables to the event) p, by guards
G(s;c;p;v) and actions S(s;c;p;v;v0):
evt b = ANY p WHERE G(s;c;p;v) THEN S(s;c;p;v;v0) END:
When the guard G(s;c;p;v) is true then the event evt is enabled and therefore the action
S(s;c;p;v;v0) can update the set of variables v to v0 (after-state of v). A more general
denition is as follows: events may occur atomically when its guards are true and as
a result the state is updated through the execution of actions. The guard of an event
states the necessary conditions under which an event may occur and an action describes
how the state variables evolve when an event occurs [88]. A mandatory event called
INITIALISATION, with TRUE as guard, denes the initial state of the machine. The
system state progresses when events are enabled and occur. More details about events,
guards and actions can be found in [15].22 Chapter 1 Introduction
We consider three kind of events depending on when they are introduced during the
development of a model:
• convergent: new events introduced after a renement. These kind of events rene
skip and require a variant (see Section 1.5.3.2) to ensure non-divergence.
• anticipated: event declared in anticipation that does not need to decrease a variant
(but must not increase it either); it only decreases the variant when it becomes
convergent in a further renement [9].
• ordinary: neither convergent nor anticipated.
The majority of developments use ordinary or convergent events but anticipated events
can be useful when modelling. Anticipated events are used to avoid a technical diculty
of using abstract variables in a new event during a renement step. By declaring the
new event in anticipation in an abstract renement, this technicality is circumvented. As
mentioned, new events can be introduced in a renement of an abstract model (similar
to CSP hiding operator where some events are hidden from the environment) repre-
senting internal events. These new events may (optionally) be dened as convergent or
anticipated.
For variable assignments in an action, there are three simple forms [13] described in
Table 1.2. v and v1 are some variables, E(:::) denotes an expression, p are parameters
Assignment Before-After Predicate (BAP)
v := E(p;v1) v0 := E(p;v1)
v :2 E(p;v1) v0 :2 E(p;v1)
v :j S(p;v1;v0) S(p;v1;v0)
Table 1.2: Event-B assignments
and S(:::) is a predicate. The before-after predicate (BAP) denotes the relationship
holding between the state variables of the model just before (denoted by v) and just
after (denoted by v0) applying a substitution. The rst row in Tab. 1.2 corresponds to
a deterministic substitution while the other two are non-deterministic substitutions. In
the second row, the assignment is non-deterministic and based on the expression E(:::)
(for instance, assigning a value to v from a non-empty set). The third row assigns a
value to v according to the predicate dened and it is also considered non-deterministic.
Variables that do not appear on the left-hand side of an assignment of an action are not
changed (variables v1). The last row is the most general form of assignment and all the
other assignments can be expressed in this manner.
Concrete models are expressed through the renement of events. An abstract event
evt1 is rened by evt2 if the guard H(s;c;q;w) of evt2 is stronger (guard strengthening)Chapter 1 Introduction 23
than the guard G(s;c;p;v) of evt1 and the gluing invariant J(s;c;v;w) establishes a
simulation of evt2 (T(s;c;p;w;w0)) by evt1 (S(s;c;p;v;v0)):
evt1 b = ANY p WHERE G(s;c;p;v) THEN S(s;c;p;v;v0) END
evt2 b = ANY q WHERE H(s;c;q;w)
WITH p : W1(p;s;c;w;q)
v0 : W2(v0;s;c;w;q;w0)
THEN T(s;c;p;w;w0) END:
The gluing invariant must be preserved by all events: invariants are supposed to hold
whenever a variable value changes in an event (invariant preservation PO). Moreover
the guard strengthening PO is preserved as follows: when a concrete event is enabled,
then so it is the corresponding abstract one. Finally the simulation PO is proved if the
occurrence of the concrete event does not contradict what the corresponding abstract
event does. In addition, for event renements it must be shown that it is possible to
choose a value for the abstract parameter p such that G(s;c;p;v) holds and the gluing
invariant J(s;c;v;w) is re-established. Possible values of the abstract parameter p are
given as witness predicates W1(p;s;c;q;w) in concrete events [90, 87]. A witness is
necessary for each disappearing abstract parameter of an abstract event in the abstract
event. Moreover a witness W2(v0;s;c;w;q;w0) is needed for each disappearing abstract
variable v0 that has a non-deterministic assignment (see the third row of Table 1.2) [9].
New events can be introduced in a renement of an abstract machine. They must
rene the implicit abstract dummy event skip and it may be proved that they do not
collectively diverge by being always enabled and preventing abstract events to occur.
The divergence is avoided if each new event decreases a variant [14]. The variant must
be well-founded, may be an integer or a nite set and it is bounded. One variant per
event that must be decremented by that same event. To preserve renement, consistency
proof obligations are dened as described in Sect. 1.5.3.
1.5.3 Proof obligations
Proof obligations have a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, they show that a model
is sound with respect to some behavioural semantics. On the other hand, they serve
to verify properties of the model [88]. In Event-B, there are dierent kind of proof
obligations generated during a model development. A list of standard POs for contexts
and machines is dened in [9, 88, 87]. Here we only cover the relevant POs for our work.
In Event-B, renement is dened in terms of POs and these correspond to standard
forward simulation [10]. We shall use a generic model illustrated in Fig. 1.5 to describe
the POs. Backward simulation is currently not supported.
Context Ctx is characterised by constants c, carrier sets s and axioms A(s,c). This
context is seen by all the involved machines. The abstract machine M contains a set of24 Chapter 1 Introduction
CONTEXT Ctx
CONSTANTS c
SETS s
AXIOMS A(s;c)
(d) Context Ctx
MACHINE M SEES Ctx
VARIABLES v
INVARIANT I(s;c;v)
EVENT evt b =
ANY p WHERE
G(p;s;c;v)
THEN
v :j S(p;s;c;v;v0)
END
(e) Machine M
MACHINE N REFINES M
SEES Ctx
VARIABLES w
INVARIANT J(s;c;v;w)
VARIANT n(s;c;w)
EVENT evt1 REFINES evt b =
ANY q WHERE
H(q;s;c;w)
WITH
p : W1(p;s;c;w;q)
v0 : W2(v0;s;c;w;q;w0)
THEN
w :j T(q;s;c;w;w0)
END
convergent EVENT evt2 b =
ANY q WHERE
H2(q;s;c;w)
THEN
w :j T2(q;s;c;w;w0)
END
(f) Machine N
Figure 1.5: Context Ctx seen by machine M and respective renement N
variables v, a list of invariants and local theorems I(s,c,v) and an event evt dened by
the parameter p, guards G(p,s,c,v) and before-after predicates S(p;s;c;v;v0) [considered
in the non-deterministic form as dened in the third row of Table 1.2] over the set of
variables v. Machine N rening M, contains a set of variables w and a set of additional
(concrete) invariants and theorems J(s;c;v;w). Event evt1 renes abstract event evt
and a new convergent event evt2 is introduced in this renement. We assume that
variables v and w are pairwise disjoint and the same happens to parameters p and q. A
proof obligation is a sequent of the shape:
Hypotheses
` Goal
Hypotheses and goal are dened by predicates such as invariants, theorems, axioms
or guards. Based on the previous, we dene the standard proof obligations in Event-
B [9]. These proof obligations are divided into consistency POs and renement POs as
described below.
1.5.3.1 Consistency POs
Consistency POs are required to be always veried for each machine. Consistency is
expressed by the feasibility and invariant preservation POs for each event [88]. Moreover
well-denedness POs are generated for each potential ill-dened term (such as axioms,
theorems, invariants, variant, guards, actions).
Invariant Preservation (INV): This kind of proof obligation ensures that each in-
variant is preserved by each event. The hypotheses include axioms, invariants,Chapter 1 Introduction 25
local theorems, guards and before-after predicates of that event. The goal is each
individual invariant from the set of existing invariants. In Fig. 1.5(e), for event evt
and each of the invariants i(s;c;v) in I(s,c,v), the respective proof obligation rule
is given by (1.3).
evt/inv/INV:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
G(p;s;c;v)
S(p;s;c;v;v0)
` i(s;c;v0)
(1.3)
i(s;c;v0) is one of the invariants where variables v are modied to v0.
Feasibility (FIS): It ensures that each non-deterministic action is feasible for a partic-
ular event. The hypotheses include axioms, invariants, local theorems and guards
of that event. The goal ensures that values exist for variables v0 such that the
before-after predicate S(p;s;c;v;v0) is feasible. In Fig. 1.5(e), for event evt and
each of the actions act, this proof obligation is given by (1.4).
evt/act/FIS:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
G(p;s;c;v)
` 9v0S(p;s;c;v;v0)
(1.4)
Well-Denedness (WD) It ensures that any axiom (WD=AXM), theorem (WD=THM),
invariant(WD=INV ), guard(WD=GRD), action(WD=ACT), variant(WD=V WD)
or witness p in an event evt(evt=p=WWD) is indeed well-dened. It varies with
the potentially ill-dened expression as seen in Table 1.1. An important property
for WD proof obligations is that they are ordered. For example, the WD condi-
tions for an invariant depends only on the previous dened invariants: for the WD
of ik, which is the invariant k from the set of invariants I, the hypotheses that can
be assumed are i1 :::ik 1.
1.5.3.2 Renement POs
The renement POs are required when the an abstract machine is rened by a more
concrete one. Besides the consistency POs, renement POs are additional obligations
required to be discharged to ensure valid renements. As mentioned in Section 1.4,
in Event-B renement requires concrete events to keep the behaviour of the respective
abstract ones. Proof rule (1.5) expresses the renement PO for each concrete event.26 Chapter 1 Introduction
Renement (REF): For each concrete event, the renement PO reinforces that ab-
stract actions are simulated by the concrete ones, that each abstract guard is at
least as weak as the concrete one and that when an abstract variable is data rened
by a concrete one and disappears, gluing invariants exist linking the abstract and
concrete variables.
evt1/REF:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
J(s;c;v;w)
H(q;s;c;w)
T(q;s;c;w;w0)
` 9v0G(p;s;c;v) ^ S(p;s;c;v;v0) ^ J(s;c;v0;w0)
(1.5)
The use of witnesses (cf. Sect. 1.5.2) allows the separation of the previous proof rule
in three parts: proof rules Gluing Invariant Preservation (1.7), Guard Strengthen-
ing (1.8) and Simulation (1.9). In practice, when discharging POs, it is simpler to
deal with one part of the renement PO at a time instead of dealing with all at
once. We do not address the technical parts about the partition of the renement
POs but more details can be found in [10]. When non-deterministic witnesses are
used, a proof obligation is generated to ensure that the witness is feasible.
Non-Deterministic Witness (WFIS): It ensures that each witness proposed in the
concrete event indeed exists, in particular when the witness is a non-deterministic
predicate. Witness are used when an abstract parameter is rened and disappears
(being replaced by another parameter, a variable or an expression) or when an
abstract variable that is assigned non-determistically is rened and disappears.
In both cases, witnesses should related the rened element with a concrete repre-
sentation (parameter, variable, expression) and this proof obligation ensures that
the substitution is indeed feasible. The hypotheses include axioms, invariants and
theorems (abstract and concrete), concrete guards and before-after predicate for
witness. The goal is to conrm that the witness indeed exists. In Fig. 1.5(f), for
convergent event evt2 and witness p, this proof obligation is given by (1.6).
evt2/p/WFIS:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
J(s;c;v;w)
H2(q;s;c;w)
T(q;s;c;w;w0)
` 9pW1(p;s;c;w;q)
(1.6)
With the use of witnesses, the renement PO (1.5) can be split in three parts
(which in practice makes the POs easier to manage and discharge). These three
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Gluing Invariant Preservation (INV): In a renement, concrete invariants must
be preserved for each concrete event. The hypotheses include axioms, abstract
invariants and theorems plus concrete invariants and theorems, concrete guards,
witnesses predicates for variables and concrete before-after predicates. The goal is
each concrete invariant from the set of invariants in the renement. In Fig. 1.5(f),
for event evt1 and each of the invariants j(s;c;v;w) in J(s,c,v,w), the respective
proof obligation rule is given by (1.7).
evt/inv/INV:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
J(s;c;v;w)
H(q;s;c;w)
W2(v0;s;c;w;q;w0)
T(q;s;c;w;w0)
` j(s;c;v0;w0)
(1.7)
Guard Strengthening (GRD): It ensures that each abstract guard is at least as weak
as the concrete one in the rening event. As a consequence, when a concrete event
is enabled, the corresponding abstract one is also enabled. The hypotheses include
axioms, abstract invariants and theorems, concrete invariants and theorems, con-
crete guards and witness predicates for parameters. The goal is each individual
abstract guard from the set of abstract guards. In Fig. 1.5(f), for event evt1 and
each of the abstract guards g(p,s,c,v), this proof obligation is given by (1.8).
evt1/grd/GRD:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
J(s;c;v;w)
H(q;s;c;w)
W1(p;s;c;w;q)
` g(p;s;c;v)
(1.8)
Simulation (SIM): It ensures that each action in a concrete event simulates the corre-
sponding abstract action. When a concrete action is executed, the corresponding
abstract one should not be contradicted. The hypotheses include axioms, abstract
invariants and theorems, concrete invariants and theorems, concrete guards, wit-
ness predicates for rened parameters, witness predicate for rened abstract vari-
ables and the concrete before-after predicate for each concrete event. The goal
is each individual abstract before-after predicate from the set of abstract assign-
ments. In Fig. 1.5(f), for event evt1 and one of the respective actions act, this
proof obligation is given by (1.9).28 Chapter 1 Introduction
evt1/act/SIM:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
J(s;c;v;w)
H(q;s;c;w)
W1(p;s;c;w;q)
W2(v0;s;c;w;q;w0)
T(q;s;c;w;w0)
` S(p;s;c;v;v0)
(1.9)
When dealing with convergency and divergency, a variant is required to ensure
that new events are not enabled forever. Otherwise, that possibly would not allow
abstract events to occur resulting in the introduction of divergency to the model.
The solution for this situation is the addition of a variant as described below.
Numeric Variant (NAT): It ensures that under the guards of each convergent or
anticipated event, a proposed numeric variant is indeed a natural number. Also
applicable to niteness of set variants (FIN). The hypotheses include axioms, in-
variants and theorems (abstract and concrete) and guards for each convergent (or
anticipated) event. The goal is to prove that the numeric variant is a natural
number. In Fig. 1.5(f), for convergent event evt2, this proof obligation is given by
(1.10).
evt2/NAT:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
J(s;c;v;w)
H2(q;s;c;w)
` n(s;c;w) 2 N
(1.10)
Numeric Variant Decreasing (VAR): It ensures that convergent events decrease
the proposed numeric variant. Also applicable to niteness of set variants (FIN).
The hypotheses include axioms, invariants and theorems (abstract and concrete)
and guards for each convergent (or anticipated) event. The goal is to prove that
after the assignments the numeric variant decreases. In Fig. 1.5(f), for convergent
event evt2, this proof obligation is given by (1.11).
evt2/VAR:
A(s;c)
I(s;c;v)
J(s;c;v;w)
H2(q;s;c;w)
T(q;s;c;w;w0)
` n(s;c;w0) < n(s;c;w)
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1.5.3.3 Enabledness PO
All the previous proof obligations are supported by the Event-B tool (Rodin platform
described in Sect. 1.5.7). Nevertheless there is another proof obligation that is not
supported by Rodin but it can be important when modelling a system: enabledness.
Following the CSP notation for channels [153], we distinguish between parameters with
an input (represented in CSP as \!") or output (represented in CSP as \?") behaviour.
This distinction is important in particular for the generation of enabledness proof obli-
gations during renements. The enabledness proof obligation is given by [41] (described
in that work as the progress condition):
G ^ J ) H _ HN (1.12)
where G are the abstract guards, J are the gluing invariants, H are the concrete guards
of rened events and HN are the guards of the new events. The guards of the abstract
event imply the guards of the concrete event or any of the new events guards. If an event
is disabled in the concrete model, it should be disabled in the abstract model. Reducing
the nondeterminism of individual events may result in reducing internal nondeterminism.
The choice between a range of output values may be reduced during a renement because
the external choice is preserved. But the range of input values in a renement must be
preserved [41]. Using an example, let us consider event Add1 in machine M illustrated
by Fig. 1.6(a).
MACHINE M
VARIABLES s
INVARIANT s  N
EVENT Add1 b =
ANY p WHERE
p 2 0::9
THEN
s := s [ fpg
END
(a) Machine S and event Add1
EVENT Add2 b =
ANY pWHERE
p 2 0::5
THEN
s := s [ fpg
END
(b) Event Add2
EVENT Add3 b =
ANY pWHERE
p 2 ?
THEN
s := s [ fpg
END
(c) Event Add3
Figure 1.6: Machine M and events Add1, Add2 and Add3
If we consider that parameter p is an input parameter and that event Add2 renes Add1,
the enabledness PO resulting from (1.12) is given by:
p 2 0::9 ^ s  N ) p 2 0::5
The previous PO cannot be proved and therefore the enabledness is violated. The
concrete guard is strengthened and some abstract conditions (x 2 6::9) are not accepted
in the concrete event. If we consider p as an output parameter and again Add2 rening
Add1, the enabledness proof obligations is:
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which can be easily proved as there exists a value for p between 0..5 from the hypotheses
(p 2 0::9). But if we consider Add3 as a renement of Add2, the enabledness proof
obligation is:
p 2 0::5 ^ s  N ) (9pp 2 ?).
The enabledness is violated because we cannot prove this PO: there is no value of p that
satises the concrete guard.
1.5.4 Feasibility and Initialisation
Contexts contain the static part of an Event-B model. It may contain carrier sets,
constants, axioms and theorems. Carrier sets, that are user-dened types, only have a
built-in assumption that they are not empty. Other assumptions about it can be added
as axioms (e.g. carrier set s is nite: finite(s)).
An Event-B model is initialised by an event initialisation with no guards. This event
does not have guards because the initialisation must always be possible. Moreover the
expressions on the right-hand side of the initialisation actions cannot refer to any variable
of the model, since the model is being initialised [9]. Returning to the birthday book
example in Sect. 1.5, this action is a valid initialisation:
• birthday :j birthday0 = fp0 7! d0g
and this is an invalid initialisation:
• birthday :j birthday0 = birthday [ fp0 7! d0g, because the right-hand side of the
assignment refers to state birthday that have not been initialised yet.
The initialisation event cannot preserve the invariants because before that event, the
system state does not exist; the initialisation event must establish the invariant for
the rst time. Thus, the other events, that are only possible after initialisation has
taken place, can be enabled when the invariants hold. The invariant proof obligation
for this invariant establishment is almost identical to the proof obligation rule INV
(see Sect. 1.5.3) except that the invariants are not mentioned in the hypotheses of the
sequent as described by PO rule (1.13) [9]. The initialisation provides a witness for the
satisability of the invariants.
INITIALISATION/inv/INV:
A(s;c)
S(s;c;v0)
` i(s;c;v0)
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Note that axioms in contexts do not generate proof obligations. Consequently they
can introduce false assumptions and in that case, anything can be proved. To tackle
this issue, sanity tests such as checking if a predicate that is clearly false can be dis-
charged (e.g., (1 = 0)) can be used. If yes, a false predicate exists in the model and
the properties and assertions may not hold. Note that this situation is dierent from
introducing an invariant or a theorem that are clearly false: the corresponding PO for
that invariant/theorem should not be found provable.
Events have feasibility proof obligations for non-deterministic actions as seen in Sect. 1.5.3.
Moreover, the introduction of a guard that is always false results in that event being
always disabled. Currently proof obligations are only generated for safety properties.
Because the enabledness property is a liveness property, no proof obligation is generated
to verify that situation. Nevertheless ProB [141], that is a model checker for the Rodin
platform (see Sect. 1.5.7) allows the verication of enabledness considering small nite
sets.
1.5.5 Event-B and Action Systems
In Event-B a system is specied as an abstract machine consisting of some state vari-
ables and some events (guarded actions) acting on that state. This is essentially the
same structure as an action system which describes the behaviour of a parallel reactive
system in terms of the guarded actions that can take place during its execution. As
described in Sect. 1.3.3, an action in Action Systems is a predicate transformer that
maps postconditions to preconditions. Event-B events are similar but from a more spe-
cic view where guards correspond to preconditions and the occurrence of the event
lead to postconditions. We can compare both by dening the weakest preconditions (as
described in Sect. 1.3.3) for events and actions respectively. We write wpM(;Q) for
the weakest precondition guaranteeing that the event with label  2 A (A being the
nite set of labels of machine M) will establish postcondition Q. An event labelled 
from machine M has a canonical form in terms of a guard and a before-after predicate
as follows [9]:
event  b = WHEN G(v) THEN v :j BA(v;v0) END:
The weakest precondition of this canonical form is [48]:
wpM(;Q) b = G(v) ) (8v0BA(v;v0) ) Q[v0=v]): (1.14)
An action  from a basic action system P = (A;v;Pi;Pa), where  2 A has a canonical
form in terms of a guard and a before-after predicate as follows [26]:
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The weakest precondition of this canonical form is [128, 129]:
wp(G(v) ! BA(v;v0);Q) b = G(v) ) wp(BA(v;v0);Q[v0=v])
 G(v) ) 8vBA(v;v0) ) Q[v0=v]): (1.15)
The weakest precondition semantics (1.14) and (1.15) are equivalent. This occurs be-
cause Event-B can be seen as a realisation of the generic Action Systems formalism:
both are predicate transformers mapping preconditions to postconditions.
1.5.6 CSP Semantics for Event-B Machines
Morgan's CSP semantics for Action Systems [129] allows traces, failures and divergences
to be dened for action systems in terms of sequences of actions that can and cannot
engage in. Butler [53] extends that work to include unbounded nondeterminism and
denes the innite traces for Action Systems. Schneider et al [159] developed a CSP
viewpoint of Event-B renement for traces, divergences and innite traces (TDI). The
notion of traces here refers to a nite sequence of events from a machine's alphabet (e.g.
tr 2 M), where alphabet are the observations of possible occurrences of events of M.
The CSP semantics is also based on the weakest precondition semantics of events. The
syntax used is slightly dierent from Sect. 1.3.3. For example, a sequence of actions
hact1;act2i occurs in exactly those states satisfying wp(act1;act2;true). That could be
also expressed as [129, 159]:
:[act1;act2]false  wp(act1;act2;true):
Let S be a statement (of an event). Then [S]Q denotes the weakest precondition for
statement S to establish postcondition Q. Observe that for the case Q = true we have
[when G(v) then v : jBA(v;v0) end]true = true. The semantics of machine M can be
dened in terms of:
Traces The traces of a machine M are those sequences of events tr = ha1;:::;ani which
are possible for M (after initialisation init): those that do not establish false:
traces(M) = ftr j :[init;tr]falseg (1.16)
Divergences A sequence of events tr is a divergence if the sequence of events is not
guaranteed to terminate, i.e. :[init;tr]true. Thus
divergences(M) = ftr j :[init;tr]trueg (1.17)
Any Event-B machine M with events of the form given above in Sect. 1.5.2 is
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true for such events (and for init), and so [init;tr]true = true. Thus no potential
divergence tr meets the condition :[init;tr]true.
Innite Traces An innite sequence of events u = hu0;u1;:::i is an innite trace of M
if there is an innite sequence of predicates Pi such that :[init](:P0) (i.e. some
execution of init reaches a state where P0 holds), and Pi ) :[ui](:Pi+1) for each
i (i.e. if Pi holds then some execution of ui can reach a state where Pi+1 holds).
infinites(M) = fu j 9hPiii2N:[init](:P0) ^ 8iPi ) :[ui](:Pi+1) (1.18)
Moreover, the failures semantics of machine M can also be dened.
Failures A failure is a pair comprising a trace and a refusal; a refusal is a set of actions.
Let R be a refusal. The behaviour (tr;R) is observed whenever the process rst
engages in all the actions in tr and then may refuse any action in R. The failures
tr : A;R : A of the action system (A;init) are those for which
failures(M) = ftr j :[init;tr]gd(R)g (1.19)
is true initially, where A is a set of sequences with elements in A and gd(R) is the
disjunction of the guards of the actions in R. Thus R can be refused if init then
tr can reach a state in which no guard of any action in R is true [129].
Like some other formal notations, Event-B has tool support. The tool is called Rodin
and it is briey described below.
1.5.7 Rodin Platform
The Rodin platform [151] is the result of an EU research project1. It is a software tool,
based on modern software programming tools developed to use Event-B notation [49, 13].
DEPLOY2 is a continuation of this project and addresses scaling methodologies in re-
quirements validation, requirements evolution, reuse, resilience, and scaling tooling in
simulation, analysis and verication of formal models. Rodin was created to help the
development of specications based on the idea that a large complex or critical project
should be started by modelling and reasoning about the specication. Moreover, formal
reasoning is achieved through the generation of proof obligations. The (ambitious) pur-
pose is to give more options to the industry when using formal methods and decrease
the criticism that aects the formal methods [6]. Rodin strives to be a high usabil-
ity tool showing that modelling does not have to be cumbersome nor hard to achieve.
1RODIN - Rigorous Open Development Environment for Open Systems: EU IST Project IST-511599
2DEPLOY - Industrial deployment of system engineering methods providing high dependability and
productivity (2008 - 2011): FP VII Project 214158 under Strategic Objective IST-2007.1.2. Further
information and downloadable tools are available at http://www.deploy-project.eu/34 Chapter 1 Introduction
Besides formally validating the specications according to some user dened proper-
ties (invariants), the main idea is to increase the understanding of the system that is
being modelled. Therefore discharging the proof obligations correspond to the formal
validation that the created system matches the requirements [49].
Rodin is an open source tool, based on the Eclipse Platform [66] and a complement
for a rigorous modelling development [49]. The intention is to allow the tool to be
customised according to the industry requirements by permitting the integration of
functionalities considered necessary. Rodin supports a Static Checker that validates
model properties. A Proof Generator is used to generate proofs obligations and these
proofs can be discharged by an Automatic Prover (which is a theorem prover that
discharges automatically as many proofs as possible as seen in Fig. 1.7). Proofs that are
not automatically discharged have to be proved interactively. Another Rodin feature
is the high level of extensibility reected by, for instance, the ability to extend the
default theorem prover (B4free provers provided by ClearSy [21]), model checking (ProB
provided by University of D usserdorf [141]) or even animate models (Brama provided by
ClearSy [39] and ProB). Applying the UML framework using Event-B, it is also another
approach developed using plug-in technology, where the concept of object oriented and
classes are introduced and \merged" with Event-B notation [182, 170, 169, 171]. Figure
1.8 shows a screenshot of the user interface for Rodin Platform.
Figure 1.7: The Proof Obligation Perspective: on the left, it is shown the proof tree
of the selected PO; on the middle, on the top window are the hypotheses of the selected
PO and just below the respective goal. Below the goal window are the buttons used
to interactively discharge a PO; on the right, are the list of generated POs. Having all
the POs green, it means that all the POs are discharged.Chapter 1 Introduction 35
Figure 1.8: The Event-B Perspective: on the left, the list of projects where the last
one is expanded, showing several machines and a context; in the middle window, a view
of a machine cm1 where the sections of variables, invariants and events are expanded
and can be edited.
Next we cover the background of some of our contributions: composition and decompo-
sition.
1.6 Composition
Composition has several denitions depending on the context. In a computer science
context, (functional) composition can be dened as the act or mechanism of combining
simple functions to build more complicated ones. It derives from a usual mathematical
step of composing functions where the result of each function is passed as the argu-
ment of the next, and the result of the last one is the result of the whole. Engineering
suggests another perspective of composition: ability to interact with sub-components.
It is possible to represent concurrently-executing systems. In the formal methods con-
text, in particular specications, composition is the capacity to model the interaction
of sub-components generating larger and more concrete specications. Several formal
methods dene the interaction of specications based on shared state or shared events
(operations) [53]. Another possibility is a combination of the previous two approaches
(sometimes called fusion composition [25]). The next sub-sections describe these dier-
ent kind of interactions in dierent formal methodologies.36 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.6.1 Shared State Composition
Shared state composition allows the interaction of sub-components by state sharing.
Because variables usually dene the state of a system, this composition is also known
as shared variable. Back [23] using Action Systems applies the interaction of sub-
components through external variables sharing. In that work, local variables are kept
distinct and the global variables are shared among the processes in the parallel com-
position. Composing action systems P = (v;PAi;PA;) and Q = (w;QBi;QB) can be
represented as follows:
P k Q b = ((v;w);PAi [ QBi;PA [ QB)
The set of variables v and w are merged and the actions of both action systems (PAi and
QBi for the initialisation plus PA and QB) are executed in parallel. The actions of P k Q
are the union of both sets of actions and the interaction occurs when global variables
are shared. Furthermore, under certain conditions parallel composition is considered
monotonic w.r.t. data renement [24]. If P0 is a renement of P, then P0 k Q is a
renement of P k Q under a condition R (abstraction relation) as long as the interleaved
execution of actions from Q preserves R.
Abadi and Lamport in [1] propose a shared variable composition as a conjunction of
properties. Composition of systems means interaction within their environments and a
system behaves properly only if its environment does. A system guarantees the prop-
erties M and L only under the environment assumption E. This can be described as
E )M \ L, where M and L are the safety and liveness properties of the system respec-
tively.
There are some approaches for the development of composition using VDM [111, 77, 101].
One of the approaches is based on rely/guarantee conditions [104] where two state pred-
icates are added as pre and postconditions of a specication, allowing interference be-
tween systems. This extension of VDM developed by Jones [103] permits the specica-
tion and development of concurrent shared-variable systems [187]. In this approach, a
specication can then be described as:
(P;R;G;Q)
where P corresponds to the precondition and is a condition describing a set of states,
while R;G;Q are rely-condition, guarantee-condition and postcondition respectively.
The last three are conditions of state-transitions (predicates of two states: before and
after state). A rely-condition states the postcondition that the rest of the system may
achieve for any atomic step. Similarly, the guarantee-condition is the postcondition for
any atomic step made by the operation itself [187]. The guarantee condition of parallelChapter 1 Introduction 37
processes should imply the guarantee condition of the overall operation. [183] describes
further work for composition using VDM combining ideas in concurrent separation logic
and the rely/guarantee formalism. Assume-guarantee [81] is a similar style to rely-
guarantee.
The B-Method includes a syntax for composition. There are some keywords that can be
used to compose models like Includes, Imports, Sees and Uses. [158] describes the use
of such keywords and restrictions. When a machine has a number of included machines
(using the Includes keyword), several operations from dierent machines can be called
in parallel. Combining operations results in the conjunction of the preconditions and
the body of the parallel combination will be the parallel combination of all the bodies.
This can be expressed as follows:
PRE P1 THEN S1 END k PRE P2 THEN S2 END
= PRE P1 ^ P2 THEN S1 k S2 END
where P1;P2 are preconditions and S1;S2 are operation statements. The preconditions
are conjoined and the postconditions are called in parallel. Potet and Rouzaud [140] use
some of these keywords to prove the correctness of composed specications under certain
restrictions. Blazy et al [33] use classical B to dene specication patterns to be used
as reuse mechanisms. One of the reuse mechanisms is composition where two patterns
can be associated using the keyword Extends and proof obligations are generated when
necessary for each kind of composition: juxtaposition (patterns are composed without
dening any link between them), composition with inter-pattern links (relations between
variables of the composed patterns can be added) and unication (some variables of the
composed patterns can be merged and shared).
More recently, Abrial et al [124, 15] proposed a state-based decomposition for Event-B
where the splitting of a system in sub-components (machines) is achieved using vari-
ables. In this case, decomposition is considered the inverse operation of composition
and one can go from one to another and vice-versa. Figure 1.9 shows the decomposition
of machine M(Fig. 1.9(a)) into machines M1(Fig. 1.9(b)) and M2(Fig. 1.9(c)). In a
shared variable decomposition, just like the name suggests, variables can be shared as
a consequence of the events' decomposition. Therefore, the events evt1 and evt2 from
machine M are allocated to machine M1 and the rest of the events (evt3 and evt4) are
allocated to machine M2. Variable v2 (Fig. 1.9(a)) is shared by events evt2 and evt3
that belong to dierent sub-components after decomposition (Figs. 1.9(b) and 1.9(c)
respectively). Therefore v2 is considered a shared variable. In addition to the events
allocated to each sub-component, it is necessary to introduce additional external events
to each sub-component, to simulate how the shared variable is handled in the other sub-
component. An external event is created based on the original event but only referring
to shared variables. They have to be rened by the original events [15]. Other variables
become parameters in that same event. evt3 ext is added to machine M1 and evt2 ext38 Chapter 1 Introduction
is added to machine M2, respectively. Sub-components M1 and M2 can be rened
independently but shared variables must always be present and cannot be data-rened.
The re-composition of the (rened) sub-components should always be possible (although
not necessary) resulting in a renement of the original system [124].
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 1.9: Shared Variable Decomposition of Machine S in Machines T and W with
shared variable v2
While studying the several approaches for the composition of systems, we realised that
there is a strong similarity between the rely/guarantee approach proposed by Jones
and the shared variable decomposition for Event-B proposed by Abrial. The constraint
originated by the shared variables and external events corresponds to the rely condition
while the internal events correspond to the guarantee conditions as depicted in Fig. 1.10.
Figure 1.10: Shared Variable Decomposition Result
From M1 viewpoint (similar for M2), evt3 ext is the rely condition that modications
in the state in event evt3 are preserved in M1 and consequently evt2 is guaranteed to
behave as the original one. Thus it is possible to make a correlation between these two
approaches. Further study is required to use the developed worked on rely/guarantee
for VDM in the shared variable decomposition for Event-B and we intend to do it in the
future.Chapter 1 Introduction 39
1.6.2 Shared Event Composition
The shared event approach is suitable for the development of distributed systems [42]:
sub-components interact through synchronised events in parallel. Even for formal no-
tation where the models have an explicit state space, the communication occurs at
the event/operation level. CSP is an event-based methodology used for modelling dis-
tributed systems. Because of CSP's stateless approach, several works try to combine
state-based and event-based approaches, as are the examples of combining CSP and
B [43, 50, 181] or combining CSP with object oriented classes [75, 131]. The parallel
composition of two processes P and Q is expressed as P k Q. Events for process P are
represented by their alphabet P (similar to Q). The interaction happens by synchro-
nising common events in P \Q, while events not in P \Q can occur independently.
An example of a synchronisation between events is represented as follows [53]:
(a →P) k (a→Q) = a →(P k Q)
Events common to P and Q become single events in P k Q. In CSP there exists a special
class of events known as communication which is an event described by a pair c:v: c is
the name of the channel on which the communication occurs and v is the value of the
message to be communicated. A process ready to input (receives) any value x on the
channel c, and then behave like Q can be described as: c?x →Qx. Similarly a process
that outputs (sends) a value v on the channel c and then behaves like P can be dened
as: c!v →P [153]. Channels can be considered members of the alphabet of the process
and used for communication in only one direction and between two processes [92]. If
two processes P and Q are composed in parallel and both have a common channel
c, interaction happens whenever both processes are ready to engage in the common
channel. If P is ready for c!v and process Q is ready for c?x, v can be passed from P to
Q [41]:
(c!v →P) k (c?x →Qx) = c!v →(P k Qv)
As expected the result is an output channel and the process Q receives the value v. This
can also be applied for channels with input-input behaviour. The laws that govern the
behaviour of P k Q are simple and regular. Some of these laws are described below
although there are more properties dened in [92]:
• Commutativity: P k Q = Q k P, there is a logical symmetry between a process
and its environment.
• Associativity: (P k Q) k R = P k (Q k R), so when three processes are assembled,
it does not matter in which order they are put together.40 Chapter 1 Introduction
• Monotonicity: If P v P0 then P k Q v P0 k Q0, for any Q. Components that are
part of the parallel operation can be rened independently while preserving the
parallel relationship.
In Z, it is possible to create big schemas based on small ones. That can be seen as compo-
sition, where specications are reused, creating more complex systems. Since Z permits
the renement of specications, composition and renement can be applied at the same
time to a model. [173] describes how the combination of schemas can be achieved, as-
suming that overloading - possibility that two distinct variables in the same scope might
have identical names - is forbidden. The piping operator () is used to describe op-
erations that have almost independent eects on two disjoint sets of state variables. If
we compose the schemas Op1 and Op2 using the piping operator: Op1  Op2, the
output parameters of Op1 are matched with the inputs of Op2 and hidden, while the
other components are merged as they would be in Op1^Op2. Another approach for the
composition is through the use of views [34, 99]. A view is a partial specication of the
entire system and can be evaluated directly from the requirements. Partial means that
unnecessary details of the system's behaviour tackled by other views should be omit-
ted. An advantage of views is that they can be constructed and analysed independently
of other views. The interaction between views uses the schema calculus and standard
logic operators. Views can be connected by an invariant relating their state (state-based
approach), or connected by synchronising their operations (event-based approach) or
a mix of both. [34] discusses a similar approach using views, but the composition is
through coupling schemas (relation between dierent state spaces). By relating several
state schemas and respecting some properties, it is described how the composition can
be achieved based on three techniques: data renement, view composition and viewpoint
unication. Circus (that combines Z and CSP) programs are sequences of paragraphs:
channel declarations, channel set denitions, Z paragraphs, or process denitions. A
system is dened as a process that encapsulates some state and communicates through
channels. The generic channel declaration channel[T]c : T declares a family of channels
c and [T] determines the type of the values that are communicated through channel c.
An action can be a schema, a guarded command, an invocation of another action, or a
combination of these constructs using CSP operators. The CSP operators of sequence,
external and internal choice, parallelism, interleaving, their corresponding iterated op-
erators, and hiding can be used to compose actions [54, 155]. The prexing operator
is standard, but a guard construction may be associated with it. For instance, given
a Z predicate p , if the condition p is true , the action p & c?x ! A inputs a value
through channel c and assigns it to the variable x , and then behaves like A, which has
the variable x in scope. If, however, the condition p is false , the same action blocks.
Such enabling conditions like p may be associated with any action. The CSP operators
of sequence, external and internal choice, parallelism, interleaving, their corresponding
iterated operators, and hiding may also be used to compose actions.Chapter 1 Introduction 41
Butler [45] proposes a shared event composition for Event-B inspired by CSP and Action
Systems with event sharing as seen in Fig. 1.11. In this kind of composition, machines
with independent state spaces (variable sharing is not permitted) can be composed by
sharing events. Since it is based on CSP synchronisation, this composition also inher-
its the CSP properties for the channel communication described above. As aforemen-
                         
Figure 1.11: Shared Event Composition of machines M1 and M2 into M with com-
position of events e2 and e3
tioned in Sect. 1.5.5, Action Systems and Event-B are related. Based on that relation,
Butler [42, 45] dened the relation between the parallel composition of actions (includ-
ing composition with Value-Passing) in Action Systems and the B operations/Event-B
events. This denition is described by Denition 1.2 as described below. In Fig. 1.11,
machine M1 has events e1 and e2 and variable v1. Machine M2 has events e3, e4 and
e5 and variables v2 and v3. These two machines can be composed originating machine
M. In particular, events e2 and e3 can be composed. Moreover, in case both events
have a common parameter p, this can be used for message passing between machines
M1 and M2. The composition of synchronised Action Systems actions ( using Event-B
syntax for actions) generates a new action whose guard is the conjunction of the original
guards and the actions are executed in parallel [42]:
Denition 1.2. If both events evt1 and evt2 have a parameter p:
evt1 b = ANY p?;x WHERE p? 2 C ^ G(p?;x;m) THEN S(p?;x;m) END
evt2 b = ANY p!;y WHERE H(p!;y;n) THEN T(p!;y;n) END
then:
evt1 k evt2 b =
ANY p!;x;y WHERE p! 2 C ^ G(p!;x;m) ^ H(p!;y;n)
THEN S(p!;x;m) k T(p!;y;n) END42 Chapter 1 Introduction
where x;y;p are sets of parameters from each of the actions evt1 and evt2. Action evt1
has p? as an input parameter and evt2 has p! as an output parameter and the resulting
composition is p! itself an output parameter (like in CSP). This property can be used to
model value-passing systems: the parameter p! is written in evt2 and its value is used as
input for parameter p? to be used in G(p?;x;m) and S(p?;x;m). An interpretation of
this composition is that the value p is sent from evt2 and received in evt1. The fusion of
parameters in only possible if the types of the shared parameter match or are a subset
of each other:
p! 2 C ^ p? 2 D ) C \ D 6= ? (1.20)
where C and D are types (carrier sets). Actions with shared parameters of type input
can also be composed and the shared parameter has input behaviour. Actions with
shared parameters of type output cannot be composed since this could lead to a deadlock
state [42].
A relation between the innite-traces semantics of CSP and Action Systems is dened in
Denition 1.1. Based on that denition, the event-based parallel composition of action
systems can be shown to correspond to the CSP parallel-composition of processes as
described by Theorem 1.1 and proved in [53]: the innite-traces semantic of syntactic
parallel composition of actions is equal to the innite-traces semantic composition of
individual actions.
Theorem 1.1 (see [53, Theorem 5.17]). Let f[M]g represent the innite-traces semantics
of action system M ( similar for f[N]g and action system N). Then the innite-traces
semantics of CSP can be applied to Action Systems according to Denition 1.1: the
innite-traces semantics of action system M in parallel with N, M k N is given as 3:
f[M k N]g = f[M]g k f[N]g (1.21)
In order to give a CSP semantics to Event-B we simply treat an Event-B machine as
an action system. Doing this just requires treating an Event-B event as a predicate
transformer as shown previously in Section 1.5.5. Therefore with respect to innite-
traces semantics, the parallel composition of action systems corresponds to the parallel
composition of Event-B events. Moreover the properties of the parallel composition
of action systems are also inherited in the parallel composition of machines. The most
relevants are commutativity along with monotonicity: if M and N are Event-B machines
and M v M0 then M k N v M0 k N, for any N. Therefore machines M and N can
be rened independently while the properties of the parallel composition M k N are
still preserved. This is one of the most important and powerful properties that shared
event composition in Event-B inherits from Action Systems and CSP. The monotonicity
property for the shared event composition in Event-B is proved by means of proof
3This theorem is shown and proved in [53], theorem 5.17 on page 67.Chapter 1 Introduction 43
obligations in Sect. 2.3.4.
1.6.3 Fusion Composition
Fusion composition is another kind of composition which can be seen as a combination
of the previous two approaches. Back and Butler [25] extend the notion of a product
operator for renement calculus of Back [22]. The fusion operator is introduced as a
generalisation of the product operator preserving the monotonicity and conjunctivity
properties. The fusion operator can be used to conjoin two specications into a larger
specication that renes both specications within their combined termination condi-
tion. As a result the non-determinism is reduced on the termination behaviour of both
specications. Poppleton [138] follows the previous work by proposing a composition
using the fusion operator as a way to reuse existing models for Event-B. A proposal for
development of feature oriented specications [139, 70] uses the fusion operator. Con-
sider machines M1 and M2 in Fig. 1.12 which are fused by combining variables and
events, generating machine M. Machine M1 has a set of variables v (variables x are
assigned in the event e and variables y are kept unchanged), a context dened by carrier
sets s, constant c, axioms A1 and invariant I1. Similarly, machine M2 has variables z
(divided in a and b) and same context properties except the axioms A2 and invariant I2.
The union of the variables of each model corresponds to the set of variables of machine
M. The common events (we consider that events e and f are common) are composed
similarly to shared event composition described in Sect. 1.6.2.
Machine M1
v = x [ y =  variables  =
s;c;A1(s;c) =  context  =
I1(s;c;v) =  invariant  =
event : e b =
ANY p1 WHERE G1(p1;v)
THEN x := S1(p1;v) END
(a)
Machine M2
z = a [ b =  variables  =
s;c;A2(s;c) =  context  =
I2(s;c;z) =  invariant  =
event : f b =
ANY p2 WHERE G2(p2;z)
THEN a := S2(p1;z) END
(b)
Machine M
v;z = x [ y [ a [ b =  variables  =
s;c;A1(s;c) ^ A2(s;c) =  context  =
I1(s;c;v) ^ I2(s;c;z) =  invariant  =
event : e  f b =
ANY p1;p2 WHERE G1(p1;v) ^ G2(p2;z)
THEN x := S1(p1;v) k a := S2(p1;z) END
(c)
Figure 1.12: Fusion Composition of machines M1 and M2 into machine M
Event fusion preserves the renement properties of the model [138] and as a requirement,
shared variables should be rened in the same functional manner in both machines.
Decomposition, that can be seen as the inverse operation of composition, is briey
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1.7 Decomposition
The development of specications in a \top-down" style starts with an abstract model of
the envisaged system. Throughout renements the initial model becomes less abstract
and more concrete, closer to an implementation. As a consequence, there is a better view
of the system as a whole and design decisions can be taken. Nonetheless renements of
a system bring complexity and tractability problems when the model augments in a way
that becomes cumbersome to manage [124]. Decomposition is precisely the process by
which a single model can be split into various sub-components in a systematic fashion.
The complexity of the whole model is decreased by studying, and thus rening, each
sub-component independently of the others [124]. The independent sub-components
can be developed in parallel which is attractive in an industrial environment. As a
result of the attractive benets of decomposition, it is a topic of interest that has been
explored in several areas like mathematics, in dierent areas of engineering and also
in dierent formal methodologies. There is a strong relation between composition and
decomposition: they can be seen as the inverse operation of each other. Therefore the
related work is very often interleaved as we present below.
Abadi and Lamport [2] suggest a decomposition of concurrent systems (interleaving
and non-interleaving representation) in the style of \composition is conjunction" using
TLA [108]. The goal is to facilitate the decomposition of complete systems and respective
proofs by reasoning about the sub-components when the environment conditions are
safety properties.
Moore [127] suggests a decomposition of system requirements and respective proofs us-
ing the CSP Trace Model. The method emphasizes the decomposition of high-level
requirements and reasons about the safety of non-divergent processes. The only way a
process can communicate with another process executing concurrently is through CSP-
like communication channels; no shared variables are permitted. The method proceeds
iteratively, until the appropriate requirements for the component processes and the min-
imal set of synchronization requirements are found.
Jian [101] uses a combination of data reication and operation decomposition in VDM
(DD-VDM) to reason about data decomposition. Data decomposition is based on the
ideas of model splitting, modularisation and operation decomposition. The operations
in the sub-models are viewed as the operations working on the whole model and rules
are added in DD-VDM concerning the interaction of several sub-models. [102] is the
continuation of that work by developing parallel object-oriented programs in the VDM
framework.
Butler [40] suggests a decomposition approach for Action Systems with value-passing,
internal actions and parallel composition as described in Sect. 1.6.2. As a continuation
of that approach, Butler and Wald en [52] combine Action Systems and classical B toChapter 1 Introduction 45
derive parallel and distributed systems.
Two methods have been identied for the Event-B decomposition: shared variable
(Fig. 1.9) and shared event (Fig. 1.13). The shared event decomposition can be seen as
the inverse operation of the shared event composition described in Sect. 1.6.2. In this
case, the decomposition requires the denition of which variables are allocated to which
sub-component (in Fig. 1.13, v1 is allocated to machine M1 and variables v2;v3 are
allocated to machine M2). Event evt2 is shared since uses variables v1 and v2 allocated
to dierent sub-components. During the decomposition, evt2 is decomposed into evt20
(containing only guards and actions related to v1) and evt200 (containing only guards
and actions related to v2). We follow the shared event decomposition approach and in a
pragmatic way, we aim to study and specify a decomposition tool. Because shared-event
decomposition is monotonic [45], the generated sub-components can be further rened
independently. So M1 and M2 can be rened independently into M11, M12...and
M21, M22...respectively . Therefore we can introduce team development: several de-
velopers share parts of the same model and can work independently in parallel (we show
this option is our case study in Chapter 6). Besides alleviating problems when dealing
with complex specications, decomposition also partition the proof obligations which are
expected to be easier to be discharged in the sub-components. Next we discuss in more
detail the shared event decomposition before introducing our contribution in Chapter 4.
1.7.1 Shared Event Decomposition
In Event-B, decomposition of a component (specication) corresponds to distributing
events and variables among the sub-components. Shared event decomposition does not
permit variable sharing and an event can be split into dierent sub-components as seen
in Fig. 1.13. The sub-components can be further rened independently according to the
monotonicity property of decomposition [45].
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 1.13: Shared event decomposition of machine M into machines M1 and M2
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The decomposition can be seen as syntactic and semantic: syntactic because the sub-
components are a consequence of the syntactic partition of the component ; semantic in
the sense that the sub-components can lose some information (invariants that relate sub-
components) but the behaviour of the recomposed sub-components is the same as the
non-decomposed component (i.e. the recomposition is a valid renement of the abstract
component).
Figure 1.14 shows the decomposition of machines M1 into M3 0 and M4 0. M3 0 and
M4 0 are rened independently until M3 m and M4 n are reached. It should be possible
to recompose M3 m and M4 n into cM2 and proved that cM2 is a renement of M1.
This is equivalent to express the monotonicity property of decomposition as:
M1 v (M3 0 k M4 0) v (M3 m k M4 n)
The shared event parallel composition of M3 0 and M4 0 renes M1. Also the par-
allel composition of the individual renements of M3 0 and M4 0 (M3 m and M4 n
respectively) are a renement of the M1.
Figure 1.14: Decomposition, Recomposition and Renement
Consider machine M in Fig. 1.15(a) containing variables v, z and events evt1, evt2 and
evt3. Each event has a parameter pi, guards Gij and assignments to variables using
predicates Sij, where i and j are indexes corresponding to events elements. Machine M
is decomposed into machines M1 and M2 as seen in Fig. 1.15. Variable v is allocated to
machine M1 and variable z is allocated to machine M2 meaning that event evt1 (that
only depends on that variable) is part of M1 and event evt2 (only dependent on z) is
part of M2. Event evt3 uses both variables so the event is split in two parts: guardsChapter 1 Introduction 47
MACHINE M
VARIABLES v;z
EVENT evt1 b =
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v;p1)
THEN
v := S1(v;p1)
END
EVENT evt2 b =
ANY p2 WHERE
G2(z;p2)
THEN
z := S2(z;p2)
END
EVENT evt3 b =
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v;p3)
G32(z;p3)
THEN
v := S31(v;p3)
z := S32(z;p3)
END
(a) Machine M
MACHINE M1
VARIABLES v
EVENT evt1 b =
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v;p1)
THEN
v := S1(v;p1)
END
EVENT evt3 b =
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v;p3)
THEN
v := S31(v;p3)
END
(b) Machine M1
MACHINE M2
VARIABLES z
EVENT evt2 b =
ANY p2 WHERE
G2(z;p2)
THEN
z := Sz(z;p2)
END
EVENT evt3 b =
ANY p3 WHERE
G32(z;p3)
THEN
z := S32(z;p3)
END
(c) Machine M2
Figure 1.15: Machines M1 and M2 resulting from the shared event decomposition of
machine M
and actions related with variable v are decomposed into machine M1 and guards and
actions related to variable z are stored in machine M2.
Event evt3 from machine M has a parameter p3. During the decomposition p3 is shared
between the sub-events and allows the interaction between the sub-components M1 and
M2. This correspond to modelling value-passing systems as described in [40, 41] for
Action Systems or in [42] for B and in [45] for Event-B.
1.7.2 Shared Variable Decomposition
In Event-B, the shared variable decomposition allows variable sharing and external
events are introduced in the sub-components to ensure that the behaviour of the shared
variables is maintained in all sub-components. Such approach is suitable for designing
parallel algorithms [42] (an example can be found in [90]). The re-composition of the
(rened) sub-components should always be possible resulting in a renement of the orig-
inal system. Therefore what was described in Fig. 1.14 can also be applied to the shared
variable decomposition and it is proved in [8].
Consider again machine M in Fig. 1.16(a) containing variables v;z and events evt1,
evt2 and evt3. Machine M is shared variable decomposed into machines M1 and M2.
Event evt1 is allocated to machine M1 and events evt2, evt3 are allocated to machine
M2. Consequently variable v is shared. Event evt3 ext must be added to machine M1
to ensure that the behaviour of (shared) variable v in the machine M is preserved in
that sub-component. Similarly, in machine M2, event evt1 ext is added to simulate
the behaviour of v from the machine M2. Machines M1 and M2 can be further rened48 Chapter 1 Introduction
MACHINE M
VARIABLES v;z
EVENT evt1 b =
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v;p1)
THEN
v := S1(v;p1)
END
EVENT evt2 b =
ANY p2 WHERE
G2(z;p2)
THEN
z := S2(z;p2)
END
EVENT evt3 b =
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v;p3)
G32(z;p3)
THEN
v := S31(v;p3)
z := S32(z;p3)
END
(a) Machine M
MACHINE M1
VARIABLES v /*shared var*/
EVENT evt1 b =
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v;p)
THEN
v := S1(v;p)
END
EVENT evt3 ext b =
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v;p3)
THEN
v := S3(v;p3)
END
(b) Machine M1
MACHINE M2
VARIABLES z
v /*shared var*/
EVENT evt1 ext b =
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v;p1)
THEN
v := S1(v;p1)
EVENT evt2 b =
ANY p2 WHERE
G2(z;p2)
THEN
z := S2(z;p2)
END
EVENT evt3 b =
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v;p3)
G32(z;p3)
THEN
v := S31(v;p3)
z := S32(z;p3)
END
(c) Machine M2
Figure 1.16: Machines M1 and M2 resulting from the shared variable decomposition
of machine M
independently as long as the external events and shared variables are present. Moreover,
the shared variables and the external events cannot be rened.
The following chapters describe our work applied to three reuse mechanisms: composi-
tion, generic instantiation and decomposition. Each chapter contains a small case study
applying the respective mechanism. A more complex case study is presented in the end
to illustrate the use of the reuse mechanisms when developing models.Chapter 2
Shared Event Composition for
Event-B
The development of a system can start with the creation of a specication. Following
this viewpoint, we claim that often a specication can be constructed from the combi-
nation of specications. The combination of specications can be seen as composition.
Event-B is a formal method that allows modelling and renement of systems. The com-
bination, reuse and validation of component specications is not currently supported
in Event-B. We extend the Event-B formalism using shared event composition as an
option for developing distributed systems. Renement is used in the development of
specications using composed machines and we prove that properties and proof obliga-
tions of specications can be reused to ensure valid composed specications. The main
contribution of this work is the Event-B extension to support shared event composition
including the denition of static checks and proof obligations (POs) for a composed
machine. Composition and renement are coupled to gradually develop a model in a
stepwise manner. Moreover, composition is the preliminary work towards decomposition
(described in Chapter 4) as it denes a methodology for (de)composing specications.
We explore the composition of specications by dening properties and (reuse of) proof
obligations. These contributions are supported by a tool developed in the Rodin plat-
form (parallel composition plug-in [162]). This chapter is based on papers accepted for
the B workshop running in parallel with FM 2011 (International Symposium on Formal
Methods) [161] and in FMCO 2010 (International Symposia on Formal Methods for
Components and Objects) [164].
2.1 Introduction
In a \top-down" style, the initial model abstracts the most important behaviour and
state of the system. Systems can often be seen as a combination and interaction of sev-
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eral sub-specications (hereafter called sub-components) where each sub-component has
its own functionality aspect. This view introduces modularity in the system: dierent
sub-components represent a particular functionality and changes in the sub-components
are accommodated more gracefully [99] in the system specication. We use composition
to structure specications through the interaction of sub-components seen as indepen-
dent modules. This use of composition is not new in other formal notations: exam-
ples are [191, 106, 138] as described in Sect. 1.6. Here we express how we can (re)use
composition for building specications in Event-B through sub-components (modules)
interaction, beneting from their properties and proof obligations inspired by views in
Z [99]. The interesting part of composition involves the interaction of sub-components
which occurs by shared state, shared operations or a combination of both (for exam-
ple, fusion composition) as discussed in Chapter 1. Although sub-components usually
have states, in our approach we mainly focus on their (visible) operations similar to the
CSP view [129, 53]. Therefore we follow a shared event composition approach where
events/operations from dierent sub-components are synchronised in parallel. We con-
strain sub-components to have independent state spaces and consequently avoid dealing
with sub-components that have intersecting states like it happens in a shared state
approach [144, 145].
This chapter is structured as follows: Sect. 2.2 introduces the notion and properties for
shared event composition. The notion of composed machine, respective static checks,
proof obligations and the monotonicity property are introduced in Sect. 2.3. Section 2.4
illustrates the application of the shared event composition to a distributed system case
study: le transfer system. Related work is described in Sect. 2.5. Conclusions and
future work are drawn in Sect. 2.6.
2.2 Shared Event Approach
Sub-component specications, that are part of a full system specication, deal with a
particular aspect of the system being modelled. Sub-component interaction must be
veried to comply with the desired behavioural semantic of the system. The interaction
usually occurs as a shared state, shared event or a combination of both as described in
Sect. 1.6. The kind of interaction usually depends on the characteristics of the specied
system. For instance, when specifying an automated teller machine (ATM) system, user
and cashMachine can have separate specications. Both specications can dene vari-
ables to describe the used debit/credit cards for the transactions and the composition of
these two specications can interact through shared variables: the variables representing
the cards. On the other hand, a shared event composition allows sub-components to
interact through synchronised events. The specication user can have an event that
denes the personal identication number (PIN) of the card: user denes PIN. cashMa-
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additional sub-component serverBankValidation can have events dening when a bank
operation is enabled. One of these events can be validate user operation card. A shared
event composition of these specications results in a new event user change PIN that
allows the introduction of a new PIN for a particular card when the conditions dened
in validate user operation card are enabled. Such event could be specied by composing
events user dene PIN, change PIN card and validate user operation card.
Here we focus on the developments using shared event composition only, where com-
position is treated as the conjunction of individual elements' properties: conjunction
of individual invariants, union of variables and synchronisation of events. Events when
synchronised are composed as described in Def. 1.2. Machine properties are merged by
the conjunction of invariants as seen in Def. 2.1.
Denition 2.1. Let machines M1 ...Mm have variables v1 ...vm respectively. Then
if machines M1 ...Mm are composed in parallel, the invariant of the composed machine
M1 k ...k Mm is given as:
I(M1 k  k Mm) b = I1(s;c;v1) ^  ^ Im(s;c;vm): (2.1)
When sub-components are composed it is desirable to dene properties that relate the in-
dividual sub-components allowing interactions. These properties are expressed by adding
composition invariants ICM(s;c;v1;:::;vm) to the composed machine constraining the
variables of all machines being composed. Therefore a more complete version of the
conjunction of invariants is described in Def. 2.2.
Denition 2.2. The invariant of the parallel composition of machines M1 to Mm with
variables v1 to vm respectively is the conjunction of the individual invariants (Def. 2.1)
and the composition invariant ICM(s;c;v1;:::;vm):
I(M1 k  k Mm) b = I1(s;c;v1) ^  ^ Im(s;c;vm) ^ ICM(s;c;v1;:::;vm): (2.2)
In Fig. 1.11, composed machine M can have as invariant the conjunction of the individual
invariants as dened by Def. 2.2: I(M1 k M2) b = IM1(s;c;v1) ^ IM2(s;c;v2;v3) plus
possible composition invariant ICM(s;c;v1;v2;v3).
2.3 Composed Machines: Composition and Renement
We dene a new construct composed machine, representing the shared event composi-
tion of Event-B machines. We aim to have a construct that remains reactive to changes
in the sub-components in a way that has a minimal eect on the entire specication.
Consequently this representation of the composition is structural. The interaction of52 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
sub-components, following a \top-down" approach, can represent a renement of an
existing abstraction. In that case, to formalise the composition, it is necessary to de-
ne composition POs plus renement POs. In the following sections, we introduce the
structure of a composed machine, respective POs, prove the monotonicity property for
shared event composition and describe the required static checks.
2.3.1 Structure of Composed Machines
A shared event composed machine is expressed as the parallel conjunction of sub-
component properties. Composed machine CM dened by machines M1;:::;Mm can
be seen in Fig. 2.1. Machines are composed in parallel including their properties and
events: CM b = M1 k  k Mm. Moreover:
• The composed machine variables are all the sub-component variables (v1 from M1,
v2 from M2, ..., vm from Mm) and are state-space disjoint.
• The invariants of the composed machine are dened as Def. 2.2.
• The composed events are dened according to Def. 1.2.
COMPOSED MACHINE CM SEES Ctx
INCLUDES M1, ..., Mm
VARIABLES v1, ..., vm
INVARIANTS ICM(s;c;v1;v2;:::;vm)
EVENTS
INITIALISATION b = M1:INITIALISATION k :::Mm:INITIALISATION
evt11 b = M1:evt11 k :::Mm:evtm1
...
evt1p b = M1:evt1p k :::Mm:evtm1 evt1p
END
Figure 2.1: Composed machine CM composing machines M1 to Mm seeing context
Ctx
ICM(s;c;v1;v2;:::;vm) expresses the properties relating the states of sub-components.
When a composed machine is used as a combination of composition and renement, it
renes an abstract model and just like in an ordinary machine, abstract events must be
rened. For instance, a composed machine CM rening abstract machine M0 can be
expressed as (M0 v CM)  (M0 v M1 k  k Mm). The next section discusses static
checks that are required in order to implement a tool for composition.
2.3.2 Static Checks
For the implementation of a tool for composition (Sect. 5.2), composed machines need
to be validated against some well-formedness conditions. The shared event composition
relies on these denitions:Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B 53
• The state space of the composed machine is dened as the composition of the
sub-components' state space.
• The invariant of the composed machine is dened as the conjunction of the indi-
vidual invariants plus possible additional composition invariants.
• Sub-components can communicate via shared parameters during the parallel oc-
currence of events (composed events).
We distinguish between necessary technical conditions for the composition and method-
ological conditions (convenient and for simplicity). The technical conditions are as
follows:
• Sub-component variables cannot be shared.
• A composed event is dened by events of the dierent sub-components.
• The same event can be composed more than once. It corresponds to dierent
events' synchronisations.
The methodological conditions are:
• A composed machine is dened by at least one sub-component.
• Composed machines rening an abstraction do not introduce new events. For
simplicity we restrict the introduction of new events during the composition since
adding new events before or after the composition has a similar outcome to adding
them during the composition.
• Variants are not required for composed machines. Only new events require variants
and they are not allowed, as justied in the previous point.
• A composed event is dened by at least one event.
• When the composed machine renes an abstraction, the rules and renement POs
are applied similarly to standard machines.
These are the required conditions to build a valid composed machine. Next we present
the required POs to verify composed machines.
2.3.3 Proof Obligations
POs play an important role in Event-B developments. For simplicity we dene POs in
terms of a composition of two machines M1(v1) and M2(v2) that re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but the rules generalise easily to the composition of n machines. Furthermore context
elements in the formulas (s;c;A(s;c)) are not considered. The same proof obligations
dened for standard machines (invariant preservation, well-denedness, renement, etc)
are dened for composed machines. We simplify the composed machines POs by assum-
ing that the POs of the individual machines already hold. We just dene the additional
POs necessary to ensure that the composed machine satises all the standard POs.
Therefore we consider that the POs of the machines to be composed (M1 and M2)
hold. The same applies for the abstract machine M0. Following the POs described
in Sect. 1.5.3 for standard machines, the respective composition POs are described as
follows.
2.3.3.1 Consistency
Consistency POs are required to be always veried. Consistency is expressed by the
feasibility and invariant preservation POs for each composed event. In the composed
machine, feasibility PO FISCM corresponds to the feasibility of all events from the
individual machines that are composed. To show the feasibility proof obligation for a
composed event, we compose event evt1 from machine M1 and event evt2 from machine
M2: evt1 k evt2. The feasibility proof obligation for the composed event evt1 k evt2 is
FISevt1kevt2.
Theorem 2.1. Let FISevt1 and FISevt2 be the feasibility proof obligations for two dif-
ferent events evt1 and evt2 operating on disjoint variables v1 and v2 respectively. Then
FISevt1kevt2 holds if both FISevt1 and FISevt2 also hold.
From (1.4):
FISevt1 : FISevt1H ` FISevt1G  I1(v1) ^ G1(p1;v1) ` 9v0
1(S1(p1;v1;v0
1)) (2.3)
FISevt2 : FISevt2H ` FISevt2G  I2(v2) ^ G2(p2;v2) ` 9v0
2(S2(p2;v2;v0
2)) (2.4)
FISevt1kevt2 : FISevt1kevt2H ` FISevt1kevt2G  (2.5)
ICM(v1;v2) ^ I1(v1) ^ I2(v2)
^ G1(p1;v1) ^ G2(p2;v2)
` 9v0
1;v0
2(S1(p1;v1;v0
1) ^ S2(p2;v2;v0
2)):
Assume: FISevt1 and FISevt2.
Prove: FISevt1kevt2.
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of FISevt1kevt2 (FISevt1kevt2H):
ICM(v1;v2)
I1(v1) ^ G1(p1;v1) (2.6)
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Prove:
9v0
1;v0
2(S1(p1;v1;v0
1) ^ S2(p2;v2;v0
2)):
The proof proceeds as follows:
9v0
1;v0
2(S1(p1;v1;v0
1) ^ S2(p2;v2;v0
2))
 9v0
1(S1(p1;v1;v0
1))
^ 9v0
2(S2(p2;v2;v0
2)) fdisjoint v1 and v2g
( (FISevt1G ^ FISevt2G): f(2.3)+(2.6),(2.4)+(2.7)g
Another consistency PO is invariant preservation. In the composed machine, invariant
preservation PO INVCM corresponds to the invariant preservation in all events from
the individual machines that are composed. The invariant preservation proof obligation
for the composed event evt1 k evt2 is INVevt1kevt2. Note that i(v0) denotes the result of
the substitution of variable v by the corresponding before-after predicate v0 in invariant
i.
Theorem 2.2. Let INVevt1 and INVevt2 be the invariant preservation proof obligations
for two dierent events evt1 and evt2. Then for each individual predicate i1, i2 and iCM
from the set of invariants I in a composed machine, INVevt1kevt2 holds if both INVevt1
and INVevt2 also hold plus the composition invariant ICM(v1;v2) holds.
From (1.3):
INVevt1 : INVevt1H ` INVevt1G  I1(v1) ^ G1(p1;v1) ^ S1(p1;v1;v0
1) ` i1(v0
1) (2.8)
INVevt2 : INVevt2H ` INVevt2G  I2(v2) ^ G2(p2;v2) ^ S2(p2;v2;v0
2) ` i2(v0
2) (2.9)
INVevt1kevt2 : INVevt1kevt2H ` INVevt1kevt2G  (2.10)
ICM(v1;v2) ^ I1(v1) ^ I2(v2)
^ G1(p1;v1) ^ G2(p2;v2)
^ S1(p1;v1;v0
1) ^ S2(p2;v2;v0
2)
` i1(v0
1) ^ i2(v0
2) ^ iCM(v0
1;v0
2):
Assume: INVevt1 and INVevt2.
Prove: INVevt1kevt2.
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of INVevt1kevt2:
ICM(v1;v2)
I1(v1) ^ G1(p1;v1) ^ S1(p1;v1;v0
1) (2.11)
I2(v2) ^ G2(p2;v2) ^ S2(p2;v2;v0
2) (2.12)
Prove:
i1(v0
1) ^ i2(v0
2) ^ iCM(v0
1;v0
2):56 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
The proof proceeds as follows:
i1(v0
1) ^ i2(v0
2) ^ iCM(v0
1;v0
2)
( INVevt1G
^ INVevt2G
^ iCM(v0
1;v0
2): f(2.8)+(2.11),(2.9)+(2.12)g
In other words, composition invariants ICM(v1;v2) need to be veried but the invariant
POs of the individual machines hold without having to be re-veried.
Well-denedness POs are also applicable to the composed machines. Nevertheless in
practice, well-denedness POs are only generated for ICM(v1;v2). Other expressions
(guards, actions, etc) are veried in the individual machines [10].
2.3.3.2 Renement
The renement POs are only required when the composed machine renes an abstract
machine. Machine M0 with variables v0, invariant I0(v0) and abstract event evt0 is
rened by composed machine CM dened by abstract machines M1 with variables
w1, invariant I1(w1), event evt1, M2 (w2 ; I2(w2); evt2) and composition invariant
JCM(v0;w1;w2). The composed event evt1 k evt2 renes the abstract event evt0. The
renement PO for a composed machine REFCM results from the verication of the com-
position invariant preservation JCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2), the verication of guard strengthening
for G0(p0;v0) and simulation S0(p0;v0;v0
0) for each rened event.
Theorem 2.3. Let composed event evt1 k evt2 rene abstract event evt0. Then the
renement REF PO for evt1 k evt2 consists in proving the guard strengthening of
abstract guards, proving the simulation of the abstract variables (v0
0) and preserving the
gluing invariant (JCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2)) in the composed machine.
From (1.5):
INVevt1 : I1(w1) ^ H1(q1;w1) ^ T1(q1;w1;w0
1) ` i1(w0
1) (2.13)
INVevt2 : I2(w2) ^ H2(q2;w2) ^ T2(q2;w2;w0
2) ` i2(w0
2) (2.14)
REFevt0v(evt1kevt2) : I0(v0) ^ I1(w1) ^ I2(w2) ^ JCM(v0;w1;w2)
^ H1(q1;w1) ^ H2(q2;w2)
^ T1(q1;w1;w0
1) ^ T2(q2;w2;w0
2)
` 9v0
0G0(p0;v0) ^ S0(p0;v0;v0
0) ^ i1(w0
1) ^ i2(w0
2) ^ JCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2):
(2.15)
Assume: INVevt1 (2.13) and INVevt2 (2.14).
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Proof. Assume the hypotheses of REFevt0v(evt1kevt2):
I0(v0) ^ JCM(v0;w1;w2)
I1(w1) ^ H1(q1;w1) ^ T1(q1;w1;w0
1)
I2(w2) ^ H2(q2;w2) ^ T2(q2;w2;w0
2)
Prove:
` 9v0
0G0(p0;v0) ^ S0(p0;v0;v0
0) ^ I1(w0
1) ^ I2(w0
2) ^ JCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2):
The proof proceeds as follows:
9v0
0G0(p0;v0) ^ S0(p0;v0;v0
0)
^ I1(w0
1) ^ I2(w0
2) ^ JCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2)
 G0(p0;v0) ^ I1(w0
1) ^ I2(w0
2)
^ 9v0
0(S0(p0;v0;v0
0) ^ JCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2)) f^ goal; v0;w0
1;w0
2 are free variablesg
( G0(p0;v0)
^ 9v0
0(S0(p0;v0;v0
0) ^ JCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2)) ffrom (2.13) and (2.14)g
As mentioned in Sect. 1.5.3, the renement POs can be slit into separated POs using wit-
nesses: guard strengthening, simulation and gluing invariant preservation. We separate
the above renement proof into these three kind of proof obligations.
Guard Strengthening For each composed event evt1 k evt2, the guard strengthening
PO GRDCM refers to the relation between the conjunction of the guards of the composed
event H1(q1;w1) ^ H2(q2;w2) and the guard of the abstract event evt0: G0(p0;v0).
For each abstract guard g0 from the set of guards G0 in an abstract machine, the GRD
PO for each event requires verication that the concrete guards H1(q1;w1)^H2(q2;w2)
are stronger than the abstract ones G0(p0;v0).
From (1.8), the proof rule to be veried is:
GRDevt0v(evt1kevt2) : I0(v0) ^ I1(w1) ^ I2(w2) ^ JCM(v0;w1;w2)
^ H1(q1;w1) ^ H2(q2;w2)
^ W1(p0;w1;w2;q1;q2)
` g0(p0;v0):
Gluing Invariant Preservation For composed events, the gluing invariant preserva-
tion PO INVCM requires that all the gluing invariants are preserved for each composed
event (similar to the invariant preservation described in Sect. 2.3.3.1).58 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
Theorem 2.4. Let the invariant in the composed machine be I1(w1)^I2(w2)^JCM(v0;w1;w2).
Then for each composed event evt1 k evt2, only each predicate from the set of gluing
invariants JCM(v0;w1;w2) needs to be veried if INVevt1 and INVevt2 hold.
From (1.7):
INVevt1kevt2 : I0(v0) ^ I1(w1) ^ I2(w2) ^ JCM(v0;w1;w2)
^ H1(q1;w1) ^ H2(q2;w2)
^ W2(v0
0;w1;w2;q1;q2;w0
1;w0
2)
^ T1(q1;w1;w0
1) ^ T2(q2;w2;w0
2)
` i1(w0
1) ^ i2(w0
2) ^ jCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2): (2.16)
Assume: INVevt1 (2.13) and INVevt2 (2.14).
Prove: INVevt1kevt2.
The proof proceeds as follows:
i1(w0
1) ^ i2(w0
2) ^ jCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2)
 jCM(v0
0;w0
1;w0
2)) ffrom (2.13) and (2.14)g
Simulation To verify the simulation PO SIMCM, each action executed in a composed
event evt1 k evt2 must not contradict the corresponding actions in the abstract event
evt0.
For a concrete composed event evt1 k evt2 rening event evt0, the simulation PO re-
quires that each concrete action T1(q1;w1;w0
1) ^ T2(q2;w2;w0
2) simulates the abstract
ones S0(p0;v0;v0
0).
From (1.9), the proof rule that needs to be veried is:
SIMevt0v(evt1kevt2) : I0(v0) ^ I1(w1) ^ I2(w2) ^ JCM(v0;w1;w2)
^ H1(q1;w1) ^ H2(q2;w2)
^ W1(p0;w1;w2;q1;q2;w0
1;w0
2)
^ W2(v0
0;w1;w2;q1;q2;w0
1;w0
2)
^ T1(q1;w1;w0
1) ^ T2(q2;w2;w0
2)
` S0(p0;v0;v0
0):
These are the required POs to verify composed machines. Next we show that composed machines
are monotonic which allows further renements of sub-components while preserving renement
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2.3.4 Monotonicity of Shared Event Composition for Composed Ma-
chines
An important property of the shared event composition in Event-B is monotonicity. Here we
prove by means of renement POs that the composition is monotonic conrming the result
described by Butler [53] using actions systems and CSP. Figure 2.2 shows abstract specication
M1 composed with other specication N1, creating a composed model M1 k N1. M1 is rened
by M2 and N1 by N2 respectively:
• M1 is characterised by variables vM, invariants IM(vM) and event evtM1.
• M2 is characterised by variables wM, gluing invariants JM(vM;wM) and event evtM2.
• N1 is characterised by variables vN, invariants IN(vN) and event evtN1.
• N2 is characterised by variables wN, gluing invariants JN(vN;wN) and event evtN2.
Monotonicity allows us to say that CM1 is rened by CM2. In other words, once we compose
specications M1 and N1, discharge the required composed POs, M1 and N1 can be rened
individually while the composition properties are preserved without the need to recompose re-
nements M2 and N2. We want to formally prove the monotonicity property through renement
Figure 2.2: Renement of composed machine CM1 b = M1 k N1 by CM2 b = M2 k N2
POs between composed machines (in Fig. 2.2 between CM1 and CM2). Therefore if the rene-
ment POs hold between CM1 and CM2, we can say that CM2 renes CM1: CM1 v CM2.
An event evtM1 in machine M1 is represented as:
evtM1 b =ANY pM WHERE GM(pM;vM)THEN SM(pM;vM;v0
M) END:
An event evtM2 in machine M2 rening abstract event evtM1 is represented as:
evtM2 b =ANY qM WHERE HM(qM;wM)THEN TM(qM;wM;w0
M) END:
The gluing invariant of the renement between M1 and M2 is expressed as JM(vM;wM)
relating the states of M1 and M2: M1 vJM M2. From (1.5) we can derive the re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PO between M2 and M1 for the concrete event evtM2 rening abstract event evtM1.
REFevtM1vevtM2 : REFevtM1vevtM2H ` REFevtM1vevtM2G
 IM(vM) ^ JM(vM;wM)
^ GM(pM;vM) ^ HM(qM;wM)
^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ TM(qM;wM;w0
M)
` 9v0
MGM(pM;vM) ^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ JM(v0
M;w0
M): (2.17)
Similarly for machines N1 and N2, the gluing invariant is expressed as JN(vN;wN)
relating the states of N1 and N2: N1 vJN N2. Furthermore, the renement PO for
concrete event evtN2 rening abstract event evtN1 is expressed as:
REFevtN1vevtN2 : REFevtN1vevtN2H ` REFevtN1vevtN2G
 IN(vN) ^ JN(vN;wN)
^ GN(pN;vN) ^ HN(qN;wN)
^ SN(pN;vN;v0
N) ^ TN(qN;wN;w0
N)
` 9v0
NGN(pN;vN) ^ SN(pN;vN;v0
N) ^ JN(v0
N;w0
N): (2.18)
We rene an abstract event in CM1 by a concrete one in CM2 and verify that the
renement POs for each individual machine hold for the composition. Event evtM1
from machine M1 and event evtN1 from machine N1 are composed, resulting in the
abstract composed event evtM1 k evtN1 in CM1 from Fig. 2.2. Such abstract composed
event is represented as:
evtM1 k evtN1 b =ANY pM;pN WHERE GM(pM;vM) ^ GN(pN;vN)
THEN SM(pM;vM;v0
M) k SN(pN;vN;v0
N) END:
A concrete composed event between M2 and N2 in CM2 (evtM2 k evtN2), rening the
abstract event evtM1 k evtN1, is represented as:
evtM2 k evtN2 b =ANY qM;qN WHERE HM(qM;wM) ^ HN(qN;wN)
THEN TM(qM;wM;w0
M) k TN(qN;wN;w0
N) END:
The gluing invariant relating the states of CM1 and CM2 is expressed as the conjunction
of the gluing invariants between M1/M2 and N1/N2:
JCM(vM;vN;wM;wN) = JM(vM;wM) ^ JN(vN;wN) (2.19)
Theorem 2.5. Let composed machine CM1 be dened by machines M1 and N1 and
composed event evtM1 k evtN1. Then composed machine CM2 is a valid renement of
CM1 if the renement proof obligations between machines M2 and N2 and machines
M1 and N1 hold respectively for each concrete composed event evtM2 k evtN2 that
renes abstract composed event evtM1 k evtN1.
From (2.15), the re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abstract composed event evtM1 k evtN1 is:
REF(evtM1kevtN1)v(evtM2kevtN2) : IM(vM) ^ IN(vN) ^ JCM(vM;vN;wM;wN)
^ HM(qM;wM) ^ HN(qN;wN)
^ TM(qM;wM;w0
M) ^ TN(qN;wN;w0
N)
` 9v0
M;v0
NGM(pM;vM) ^ GN(pN;vN)
^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ SN(pN;vN;v0
N) ^ JCM(v0
M;v0
N;w0
M;w0
N):
Assume: REFevtM1vevtM2 and REFevtN1vevtN2.
Prove: REF(evtM1kevtN1)v(evtM2kevtN2).
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of REF(evtM1kevtN1)v(evtM2kevtN2):
JCM(vM;vN;wM;wN)  JM(vM;wM) ^ JN(vN;wN) fexpanding JCM from (2.19)g
IM(vM) ^ HM(qM;wM) ^ TM(qM;wM;w0
M) (2.20)
IN(vN) ^ HN(qN;wN) ^ TN(qN;wN;w0
N) (2.21)
Prove:
9v0
M;v0
NGM(pM;vM) ^ GN(pN;vN) ^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ SN(pN;vN;v0
N)
^ JCM(v0
M;v0
N;w0
M;w0
N):
The proof proceeds as follows:
9v0
M;v0
NGM(pM;vM) ^ GN(pN;vN)
^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ SN(pN;vN;v0
N)
^ JCM(v0
M;v0
N;w0
M;w0
N)
 9v0
M;v0
NGM(pM;vM) ^ GN(pN;vN)
^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ SN(pN;vN;v0
N)
^ JM(v0
M;w0
M) ^ JN(v0
N;w0
N) fexpanding JCM from (2.19)g
 9v0
MGM(pM;vM) ^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ JM(v0
M;w0
M)
^ 9v0
NGN(pN;vN) ^ SN(pN;vN;v0
N) ^ JN(v0
N;w0
N) fdisjoint v0
M,v0
Ng
( REFevtM1vevtM2G
^ REFevtN1vevtN2G f(2.17)+(2.20),(2.18)+(2.21)g
The renement POs for composed machines is expressed as the conjunction of the re-
nement POs for the individual machines. Therefore the monotonicity property holds
if the renement POs of individual machines hold.62 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
2.3.4.1 Monotonicity of Non-Composed Events for Composed Machines
We also need to prove the monotonicity for non-composed events that appear at both
levels of abstraction. We shall prove it using machines M1 and CM2 as seen in Fig. 2.3
(similar for N1 and CM2).
Figure 2.3: Renement of composed machine CM1 b = M1 by CM2 b = M2 k N2
Theorem 2.6. Let an event evtM1 in machine M1 be rened by a composed event evtM2 k
evtN2 in composed machine CM2. Assuming that machine M1 is rened by machine
M2 and INVevtN2 holds, then the monotonicity is preserved and event M1 is rened by
the composed event M2 k N2.
Assume: REFevtM1vevtM2 and INVevtN2.
Prove: REFevtM1v(evtM2kevtN2).
In this case, the gluing invariant described in (2.19) does not use neither the variables
(vN) neither the invariants (IN). Therefore it can be simplied and rewritten as:
JCM(vM;wM;wN) = JM(vM;wM) ^ JN(wN) (2.22)
From (2.15), the renement PO between concrete composed event evtM2 k evtN2 and
abstract event evtM1:
REFevtM1v(evtM2kevtN2) : IM(vM) ^ JCM(vM;wM;wN)
^ HM(qM;wM) ^ HN(qN;wN)
^ TM(qM;wM;w0
M) ^ TN(qN;wN;w0
N)
` 9v0
MGM(pM;vM) ^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ JCM(v0
M;w0
M;w0
N):
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of REFevtM1v(evtM2kevtN2):
JCM(vM;wM;wN)  JM(vM;wM) ^ JN(wN) fexpanding JCM from (2.22)g:
IM(vM) ^ HM(qM;wM) ^ TM(qM;wM;w0
M)
HN(qN;wN) ^ TN(qN;wN;w0
N)Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B 63
And assume INVevtN2:
INVevtN2 : INVevtN2H ` INVevtN2G
 JN(wN) ^ HN(qN;wN) ^ TN(qN;wN;w0
N)
` jN(w0
N): (2.23)
The proof proceeds as follows:
9v0
MGM(pM;vM) ^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ JCM(v0
M;w0
M;w0
N)
 9v0
MGM(pM;vM) ^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M)
^ JM(v0
M;w0
M) ^ JN(w0
N) fexpanding JCM from (2.22)g
( REFevt M1vevt M2G
^ JN(w0
N) f (2.17)g
( REFevt M1vevt M2G
^ INVevt N2G f (2.23)g
2.3.4.2 New Events
New events must rene event skip and their state space include only new variables
w; abstract variables v do not change state. Nevertheless new composed events must
respect the renement POs.
Theorem 2.7. Let evtM2 be a new (composed) event in CM2 rening skip. If we assume
that the invariant proof obligation for event evtM2 holds, then the monotonicity property
is preserved (i.e. REFskipvevtM2 holds).
From (2.15), the renement PO for new event evtM2 is necessary to be veried to ensure
that monotonicity is preserved. It can be expressed as:
REFskipvevtM2 : REFskipvevtM2H ` REFskipvevtM2G
 IM(vM) ^ JCM(vM;wM;wN)
^ HM(qM;wM) ^ TM(qM;wM;w0
M)
` 9v0
MGM(pM;vM) ^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ JCM(v0
M;w0
M;w0
N):
And assume INVevtM2:
INVevtM2 : INVevtM2H ` INVevtM2G
 JM(vM;wM) ^ HM(qM;wM) ^ TM(qM;wM;w0
M)
` jM(vM;w0
M): (2.24)
Moreover, since evtM2 is a new event rening skip (event with guard always TRUE and64 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
without actions), then:
JCM(vM;wM;wN) = JM(vM;wM) (2.25)
GM(pM;vM) = TRUE (2.26)
SM(pM;vM;v0
M) = ?: (2.27)
Assume: INVevtM2
Prove: REFskipvevtM2.
The proof proceeds as follows:
Proof.
9v0
MGM(pM;vM) ^ SM(pM;vM;v0
M) ^ JCM(v0
M;w0
M;w0
N)
 9v0
MJCM(v0
M;w0
M;w0
N) f(2.26) and (2.27)g
 9v0
MJM(v0
M;w0
M) f (2.25)g
( INVevt M2G f (2.24)g
Next section presents the application of the shared event composition to a more complex
case study whose architecture is a distributed system: le transfer system.
2.4 File Access Management case study
A distributed system is presented where two component specications are composed in
the style dened in Fig. 1.11. A specication of a le management system is developed:
les containing DATA can be created, read, overwritten, deleted and sent to other users.
Another separated specication deals with the access management of les in which each
le has an owner. The owners are users with clearance level from 1 to 10 where 10 is
the highest level. A super user exists with clearance level 10. Moreover, les have a
classication level varying from 1 to 10. Permission is needed in order to read, modify
or delete a le. When the permission is granted, the requested action can take place.
The rst specication is dened as machine FileManagement M0 and variables user,
le, leData and leStatus (denes the status of a le operation and can have the states
SUCCESS or FAILED) as depicted in Fig. 2.4. After a le is created or sent, variable
leStatus is updated accordingly to the result of the operation. In order to allow a new
operation in the same le, the state of that le must be reset in event clearFileStatus. The
le operations are dened by events createFile, readFile, overwriteFile, deleteFile,
sendFile and clearFileStatus as seen in Fig. 2.4. The access management specica-Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B 65
FileManagement
machine FileManagement_M0
sees FileManagement_C0 User_C0
variables user ﬁle ﬁleData ﬁleStatus
invariants
  @inv1 ﬁle   FILE
  @inv2 user   USER
  @inv3 ﬁleData   ﬁle   DATA
  @inv4 ﬁleStatus   ﬁle   STATUS
  @inv5 ran(ﬁleStatus)   {SUCCESS, FAILED}
events
  event INITIALISATION
    then
      @act1 user   {super}
      @act2 ﬁle    
      @act3 ﬁleData    
      @act4 ﬁleStatus    
  end
  event addUser
    any uu
        masterUser // user that creates uu
    where
      @grd1 uu   user
      @grd2 masterUser   user
    then
      @act1 user   user   {uu}
  end
  event createFile
    any   // ﬁle to be added
        dd // content DATA of the ﬁle
        fStatus
        u // ﬁle owner
    where
      @grd1     FILE ﬁle
      @grd2 dd   DATA
      @grd3 fStatus    {SUCCESS}
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  event createFile
    any   // ﬁle to be added
        dd // content DATA of the ﬁle
        fStatus
        u // ﬁle owner
    where
      @grd1     FILE ﬁle
      @grd2 dd   DATA
      @grd3 fStatus    {SUCCESS}
      @grd4 u   user
    then
      @act1 ﬁle ﬁle   { }
      @act2 ﬁleData( ) dd
      @act3 ﬁleStatus( )   fStatus
  end
  event readFile
    any   // ﬁle to be read
        dd // data of the ﬁle
        u // user that reads the ﬁle
    where
      @grd1     ﬁle
      @grd2 dd = ﬁleData( )
      @grd3 u   user
  end
  event overwriteFile
    any   dd
    where
      @grd1     ﬁle
      @grd2 dd   DATA
      @grd3 dd   ﬁleData( )
    then
      @act1 ﬁleData( ) dd
  end
  event deleteFile
    any   // ﬁle to be deleted
        u // user that will execute the action
    where
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  event deleteFile
    any   // ﬁle to be deleted
        u // user executes the action
    where
      @grd1     ﬁle
      @grd2 u   user
    then
      @act1 ﬁle ﬁle { }
      @act2 ﬁleData { } ﬁleData
      @act3 ﬁleStatus { } ﬁleStatus
  end
  event sendFile
    any   recipient u fs
    where
      @grd1     ﬁle
      @grd2 u   user
      @grd3 recipient   user
      @grd4     dom(ﬁleStatus)
      @grd5 fs   {SUCCESS,FAILED}
      @grd6 u   recipient
    then
      @act1 ﬁleStatus( )   fs
  end
  event clearFileStatus
    any  
    where
      @grd1     dom(ﬁleStatus)
      @grd2 ﬁleStatus( ) {SUCCESS,FAILED}
    then
      @act1 ﬁleStatus   { } ﬁleStatus
  end
end
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Figure 2.4: Machine FileManagement M0
tion is dened by machine AccessManagement M0 and variables userClearanceLevel,
permission, leClassication and leOwner as seen in Fig. 2.5. A user can change the
clearance of another user as long as the former has a clearance level superior to the lat-
ter as described in event changeClearance (guard grd5). For all the other operations,
permission is needed given by the non-deterministic action in event requestPermission.
With permission granted, a le can be read, modied or deleted. Moreover, only users
with a clearance level superior to the le classication can modify a le (guard grd7 in
event modifyFile). To delete a le, described in event deleteFile, the user must be the
owner of the le or the super user as described by guard grd5.
These two specications were developed in two dierent machines as they deal with dif-
ferent contexts: machine FileManagement M0 handles the physical creation and modi-
cation of les and respective data. Machine AccessManagement M0 handles the con-
ditions in which a reading and a modication can occur. By composing these two
specications and respective events, we explore the development of a composed speci-
cation that is constrained by the other. The composed machine FileAccessManagement
can be seen in Fig. 2.6. Modifying, overwriting, sending or deleting a le must be au-
thorised (request permission) and only a dened set of users are allowed to do it (in
opposition to what happens in machine FileManagement M0); events corresponding to
the creation of users and change of clearance are synchronised and occur in parallel. The
conjunction of the guards of each event (Def. (1.2)) restrains the conditions to enable the
composed event. Nevertheless some events are not composed such as requestPermission
or clearFileStatus. Moreover, additional invariants are added allowing the interaction of66 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
machine AccessManagement_M0 
sees User_C0 AccessManagement_C0 FileManagement_C0 
 
variables userClearanceLevel permission fileClassification fileOwner 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 userClearanceLevel   USER   ClearanceLevel 
  @inv2 permission   PERMISSION 
  @inv3 fileClassification   FILE   Classification 
  @inv4 fileOwner   FILE   USER 
  @inv5 dom(fileClassification) = dom(fileOwner) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 userClearanceLevel   {super 10} 
      @act2 permission   OFF 
      @act3 fileClassification     
      @act4 fileOwner     
  end 
 
  event changeClearance 
    any uu // changed user 
        masterUser // user who will make the change to uu 
        newUserClearanceLevel // new user ClearanceLevel 
    where 
      @grd1 masterUser   USER 
      @grd2 uu   USER 
      @grd3 uu   dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @grd4 newUserClearanceLevel   ClearanceLevel 
      @grd5 newUserClearanceLevel < userClearanceLevel(masterUser) 
      @grd6 uu   super 
     then 
      @act1 userClearanceLevel(uu)  newUserClearanceLevel 
  end 
 
  event readOperation 
    any u // user that wants to modify the file 
        ff 
    where 
      @grd1 permission = ALLOWED 
      @grd2 u   USER 
      @grd3 u dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @grd4 ff dom(fileClassification) 
      @grd5 ff   FILE 
      @grd6 userClearanceLevel(u) fileClassification(ff) 
    then 
      @act1 permission   OFF 
  end 
 
 
  event requestPermission 
    where 
      @grd1 permission   ALLOWED 
  event requestPermission 
    where 
      @grd1 permission   ALLOWED 
    then 
      @act1 permission:  PERMISSION {OFF} 
  end 
 
  event modifyFile 
    any ff cl 
        u // owner of the file 
    where 
      @grd1 u dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @grd2 ff   FILE 
      @grd3 cl   Classification 
      @grd4 permission = ALLOWED 
      @grd5 ff   dom(fileClassification)   cl = fileClassification(ff) 
      @grd6 u   USER 
      @grd7 userClearanceLevel(u)>cl 
    then 
      @act1 fileClassification(ff)  cl 
      @act2 permission   OFF 
      @act3 fileOwner(ff)  u 
  end 
 
  event deleteFile 
    any ff u 
    where 
      @grd1 ff   FILE 
      @grd2 permission = ALLOWED 
      @grd3 u   USER 
      @grd4 ff   dom(fileOwner) 
      @grd5 u   {super,fileOwner(ff)} 
    then 
      @act1 fileClassification {ff} fileClassification 
      @act2 permission   OFF 
      @act3 fileOwner {ff} fileOwner 
  end 
end 
 
Figure 2.5: Machine AccessManagement M0
states but still without possibility to share variables. Among the added invariants, the
most important is the one that requires the classication of a le to be lower than the
clearance level of its owner (@inv4).
As aforementioned in a shared event composition, the composed events communicate
through value passing. The value passing is allowed when composed events have param-
eters with the same name and compatible types (cf. (1.20)). For instance, the composed
event createFile results from the composition of events AccessManagement M0.modifyFile
and FileManagement M0.createFile. AccessManagement M0.modifyFile has parame-
ters  of type FILE, u of type USER and cl of type Classication. FileManage-
ment M0.createFile has parameters  of type FILE, dd of type DATA, u of type USER
and fStatus of type STATUS. When these two events are synchronised, parameters 
and u are shared as seen in Fig. 2.7 (the labels of the guards and actions, starting with
'@', dene their source). Although not explicitly dened, parameter  inputs an element
of FILE (guards FileManagement M0ngrd1 and AccessManagement M0ngrd2) that will
be added to the variable le in action FileManagement M0nact1. Similarly, parameter
u behaves as an input parameter. The respective actions occur in parallel: when a le is
created, its content is dened by parameter dd and the resulting state of the operation
is updated by fStatus; also the le is classied according to the parameter cl and has anChapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B 67
COMPOSED MACHINE FileAccessManagement
INCLUDES
AccessManagement M0, FileManagement M0
INVARIANTS
@inv1: dom(userClearanceLevel) = user
@inv2: dom(fileClassification) = file
@inv3: fileOwner 2 file ! user
@inv4: 8ff 2 file ) userClearanceLevel(fileOwner(f)) > fileClassification(f)
EVENTS
addUser
Combines Events AccessManagement M0:changeClearance k FileManagement M0:addUser
modifyUser
Combines Events AccessManagement M0:changeClearance
createFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0:modifyFile k FileManagement M0:createFile
readFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0:readOperation k FileManagement M0:readFile
overwriteFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0:modifyFile k FileManagement M0:overwriteFile
deleteFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0:deleteFile k FileManagement M0:deleteFile
sendFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0:modifyFile k FileManagement M0:sendFile
requestPermission
Combines Events AccessManagement M0:requestPermission
clearFileStatus
Combines Events FileManagement M0:clearFileStatus
Figure 2.6: Composed machine FileAccessManagement
owner u. The others composed events behave similarly.
  event createFile 
    any ff // file to be added 
        dd // content DATA of the file 
        fStatus 
        u // file owner 
        cl 
    where 
      @FileManagement_M0\grd1 ff   FILE file 
      @FileManagement_M0\grd2 dd   DATA 
      @FileManagement_M0\grd3 fStatus    {SUCCESS} 
      @FileManagement_M0\grd4 u   user 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd1 u dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd2 ff   FILE 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd3 cl   Classification 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd4 permission = ALLOWED 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd5 ff   dom(fileClassification)   cl =fileClassification(ff) 
@AccessManagement_M0\grd6 u   USER      
@AccessManagement_M0\grd7 userClearanceLevel(u)>cl 
    then 
      @FileManagement_M0\act1 file file   {ff} 
      @FileManagement_M0\act2 fileData(ff) dd 
      @FileManagement_M0\act3 fileStatus(ff)   fStatus 
      @AccessManagement_M0\act1 fileClassification(ff)  cl 
      @AccessManagement_M0\act2 permission   OFF 
      @AccessManagement_M0\act3 fileOwner(ff)  u 
  end 
 
  event readFile 
    any ff // file to be read 
        dd // data of the file 
        u // user that reads the file 
 
    where 
      @[FileManagement]FileManagement_M0\grd1 ff   file 
      @[FileManagement]FileManagement_M0\grd2 dd = fileData(ff) 
      @[FileManagement]FileManagement_M0\grd3 u   user 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd1 permission = ALLOWED 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd2 u   USER 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd3 u dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd4 ff dom(fileClassification) 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd5 ff   FILE 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd6 
userClearanceLevel(u) fileClassification(ff) 
    then 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\act1 permission   OFF 
  end 
 
  event overwriteFile 
    any ff dd cl 
        u // owner of the file 
 
    where 
      @[FileManagement]FileManagement_M0\grd1 ff   file 
Figure 2.7: \Expanded" event createFile from composed machine FileAccessManage-
ment
The composed machine needs to be veried to ensure that the properties of the model
are preserved. The verication is accomplished by discharging the proof obligations as
described in Sect. 2.3.3. Moreover, the additional invariants must also be preserved by all
the events in the composed machine. After the generation of the proof obligations for the
composed machine FileAccessManagement only one proof obligation is not automatically68 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
discharged: it is a composition gluing invariant preservation PO referring to inv4 in
event modifyUser. After analysing the event, it is easy to understand why the PO
cannot be discharged: there is no information in the event that guarantees that the
les owned by uu have a classication that is inferior to the new user's clearance. To
discharge this PO, it is necessary to add a guard to the composed event modifyFile that
guarantees that all the les owned by uu have a classication that is inferior than the
new clearance. But the composition of machines is structural and therefore no guards
can be added directly to the composed machine. Instead a new guard needs to be added
to the original event changeClearance in the included machine AccessManagement M0
from where the composed event modifyUser comes from (cf. Fig. 2.6). Guard grd8 is
added in event changeClearance of machine AccessManagement M0 as seen in Fig. 2.8.
After changing the event changeClearance, the proof obligations can be re-generated
event changeClearance 
    any uu // changed user 
        masterUser // user who will make the change to uu 
        newUserClearanceLevel // new user ClearanceLevel 
    where 
      @grd1 masterUser   USER 
      @grd2 uu   USER 
      @grd3 uu   dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @grd4 newUserClearanceLevel   ClearanceLevel 
      @grd5 newUserClearanceLevel < userClearanceLevel(masterUser) 
      @grd6 uu   super 
      @grd7  f·f   dom(fileClassification)   fileOwner(f)=uu  
            newUserClearanceLevel>fileClassification(f) 
  then 
      @act1 userClearanceLevel(uu)  newUserClearanceLevel 
  end 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Event changeClearance from machine AccessManagement with added
guard grd8
for the composed machine and as expected, all the POs are automatically discharged.
Moreover, no changes were made directly in the composed machine. In this manner,
there is more exibility in the interaction of specications as the changes in the individual
sub-components are directly reected in the composed machines.
One of the properties of the shared event composition is monotonicity. Therefore sub-
components can be further rened independently preserving the veried properties while
composed. For instance, machine AccessManagement M0 can be rened by dening a
more deterministic event requestPermission based on the kind of operation and the user
that intends to execute the operation. For machine FileManagement M0, the event
sendFile can be further rened by introducing a queue where events would be stored
before being processed (creating a new le own by the le recipient). The independent
renement of the sub-components results in a separation of behaviours and properties
that can be veried without the interference of other sub-components.Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B 69
2.5 Related Work
Composition allows the interaction of sub-components and usually occurs through vari-
able sharing, event sharing or a combination of both. Back [23], Abadi and Lamport[1]
studied the interaction of components through shared variable composition. Jones [187]
also proposes a shared variable composition for VDM by restricting the behaviour of the
environment and the operation itself in order to consider the composition valid using
rely-guarantee conditions.
CSP [92] allows the specication of distributed systems from an event-based viewpoint.
Processes and environment behaviours can be composed using the parallel composition
operator k. They interact by synchronisation of common events within the respective
alphabets (interaction) and stop if any of the involved processes deadlocks. Another
option is to have processes with dierent alphabets: concurrency exists when inde-
pendent events occur in parallel. On the one hand, when the alphabets of processes
P and Q do not have common events, P \ Q = fg, then the alphabet is given as
(P k Q) = P [ Q and the traces of P k Q are pure interleavings between events of
both processes: traces(P k Q) = fs j 9 t : traces(P);u : traces(Q)s interleaves(t;u)g.
On the other hand, when the alphabets of P and Q are exactly the same, P = Q,
then traces(P k Q) = traces(P) \ traces(Q). Communication is a special class of event
described by a pair c:v where c corresponds to the name of the channel and v corre-
sponds to the value of the message which passes. Channels can be considered members
of the alphabet of the process and used for communication in only one direction and
between two processes [92]. If two processes P and Q are composed in parallel and both
have a common channel c, interaction happens whenever both processes are ready to
engage in the common channel. If P is ready for c!v and process Q is ready for c?x, v
can be passed from P to Q [41]: (c!v →P) k (c?x →Qx) = c!:v →(P k Qv). The result
is an output channel and the process Q receives the value v. This can also be applied
for channels with input-input behaviour. Our approach is similar to CSP concurrency
where events from dierent machines can be composed and interact, similar to what
happens between events of dierent processes.
In Z, composition can be achieved by combining schemas. Two signatures of dierent
schemas can be combined if they are type compatible: each variable common to the two
has the same type in both of them. The result is a larger signature which contains
all the variables of each of them. The properties of each of the schemas can be con-
nected through logical connectives such as _, ^, ) or  [173]. Still combining schemas,
views [34, 99] allow the development of partial specications that can interact through
invariants that relate their state or by operations' synchronisation. Views are similar
to our composition as it allows the exploration of sub-components interaction without
variable sharing.
In Circus [186, 155] (that combines Z and CSP), processes may be dened explicitly70 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
or in terms of other processes (compound processes). Compound processes are dened
using the CSP operators of sequence, external and internal choice, parallelism and in-
terleaving, or their corresponding iterated operators, event hiding, or indexed operators,
which are particular to Circus specications. An action can be a schema, a guarded
command, an invocation of another action, or a combination of these constructs using
CSP operators. Communication is achieved by parallelism and interleaving of actions
declaring a synchronisation channel set and two sets that partition all the variables. In
the parallelism A1Jns1jcsjns2KA2 , the actions A1 and A2 synchronise on the channels
in set cs. Both A1 and A2 have access to the initial values of all variables in both ns1
and ns2. However, A1 and A2 may modify only the values of the variables in ns1 and
ns2, respectively. The changes made by A1 in variables in ns1 are not seen by A2,
and vice-versa. Oliveira et al [132] make use of the Circus communication system to
specify a distributed re protection system divided into re detection and gas discharge
covering two dierent separate zones. In our composition machine, the included ma-
chines communicate by synchronised events similar to channels in Circus. Similarly, the
included machines can only modify their own variables but can read the other variables
in a composed event.
CSP-OZ [167] (CSP combined with Object-Z) and TCOZ [142, 118, 117] (Timed Com-
municating Object-Z that is an integration of Object-Z and Timed CSP) use Object-Z
data structure and the CSP structure for the control ow of a system. The Z math-
ematical toolkit is extended with object oriented structuring techniques. Timed CSP
has strong process control modelling capabilities. The multi-threading and synchro-
nisation primitives of CSP are extended with timing primitives. In CSP-OZ, classes
in Object-Z and processes in CSP are given an identical failure divergence semantics
(history of class objects corresponds to traces of processes in CSP) which allows the
development of communication through synchronised operations with the same name in
a similar style as it happens with channels in CSP: local parameters to operations can be
passed via message passing [167, 75]. The sequencing of operation events is determined
by the preconditions of the individual events, at each time the object participates in
any event which is currently enabled [117]. Nevertheless such an approach is not well
suited for considering multi-threading and real-time due to the restriction of operations
to atomic events. TCOZ identies operation schemas with terminating CSP processes
that perform only state updates: rather than treating operation as atomic events, they
are treated as sequences of abstract state-update events [117]. TCOZ specications have
the same strcuture as Object-Z ones except in the structure of the class denition that
may include CSP channels and processes denitions. The Z operation schema is the only
way to describe a state change in TCOZ and it is not responsible for communicating
inputs and outputs. Composition occurs using communicating CSP-style channels be-
tween class objects: state, initialisation schemas are conjoined; operation schemas with
the same name are also conjoined resulting in compositive objects. The behaviour of an
(active) compositive is dened by the construct MAIN along with the channel constructChapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B 71
chan. Active objects are modelled as pure (non-terminating) CSP processes, using the
basic innite timed failures semantics [117]. For synchronisation, channel renaming may
be required where input and output parameters can be passed similar to the original
CSP. Intermediate channels can be introduced as internal interfaces between objects.
The internal interfaces are protected from environment by hiding them [118]. Another
approach for describing the semantics of TCOZ is given by Qin et al [142]: using uni-
fying theories of programming (UTP), a unied semantic model for both channel and
sensor/actuators based communications in TCOZ is dened. Unlike our approach, we
do not blend dierent formalisms and dene the corresponding semantics: we keep the
Event-B semantics and inspired by the CSP, we build a correspondence between events'
composition with possible value-passing communication and the synchronisation of pro-
cesses using CSP channels. Just like in CSP, there is dierent semantics between input
and output channels. For our composition, input and output parameters also have dif-
ferent semantics expressed by enabledness POs (cf. Denition 1.20 and Sect. 1.5.3.3).
Note that these POs are currently not implemented in the Rodin platform.
In classical B the composition [4, 140, 158] uses keywords like Includes to extend a
machine, not allowing writing access to variables in the included machine or keyword
Sees used to complement machines. Although systems are developed in single machines
in classical B, Bellegarde et at [32] suggest a composition by rearranging the separated
machines and synchronising their operations under feasibility conditions. The behaviour
of a component composition is seen as a labelled transition system using weakest precon-
ditions, where a set of authorised transitions are dened. The objective is to verify the
renement of synchronised parallel composition between components but it is limited to
nite state transitions and a nite number of components. This work diers from ours
as it uses a labelled transition system while we use synchronisation and communication
in the CSP style. Variable sharing is also possible unlike our shared event composition.
Butler and Walden [52] discuss a combination of action systems and classical B by com-
posing machines using parallel systems in an action systems style and preserving the
invariants of the individual machines. This approach allows the classical B to derive
parallel and distributed systems and since the parallel composition of action systems
is monotonic, the sub-systems in a parallel composition may be rened independently.
This work is closely related to our work as it follows a CSP style to compose actions
with similar underlying semantics and notion of renement. Combining state machine
diagrams and classical B, Papatsaras and Stoddart [135] manually decompose a global
a system into sub-components. The sub-components are then composed in classical B
using the Includes keyword. Similarly to our approach, sub-components communicate
via shared parameters. Since there is not a formal methodology to follow, the resulting
composition needs to be proved to be a valid renement of the global system which is
not the case in our work, where we prove the monotonicity of our composition. Abrial et
al [124, 15] propose a state-based decomposition for Event-B introducing the notion of
shared variables and external events as described in Sect. 1.6.1. Although this approach72 Chapter 2 Shared Event Composition for Event-B
and our work are both monotonic and sub-components can be rened independently,
their respective nature is suitable for dierent kind of systems: parallel programs for
shared variable and distributed systems for shared event [42]. Sorge et al [172] propose
a feature composition in Event-B and dene composition proof obligations to ensure its
consistency. In the feature composition approach, exploration of specications' compo-
sition with possible variable sharing (similar to the shared variable style) is allowed but
no renement is dened which diers from our work. Nevertheless similar to our work,
sub-components POs are reused to avoid re-proving composition POs.
2.6 Conclusions
Based on the close relation between action systems and Event-B plus the correspon-
dence between action systems and CSP [53], we dene our Event-B composition with an
event-based behaviour. Shared event composition is proved to be monotonic by means of
proof obligations. Consequently sub-components can be further rened independently.
Renement in a \top-down" style for developing specications is allowed including the
generation of POs. During composition, sub-components interact through event parame-
ters by value-passing. We extend Event-B to support shared event composition, allowing
combination and reuse of existing sub-components through the introduction of composed
machines. Required static checks are developed and POs are generated to validate the
composition. Such an approach seems suitable for modelling distributed systems, where
the system can be seen as a combination of interacting parts (sub-components). This
work is the result of the exploration of specications' composition in a shared event style.
A methodology for the composition is dened including the verication of properties
through the generation of proof obligations. We do not address the step corresponding
to the translation of this composition exploration to an implementation and it is a study
that needs to be carried out in the future. A tool was developed to support composition
in the Rodin platform. Although we have dened the required POs for composition,
currently they are not implemented in the tool. At the moment, the generation of a
new machine (that is the expansion of the sub-components) is required to validate the
composition. A le transfer case study dened as a distributed system is modelled using
the composition tool. We intend to carry on developing the shared event composition
approach by adding the enabledness POs when available for the Rodin platform. With
the developed work, we have the necessary conditions to develop another reuse technique
that can be seen as the inverse operation of composition: decomposition. This is further
discussed in Chapter 4.Chapter 3
Generic Instantiation
It is believed that reusability in formal development should reduce the time and cost
of formal modelling within a production environment. Along with the ability to reuse
formal models, it is desirable to avoid unnecessary re-proof when reusing models. Event-
B supports generic developments through the context construct. However Event-B lacks
the ability to instantiate and reuse generic developments in other formal developments.
We propose a methodology to instantiate generic models and extend the instantiation to
a chain of renements. We dene sucient proof obligations to ensure that the proofs
associated to a generic development remain valid in an instantiated development thus
avoiding re-proofs. This chapter is based on the paper [163] that appeared in the ICFEM
(International Conference in Formal Engineering Methods) 2009.
3.1 Introduction
Reusability has always been sought in several areas as a way to reduce time, cost and
improve the productivity of developments [176]. Examples can be found in areas such
as software, mathematics and even formal methods. Generic instantiation can be seen
as a way of reusing components and solving diculties raised by the construction of
large and complex models [124, 15]. The goal is to reuse generic developments (single
model or a chain of renements) and create components with similar properties instead
of starting from scratch. Reusability is applied through the use of a pattern as the basic
structure and afterwards each new component is generated through parameterisation.
We propose a generic instantiation approach for Event-B by instantiating machines. The
instances inherit properties from the generic development (pattern) and afterwards are
parameterised by renaming/replacing those properties to more specic names according
to the instance. Proof obligations are generated to ensure that assumptions used in the
pattern are satised in the instantiation. In that sense our approach avoids re-proof of
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pattern proof obligations in the instantiation. The models are developed in the Rodin
platform. A simple case study modelling a protocol communication is described to
illustrate the use of instantiation.
Section 3.2 denes how generic instantiation is interpreted by us. In Sect. 3.3 instan-
tiated machines are introduced. Section 3.4 gives an application of instantiation in
combination with shared event composition. The application of instantiation to a chain
of renements is described in Sect. 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses an open question that
arises when instantiating theorems and invariants in a pattern. Conclusions are drawn
in Sect. 3.7.
3.2 Generic Instantiation
In order to explain our approach for Generic Instantiation we use a simple case study. A
protocol is modelled between two entities, Source and Destination which communicate
by sending messages through a channel. The content of the channel has a maximum
dimension. To send a message it is necessary to add the content of the message to the
channel. Based on the proposed requirements it is possible to create a context Chan-
nelParameters to model the channel as seen in Fig. 3.1(b). The content of the message
 Channel
 1  machine Channel sees ChannelParameters
 2  
 3  variables channel
 4  
 5  invariants
 6    @inv1 channel   Message
 7    @inv3 finite(channel)
 8    @inv2 card(channel)   max_size
 9  
 10  events
 11    event INITIALISATION
 12      then
 13        @act1 channel    
 14    end
 15  
 16    event Send
 17      any m
 18      where
 19        @grd1 m   Message
 20        @grd2 card(channel) < max_size
 21      then
 22        @act1 channel   channel   {m}
 23    end
 24  
 25    event Receive
 26      any m
 27      where
 28        @grd1 m   channel
 29      then
 30        @act1 channel   channel {m}
 31    end
 32  end
 33  
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(a)
 ChannelParameters
 1  context ChannelParameters
 2  
 3  constants max_size 
 4  
 5  sets Message 
 6  
 7  axioms
 8    @axm1 max_size    
 9  end
 10  
 Page 1
(b)
Figure 3.1: Machine Channel and respective context ChannelParameters
is of type Message and has a maximum dimension max size. Figure 3.1(a) represents
the machine side where a variable channel stores all the sent/received messages. The
channel messages have type Message and the number of messages in the channel is
limited. Messages are introduced in the channel to be sent as seen in event Send. TheChapter 3 Generic Instantiation 75
event Receive models the reception of the message in the destination by extracting the
messages from the channel. Elements in ChannelParameters context are the parameters
(type and constant) for the Channel machine.
Now suppose we wish to model a bi-directional communication between two entities using
two channels. Both channels are similar so an option is to instantiate machine Channel
twice to create two instances: one channel called Request and the other Response. The
protocol, represented in Fig. 3.2 starts by a message being sent from the Source. After
arriving at the Destination, the reception of the message is acknowledged in the Source.
Then a response is sent from the Destination and after arriving at the Source, it is also
acknowledged in the Destination.
Figure 3.2: Protocol diagram
The instantiation of Channel is achieved by applying machine instantiation. An instance
of the pattern Channel is created with more specic properties. A detailed description
of the machine instantiation is described in Sect. 3.3. Moreover, a context containing
the specic instances properties is required to model the protocol. In our case study we
use the context ProtocolTypes in Fig. 3.3, where types Request and Response replace the
more generic type Message and constants qmax size and pmax size replace max size.
This context must be provided by the modeller/developer.
 ProtocolTypes
 1  context ProtocolTypes
 2  
 3  constants qmax_size pmax_size 
 4  
 5  sets Request Response 
 6  
 7  axioms
 8    @axm1 qmax_size    
 9    @axm2 pmax_size    
 10  end
 11  
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Figure 3.3: ProtocolTypes Context
Abrial and Hallerstede [15] and M etayer et al [124] propose the use of generic instan-
tiation for Event-B. It is suggested that the contexts of a development (equivalent to
the pattern) can be merged and reused through instantiation in other developments.
That proposal lacks a mechanism to apply the instantiation from the pattern to the in-
stances. Therefore our work proposes a mechanism to instantiate machines and extend
the instantiation to a renement chain. The reusability of a development is expressed
by instantiating a development (pattern) according to a more specic problem.76 Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation
3.3 Generic Instantiation and Instantiated Machines
Inspired by the previous case study and having the ability to compose machines (Shared
Event Composition plug-in [162]) and rename elements (Refactory plug-in [160] and
Sect. 5.4) on the Rodin platform, we propose an approach to instantiate machines. As
mentioned the context plays an important role while instantiating since this is where the
specic properties of the instance are dened (parameterisation). The use of context is
briey discussed before instantiated machines are introduced.
3.3.1 Contexts
As aforementioned, contexts in Event-B are the static part of a model containing prop-
erties of the modelled system through the use of axioms and theorems. Having a closer
look at the possible usage of contexts, there are two possible viewpoints:
Parameterisation : the context is seen only by one machine (or one chain of machine
renements) and denes specic properties for that machine (sets, constants, ax-
ioms, theorems). These properties are unique for that machine and any other
machine would have dierent properties.
Sharing : a context is seen by several machines and there are some properties (sets,
constants, axioms, theorems) shared by the machines. Therefore the context is
used to share properties.
Several model developments mix the usage for the same context. For the ordinary
modeller this distinction is not very clear and perhaps not so important. Our approach
of generic instantiation reuses components and personalises each instance implying the
use of Parameterisation.
3.3.2 Example of Instantiated Machine
An instantiated machine instantiates a generic machine (pattern). If the generic machine
sees a context, then the context elements (sets and constants) have to be replaced by
instance elements. The instance elements must already exist in a context seen by the
instantiated machine (in our case study, this corresponds to ProtocolTypes - see Fig. 3.3).
In the case study, the instantiated machine QChannel, that is an instance of the machine
Channel for requests, is represented in Fig. 3.4. Note that ChannelParameters elements
(sets and constants) are replaced because the replacement elements are already dened
in ProtocolTypes. Machine elements (variables, parameters and events) are renamed
since they did not exist before. The instantiated machine PChannel, an instance of
Channel for responses, is similar.Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation 77
INSTANTIATED MACHINE QChannel
INSTANTIATES Channel VIA ChannelParameters
SEES ProtocolTypes /* context containing the instance properties*/
REPLACE /* replace parameters in ChannelParameters*/
SETS Message := Request
CONSTANTS max size := qmax size
RENAME /* rename variables and events in machine Channel*/
VARIABLES channel := qchannel
EVENTS Send := QSend
m := q /*optional:rename parameter m in event Send*/
Receive := Receive
m := q /*optional:rename parameter m in event Receive*/
END
Figure 3.4: Instantiated Machine: QChannel instantiates Channel
Pattern Assumptions and Instance Theorems: Axioms in contexts are assump-
tions about a system and are used to help discharge proofs obligations. When instanti-
ating, we need to show that assumptions in the pattern are satised by the replacement
sets and constants. A possible solution is to convert the pattern axioms into instantiated
machine theorems after the replacement is applied. A theorem has a proof obligation
associated with it. By ensuring that a proof obligation related to each axiom is gener-
ated and discharged when instantiating a machine, we are conrming the correctness of
the instantiation by satisfying the pattern assumptions (see Theorem thm1 in Fig. 3.5).
In this manner, the theorem is automatically generated in the instantiated machine
and does not need to be manually added in the pattern context. \Expanded" machine
QChannel can be seen in Fig. 3.5.
 QChannel
 1  machine QChannel sees ProtocolTypes
 2  
 3  variables qchannel
 4  
 5  invariants
 6    @inv1 qchannel   Request
 7    @inv3 finite(qchannel)
 8    @inv2 card(qchannel)   qmax_size
 9    theorem @thm1 qmax_size    
 10  
 11  events
 12    event INITIALISATION
 13      then
 14        @act1 qchannel    
 15    end
 16  
 17    event QSend
 18      any q
 19      where
 20        @grd1 q   Request
 21        @grd2 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
 22      then
 23        @act1 qchannel   qchannel   {q}
 24    end
 25  
 26    event Receive
 27      any q
 28      where
 29        @grd1 q   qchannel
 30      then
 31        @act1 qchannel   qchannel {q}
 32    end
 33  end
 34  
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Figure 3.5: Expanded version of instantiated machine QChannel
The instance QChannel sees the context ProtocolTypes (provided by the modeller/de-
veloper) that contains the context information for the instances. The type Message
in context ChannelParameters is replaced by Request in ProtocolTypes, the constant
max size is replaced by qmax size, the variable channel in Channel is renamed qchannel
and event Send is renamed QSend. The axiom that exists in ChannelParameters is
converted into a theorem in QChannel (but easily discharged by the axioms in Proto-78 Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation
colTypes). We convert the axiom axm1 from the generic context ChannelParameters:
@axm1 max size 2 N
into the theorem thm1 in the instance QChannel:
@thm1 qmax size 2 N
This results from the replacement of the constant max size by qmax size. For a machine
theorem, the respective proof obligation is [9]:
Axioms
Invariants
`
Theorem
For theorem thm1, the proof obligation to be generated is the following:
qmax size 2 N /*axiom from ProtocolTypes*/
pmax size 2 N /* axiom from ProtocolTypes*/
qchannel  Request /*invariant from QChannel*/
:::
`
qmax size 2 N
The rst axiom of ProtocolTypes easily discharges this proof obligation. Note the ex-
pansion of QChannel is not required in practice. We use it to show the meaning of an
instantiated machine.
3.3.3 Denition of Generic Instantiation of Machines
Based on the instantiated machine QChannel, a general denition for generic instanti-
ation of machines can be drawn. Considering Context Ctx and machine M in Fig. 3.6
together as a pattern, we can create a generic instantiatiated machine IM as seen in
Fig. 3.7.
CONTEXT Ctx
SETS S1:::Sm
CONSTANTS C1:::Cn
AXIOMS Ax1:::Axp
(a)
MACHINE M
SEES Ctx
VARIABLES v1:::vq
EVENTS ev1:::evr
(b)
Figure 3.6: Generic view of a context and a machine
The context D contains the replacement properties (sets DS1;:::;DSm and constants
DC1;:::;DCn) for the elements in context Ctx. The variables, events and parametersChapter 3 Generic Instantiation 79
INSTANTIATED MACHINE IM
INSTANTIATES M VIA Ctx
SEES D /* context containing the instance properties */
REPLACE /* replace parameters defined in context C */
SETS S1 := DS1;:::;Sm := DSm /* Carrier Sets */
CONSTANTS C1 := DC1;:::;Cn := DCn /* Constants */
RENAME /*rename elements in machine M */
VARIABLES v1 := nv1;:::;vq := nvq /* optional */
EVENTS ev1 := nev1 /* optional */
p1 := np1;:::;ps := nps /* parameters: optional */
:
evr := nevr
END
Figure 3.7: An Instantiated Machine
are also renamed by new variables nv1;:::;nvq, new events nev1;:::;nevr and new
parameters np1;:::;nps. From the pattern we are able to create several instances that
can be used in a more specic problem. During the creation of instances validity checks
are required:
1. A static validation of replaced elements is required, e.g., a type must be replaced
by a type and a constant with a constant.
2. All sets and constants should be replaced, i.e., no uninstantiated parameters.
3. Renaming the constants, variables, events must be injective (not introducing name
clashes) in order to reuse all the existing proof obligations.
4. Replacing sets does not have to be injective. Dierent sets in the pattern can be
replaced by the same instance set.
5. Only given sets (dened by the user) can be replaced. Built-in types such as integer
numbers Z and boolean BOOL cannot be replaced.
3.3.4 Avoiding re-proofs
As described above, a proof obligation is a sequent of the form H ` G (where H
represents some hyphoteses and G represents a goal). Renaming variable (or replacing
constant) v with w and type (carrier set) S to T results in instantiated POs as follows:
[v := w] (H ` G) (variable/constant instantiation)
[S := T] (H ` G) (type instantiation)
H ` G is valid means that the proof has been constructed. We must ensure if H `
G is valid, then any instantiation of H ` G that avoids name clashes is also valid.
Instantiation of variables and constants maintains validity since a sequent is implicitly
universally quantied over its free variables and quantied variables may be renamed
provided there are no name clashes.80 Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation
Schmalz [156, 157], inspired by term rewriting in the Rodin platform, describe a theoret-
ical foundation of term rewriting for logics of partial functions as well as the semantics
of Event-B logic based on Isabelle/HOL [85, 130]. [157] describes the rewriting and in-
stantiation of proof rules as redundant inference rules that may be derived from a given
valid proof rule while preserving soundness. Existing generic proofs can be reused in the
instances following some side-conditions as described below. A general inference rule is
written as:
` H1 ::: Hn
` G
r (x fresh)
(3.1)
where H1 :::Hn, n > 0, are a sequence of (possible empty) sequents called antecedents, G
is a sequent called consequent, has an optional name r and x are possible empty freshness
conditions (the variables introduced as part of a proof rule step like 8goal). Variables
in x are pairwise distinct and do not occur free in G. Furthermore, by convention, type
variables are considered free in the sequents in Event-B [156]. Two kind of substitution
are considered:
Ordinary (bound variable) Substituition: 1 replaces ordinary variables y by vari-
ables u (called the right-hand side of 1). It is denoted as: 1 = [y := u] where
y is a sequence of pairwise distinct variables and u a sequence of variables of the
same length and type as y.
Type Substitution: 2 substitutes type variables  for type variables . It is denoted
as: 2 = [ := ] where  is a sequence of pairwise distinct type variables and
 a sequence of types having the same length as .
The instantiation of inference rule r for ordinary and type substitution can be expressed
as:
` H1 ::: Hn
` G
r (x fresh)
(3.2)
where  is a substitution over  (type signature containing the set of all types). In
an ordinary substitution, the right-hand side of  corresponds to ordinary variables.
Moreover, the instantiation is possible if the following side-conditions on  hold [156]:
• The variables in x are pairwise distinct. Moreover, for type substitution, variables
in x cannot have the same name and dierent types.
• If a variable x is free in one of H1 :::Hn and x belongs to x, then x belongs to
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POs in the generic model (pattern) are sequents of the form:
A;I;H `D G (3.3)
where A represents the axioms, I represents the invariants and H represents the guards.
The substitution  results in A being replaced by B, where B is the specic axioms and
we have that
B `D A (3.4)
From (3.3) and [157], we have that
A;I;H `D G (3.5)
i.e, variable and type substitution preserves validity. Then from (3.4) and (3.5), we have:
B;I;H `D G (3.6)
(3.3) is the form that a PO takes in the pattern machine, (3.6) is the form a PO takes
in the specic machine and we have shown that (3.6) follows from (3.3).
3.4 Example of Instantiation and Composition
The creation of the instances is an intermediate step in the overall model development.
In our case study we model a protocol between entities that sends and receives messages.
By using the created instances and the shared event composition plug-in, we share events
between Request and Response and model the protocol. A composed machine Protocol
modelling this system can be seen in Fig. 3.8.
COMPOSED MACHINE Protocol
REFINES -
INCLUDES
QChannel
PChannel
EVENTS
SendRequest
Combines Events QChannel.QSend
RecvReq SendResp
Combines Events QChannel.Receive k PChannel.Send
RecvResp
Combines Events combines PChannel.Receive
END
Figure 3.8: Composed Machine Protocol
As seen in Fig. 3.2, while composing the instance machines QChannel and PChannel we
add the events that are unique for each entity (SendRequest and RecvResp). In Fig. 3.8,
event SendRequest sends a message through the channel from Source to Destination.82 Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation
RecvResp models the reception of the response in the Source after being sent by Des-
tination. Moreover the event that relates the communication between the two entities
is also modelled (RecvReq SendResp). The request is received and acknowledged and
the response to that request is sent in parallel (from this combined event, a possible
renement is processing the request message before sending the response). We opt not
to rene an abstract machine in Fig. 3.8 (REFINES clause is empty: \-") although it
is possible. The composed machine Protocol corresponds to the expanded machine in
Fig. 3.9.
 Protocol
 1  machine Protocol sees ProtocolTypes
 2  
 3  variables qchannel pchannel
 4  
 5  invariants
 6    @inv1 qchannel   Request
 7    @inv2 pchannel   Response
 8    @inv3 card(pchannel)   pmax_size
 9    @inv4 card(qchannel)   qmax_size
 10    theorem @QChannel/thm1 qmax_size    
 11    theorem @PChannel/thm2 pmax_size    
 12  
 13  events
 14    event INITIALISATION
 15      then
 16        @act1 qchannel    
 17        @act2 pchannel    
 18    end
 19  
 20    event SendRequest
 21      any q
 22      where
 23        @grd1 q   Request
 24        @grd2 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
 25      then
 26        @act1 qchannel   qchannel   {q}
 27    end
 28  
 29    event RecvReq_SendResp
 30      any q p
 31      where
 32        @grd1 q   qchannel
 33        @grd2 p   Response
 34        @grd3 card(pchannel) < pmax_size
 35      then
 36        @act1 pchannel   pchannel   {p}
 37    end
 38  
 39    event RecvResp
 40      any p
 41      where
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 42  
 43    event SendRequest
 44      any q
 45      where
 46        @grd1 q   Request
 47        @grd2 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
 48      then
 49        @act1 qchannel   qchannel   {q}
 50    end
 51  
 52    event RecvReq_SendResp
 53      any q p
 54      where
 55        @grd1 q   qchannel
 56        @grd2 p   Response
 57        @grd3 card(pchannel) < pmax_size
 58      then
 59        @act1 pchannel   pchannel   {p}
 60        @act2 qchannel   qchannel {q}
 61    end
 62  
 63    event RecvResp
 64      any p
 65      where
 66        @grd1 p   pchannel
 67      then
 68        @act1 pchannel   pchannel {p}
 69    end
 70  end
 71  
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Figure 3.9: \Expanded" machine Protocol
The two instances of machine Channel model a bi-directional communication channel
between two entities. This allows us to express the applicability of generic instantiation
for modelling distributed systems. Nevertheless generic instantiation is not restricted to
this kind of systems. When modelling a nite number of similar components with some
specic individual properties, instantiated machines are a suitable option (as described
in our case study in Chapter 6).
3.5 Generic Instantiation applied to a chain of renements
The above sections describe generic instantiation applied to individual machines. Al-
though it is already an interesting way of reusing, the instantiation of a chain of machines
in a large model would be more interesting. In other words, we instantiate a chain of
renements. Suppose we have a development Dv containing several renement levels
(Dv1;Dv2;:::;Dvn). The most concrete model Dvn matches a generic model (pattern)
P1 that is part of a chain of renements P1;P2;:::;Pm as seen in Fig. 3.10. By applying
generic instantiation we instantiate the pattern P1 according to Dvn. That instantiation
is a renement of Dvn and it is called Dvn+m abs (the sux abs stands for abstract). InChapter 3 Generic Instantiation 83
Figure 3.10: Instantiation of a generic chain of renements
addition we can extend the instantiation to one of the renement layers of the pattern
and apply it to the development Dv. The outcome is a further renement layer for Dvn
for free ( Dvn+m abs corresponds to the instantiation of P1 and Dvn+m corresponds to
the instantiation of Pm). The renement between Dvn+m abs and Dvn+m does not in-
troduce renement proof obligations since the proof obligations were already discharged
in the pattern chain. This follows from the instantiated machines where the re-proof
of pattern proof obligations is avoided. Afterwards Dvn+m can be further rened to
Dvn+m+z. For a better understanding of this approach, we will rene our case study
and apply an instantiation over the pattern chain.
3.5.1 Renement of the Channel case study
We rene the Channel machine. For the rst renement, the requirement is to include
buers before and after adding a message to the channel. A second renement species
the type Message. In particular, Message will be divided in two parts: header and
body. The header of the Message contains the destination identication and the body
represents the content of the message (data). header and body are based on the records
proposal for Event-B suggested by Evans and Butler [69] and also in work developed by
Rezazadeh et al. [150].
The rst renement requires the introduction of two new variables sendingBuer and
receivingBuer and a new event addMessageBuer that loads the message to sending-84 Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation
Buer before being introduced in the channel in the Send event. The latter event reects
the introduction of the buers. In the event Receive, messages in channel are extracted
and loaded to receivingBuer as seen in Fig. 3.11.
 Channel_M1
 1  machine Channel_M1 refines Channel
 2  sees ChannelParameters
 3  
 4  variables channel sendingBuffer
 5        receivingBuffer
 6  
 7  invariants
 8    @inv1 sendingBuffer   Message
 9    @inv2 receivingBuffer   Message
 10  
 11  events
 12    event INITIALISATION
 13      then
 14        @act1 channel    
 15        @act2 sendingBuffer    
 16        @act3 receivingBuffer    
 17    end
 18  
 19    event addMessageBuffer
 20      any m
 21      where
 22        @grd1 m   Message
 23        @grd2 m   sendingBuffer
 24      then
 25        @act1 sendingBuffer sendingBuffer {m}
 26    end
 27  
 28    event Send refines Send
 29      any m
 30      where
 31        @grd1 sendingBuffer    
 32        @grd2 m   sendingBuffer
 33        @grd3 card(channel) < max_size
 34      then
 35        @act1 channel   channel   {m}
 36        @act2 sendingBuffer sendingBuffer {m}
 37    end
 38  
 39    event Receive refines Receive
 40      any m
 41      where
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 42  
 43    event Send refines Send
 44      any m
 45      where
 46        @grd1 sendingBuffer    
 47        @grd2 m   sendingBuffer
 48        @grd3 card(channel) < max_size
 49      then
 50        @act1 channel   channel   {m}
 51        @act2 sendingBuffer sendingBuffer {m}
 52    end
 53  
 54    event Receive refines Receive
 55      any m
 56      where
 57        @grd1 m   channel
 58        @grd2 m   receivingBuffer
 59      then
 60        @act1 channel   channel {m}
 61        @act2 receivingBuffer receivingBuffer {m}
 62    end
 63  end
 64  
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Figure 3.11: Channel M1: renement of Channel
The second renement is a data renement over the type Message by dividing it into
header and body. The header contains the destination identication and the body con-
tains the data of the message. Constants header and body are dened in the context
ChannelParameters C2 as in Fig. 3.12.
 ChannelParameters_C2
 1  context ChannelParameters_C2 extends ChannelParameters 
 2  
 3  constants header body 
 4  
 5  sets DATA DESTINATION 
 6  
 7  axioms
 8    @axm3 header   Message   DESTINATION
 9    @axm4 body   Message   DATA
 10  end
 11  
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Figure 3.12: Context ChannelParameters C2
In Fig. 3.13 the machine Channel M2 data renes the variable channel and introduces
a new event, processMessage that processes the received message after being retrieved
from the receiving buer. A variable storeDATA is also introduced to store the data
that each destination receives.
3.5.2 Instantiation of a chain of renements
We can consider the chain of renements of Channel as a pattern. In that case, having all
the proof obligations discharged we can reuse this pattern in a more specic development.
The chain of renements is seen as a single entity where it is possible to choose an initial
and a nal renement level. Using our case study, we intend to instantiate and reneChapter 3 Generic Instantiation 85
 Channel_M2
 1  machine Channel_M2 refines Channel_M1
 2  sees ChannelParameters_C2
 3  
 4  variables channel sendingBuffer
 5        receivingBuffer storeDATA
 6  
 7  invariants
 8    @inv1 storeDATA   DESTINATION    (DATA)
 9  
 10  events
 11    event INITIALISATION
 12      then
 13        @act1 channel    
 14        @act2 sendingBuffer    
 15        @act3 receivingBuffer    
 16        @act4 storeDATA   DESTINATION   { }
 17    end
 18  
 19    event addMessageBuffer
 20    refines addMessageBuffer
 21      any h b m
 22      where
 23        @grd1 header(m) = h
 24        @grd2 body(m) = b
 25        @grd3 m   sendingBuffer
 26      then
 27        @act4 sendingBuffer sendingBuffer {m}
 28    end
 29  
 30    event send refines Send
 31      any m
 32      where
 33        @grd1 sendingBuffer    
 34        @grd2 m   sendingBuffer
 35        @grd3 card(channel) < max_size
 36      then
 37        @act1 channel   channel   {m}
 38        @act2 sendingBuffer sendingBuffer {m}
 39    end
 40  
 41    event receive refines Receive
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 42  
 43  
 44    event send refines Send
 45      any m
 46      where
 47        @grd1 sendingBuffer    
 48        @grd2 m   sendingBuffer
 49        @grd3 card(channel) < max_size
 50      then
 51        @act1 channel   channel   {m}
 52        @act2 sendingBuffer sendingBuffer {m}
 53    end
 54  
 55    event receive refines Receive
 56      any m
 57      where
 58        @grd1 m   channel
 59        @grd2 m   receivingBuffer
 60      then
 61        @act1 channel   channel {m}
 62        @act2 receivingBuffer receivingBuffer {m}
 63    end
 64  
 65    event processMessage
 66      any m dest d
 67      where
 68        @grd1 m   receivingBuffer
 69        @grd3 header(m) = dest
 70        @grd4 d = body(m)
 71        @grd5 dest   dom(storeDATA)
 72      then
 73        @act1 storeDATA(dest) storeDATA(dest) {d}
 74    end
 75  end
 76  
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Figure 3.13: Channel M2: renement of Channel M1
QChannel with the chain of renements of machine Channel, selecting Channel and
Channel M2 as our initial and nal renement levels respectively. In Fig. 3.14 the
shaded chain of renement is seen as a single entity. After the selection of the two
renement levels to be instantiated, QChannel M2 abs and QChannel M2 are created.
QChannel M2 is treated as a renement of QChannel M2 abs as a consequence of the
instantiation. Subsequently, QChannel M2 can be further rened to QChannel Mz.
Figure 3.14: Instantiation of a chain of renements: Channel to Channel M2
The renement relationship between Channel and Channel M2 is ensured by discharg-
ing all the proof obligations in the chain of renement (all the proofs are discharged
automatically in the Rodin platform). By instantiating Channel and Channel M2 im-
plicitly we are also referring to Channel M1. Some of the properties of Channel M2 are86 Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation
inherited from Channel M1 (for instance the buers) but for the instantiation purpose
it is not necessary to incorporate Channel M1 explicitly. The instantiation of a chain of
renements follows the instantiation of a single machine as seen in Fig. 3.15.
INSTANTIATED REFINEMENT QChannel M2
INSTANTIATES Channel M2 VIA ChannelParameters C2
REFINES -
SEES ProtocolTypes C2
REPLACE
SETS Message := Request
CONSTANTS max size := qmax size
header := qHeader
body := qBody
RENAME
VARIABLES channel := qchannel
receivingBuer := qReceivingBuer
sendingBuer := qSendingBuer
EVENTS Send := QSend
m := q
receive := Receive
m := q
END
Figure 3.15: Instantiation of a chain of renements
The initial renement level corresponds to the most abstract machine of the pattern.
Therefore it is not necessary to explicitly refer to it. The nal renement level is any
of the other renement levels in the chain. The replacement and renaming is applied to
the occurrences in both instances whenever applicable. Once again it is not necessary to
\expand" QChannel M2 but that can be seen in Fig. 3.16. In an instantiation of a chain
of renements, the pattern context is seen as a at context comprising all the properties
seen by the renements until the selected nal renement level is reached. Therefore
context ProtocolTypes C2 is the parameterisation context for QChannel M2 and extends
ProtocolTypes, similarly to the relation between contexts ChannelParameters C2 and
ChannelParameters. As before, axioms in ProtocolTypes C2 must be respected in the
instance, so axioms are converted in theorems in QChannel M2.
3.5.3 Denition of Generic Instantiation of Renements
From the case study it is possible to draw a generic denition for the instantiation of a
chain of renements. If we consider a pattern that consists of a chain of renements M1,
M2, ...Mt, we can create a generic instantiated renement IR as seen in Fig. 3.17. The
instantiated renement IR instantiates one of the renements of the pattern Mt via the
parameterisation context Ctxt. IR renes an abstract machine IR0 and sees the context
Dw containing the instance properties. The replacement and renaming are similar to
the machine instantiation but apply to both M1 and Mt. The initial level does not
need to be explicitly dened since the most abstract level of the chain is automatically
considered. Therefore M1 is automatically dened as the initial level. In addition to the
validity checks for instantiated machines, instantiated renements require:Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation 87
 QChannel_M2
 1  machine QChannel_M2 refines QChannel_M1
 2  sees ProtocolTypes_C2
 3  
 4  variables qchannel qReceivingBuffer
 5        qSendingBuffer qStoreDATA
 6  
 7  invariants
 8    @inv1 qStoreDATA   DESTINATION    (DATA)
 9    theorem @theo1 qHeader   Request   DESTINATION
 10    theorem @theo2 qBody   Request   DATA
 11  
 12  events
 13    event INITIALISATION
 14      then
 15        @act1 qchannel    
 16        @act2 qSendingBuffer    
 17        @act3 qReceivingBuffer    
 18        @act4 qStoreDATA   DESTINATION   { }
 19    end
 20  
 21    event AddMessageBuffer
 22    refines qAddMessageBuffer
 23      any h b m
 24      where
 25        @grd1 qHeader(m) = h
 26        @grd2 qBody(m) = b
 27        @grd3 m   qSendingBuffer
 28      then
 29        @act1 qSendingBuffer   qSendingBuffer {m}
 30    end
 31  
 32    event QSend refines QSend
 33      any q
 34      where
 35        @grd1 qSendingBuffer    
 36        @grd2 q   qSendingBuffer
 37        @grd3 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
 38      then
 39        @act1 qchannel   qchannel   {q}
 40        @act2 qSendingBuffer qSendingBuffer {q}
 41    end
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 42  
 43    event QSend refines QSend
 44      any q
 45      where
 46        @grd1 qSendingBuffer    
 47        @grd2 q   qSendingBuffer
 48        @grd3 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
 49      then
 50        @act1 qchannel   qchannel   {q}
 51        @act2 qSendingBuffer qSendingBuffer {q}
 52    end
 53  
 54    event Receive refines Receive
 55      any q
 56      where
 57        @grd1 q   qchannel
 58        @grd2 q   qReceivingBuffer
 59      then
 60        @act1 qchannel   qchannel {q}
 61        @act2 qReceivingBuffer qReceivingBuffer {q}
 62    end
 63  
 64    event processMessage
 65      any m dest d
 66      where
 67        @grd1 m   qReceivingBuffer
 68        @grd2 qHeader(m) = dest
 69        @grd3 d = qBody(m)
 70        @grd4 qHeader(m)   dom (qStoreDATA)
 71      then
 72        @act1 qStoreDATA(dest) qStoreDATA(dest) {d}
 73    end
 74  end
 75  
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(a)  ProtocolTypes_C2
 1  context ProtocolTypes_C2 extends ProtocolTypes 
 2  
 3  constants qHeader qBody pHeader pBody 
 4  
 5  sets DATA DESTINATION 
 6  
 7  axioms
 8    @axm3 qHeader   Request   DESTINATION
 9    @axm4 qBody   Request   DATA
 10    @axm5 pHeader   Response   DESTINATION
 11    @axm6 pBody   Response   DATA
 12  end
 13  
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(b)
Figure 3.16: Expanded version of instantiated machine QChannel M2(a) and context
ProtocolTypes C2(c)
1. A static validation for the existence of a chain of renements for M
(M1;M2;:::;Mt).
2. The types and constants in the contexts seen by the initial and nal level of
renement should be instantiated.
The instantiation of renements reuses the pattern proof obligations in the sense that
the instantiation renames and replaces elements in the model but does not change the
model itself (nor the respective properties). The correctness of the renement instantia-
INSTANTIATED REFINEMENT IR
INSTANTIATES Mt VIA Ctxt
REFINES IR0 /* abstract machine */
SEES Dw /* context containing the instance properties */
REPLACE /* replace parameters defined in context C */
SETS S1 := DS1;:::;Sm := DSm /* Carrier Sets */
CONSTANTS C1 := DC1;:::;Cn := DCn /* Constants */
RENAME /*rename variables, events and params in M1 to Mt */
VARIABLES v1 := nv1;:::;vq := nvq
EVENTS ev1 := nev1 =  optional  =
p1 := np1;:::;ps := nps =  parameters :optional  =
:::
evr := nevr
END
Figure 3.17: An Instantiated Renement88 Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation
tion relies in reusing the pattern proof obligations and ensuring the assumptions in the
context parameterisation are satised in the instantiation.
3.6 Instantiating Theorems and Invariants
Theorems in contexts and machines are assertions about characteristics and properties
of the system. Theorems have associated proof obligations that are discharged based
on the model assumptions (axioms and invariants) . Once the theorems are discharged,
they can be used as hypotheses for discharging other proof obligations in the model,
since they work as a consequence of the assumptions.
An interesting question arises when a pattern is instantiated and contains theorems and
invariants. If a proof obligation of a theorem is discharged by creating an instance we
would not want to re-prove the theorem proof. Regarding the invariants and respective
proof obligations we would have a similar situation where we would not want to dis-
charge proof obligations in the instance if they were already discharged in the pattern.
Ideally we would like to add to the instance the assumptions and assertions given by
the theorems and invariants without re-proving them. Although addressed here as an
open question, this situation suggests a dierent kind of theorem that does not exist in
Event-B, a pre-proved theorem to be used in the instance. A pre-proved theorem would
be similar to a theorem but it would not have an associated proof obligation. The in-
variants imported from the pattern fall under the same category, where the respective
proof obligations should not be re-generated. Informally the instances are just renaming
and replacing elements without changing the semantics under the original pattern (if the
validity checks are followed) so theorems and invariants would work as assumptions in
the instantiated machine. The assumptions in the pattern (axioms) need to be satised
by the instances through the generation of proof obligations but the same does not apply
for invariants and theorems that are assertions in the pattern.
3.7 Conclusions
Reusability is of signicant interest in the general software engineering research com-
munity. Reuse has its advantages and disadvantages discussed by Standish [176] and
Cheng [55]. Reusing patterns in a style similar to design patterns is proposed in [63]
using the KAOS specication language and temporal logic. KAOS goals are combined
with existing patterns, that are already proved correct and complete and proofs can
be reused. Sabatier [154] discusses the reuse of formal models as a detailed component
specication or a high level requirement, and presents some real project examples. In
classical B [158, 4], reuse is expressed using the keywords INCLUDES and USES where
an existing machine can be used in other developments. Instantiation is a way of reusing.Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation 89
Instantiation is well-established in areas such as mathematics and other formal methods
like classical B or theorem provers such as Isabelle [137]. Blazy et al. [33] reuse Gang of
Four (GoF) design pattern adapted to formal specications (denominated specication
patterns) for classical B. Several reuse mechanisms are suggested like instantiation, com-
position and extension. Proof obligations are also reused when the patterns are applied.
Focusing on the instantiation, this is achieved by renaming sets (machine parameters),
variables and operations. Unlike our work, this approach only denes patterns as a
single abstract machine whereas we dene the parameterisation in contexts and extend
the pattern to a chain of renements.
Abrial and Hallerstede [15] and M etayer et al [124] make use of generic instantiation
for Event-B. The attening of the context is proposed in a way that the contexts of
the pattern are merged and the reuse by instantiating the at context is suggested.
Following and extending that approach, we:
• propose a methodology for the implementation of generic instantiation.
• dene a generic instantiation mechanism for a machine as an instantiated machine.
• dene a generic instantiation mechanism for a chain of renement as an instantiated
renement.
• show that that generic proofs can be reused in specic instances under the condi-
tions described in Sects. 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.5.3.
The motivation for such implementation is concerned with reusability of components
and existing developments. By creating an instance from a generic model, a new pa-
rameterised model is created based on the pattern with new specic properties.
Event-B supports generic developments but lacks the capacity to instantiate and reuse
those generic developments. As a solution, generic instantiation is applied to patterns
and as an outcome instantiated machines are created and parameterised. An instan-
tiated machine instantiates a generic machine, is parameterised by a context and the
pattern elements are renamed/replaced according to the instance. In a similar style,
an instantiated renement instantiates a chain of renements reusing the pattern proof
obligations assuming that the instantiated proof obligations are as valid as the pattern
ones. By quantifying the variables, constants and types we want to ensure that pattern
proof obligations remain valid when instantiating. Event-B is not a higher-order for-
malism: although it is possible to quantify over expression, it is not possible to directly
quantify types. Nevertheless instantiation of sequences (hypotheses and goal) is possible
as long as is done in an alpha-congruent manner. Therefore the generic proofs can be
instantiated and be used in the instance since they will also hold. A renaming plug-
in was developed supporting the renaming of Event-B elements and respective proofs.
Optimisation at level of proof renaming will be investigated in the future as it may be90 Chapter 3 Generic Instantiation
a slow operation for large proof trees. A practical case that models a communication
protocol between two entities illustrates the advantages of using generic instantiation
and in particular how to use our approach in the Rodin platform. Although a simple
case study, we believe that it can be applied to more complex cases.
Further study is required to determine if context instantiation similar to instantiated
machines is a worthwhile approach while modelling (for instance, to instantiate sets into
implementable types) Some methodological points will arise in a possible implementation
of instantiated machines and renements in the Rodin platform. As an example, Section
3.6 addresses the situation of instantiating theorems and invariants and is left as an open
question. A future step for the instantiation of a chain of renements is to study the
possibility of selecting any of the renement levels as the initial renement level giving
more freedom to the modeller. In a long term perspective, any renement chain could be
considered a pattern. Moreover a library of patterns could be provided when modelling:
whenever a formal development ts in a pattern, instantiation could be applied taking
advantage of the reusability of the model and respective proof obligations.Chapter 4
Decomposition
In the previous chapters we dened mechanisms for reusability. Still following that line
of work, we propose decomposition as another approach for reusing. Decomposition is
motivated by the possibility of breaking a complex problem or system into parts that are
easier to conceive, manage and maintain. The partition of a model into sub-components
can also be seen as a design/architectural decision and the further development of the
sub-components in parallel is possible. Two methods have been identied for Event-B
model decomposition: shared variable and shared event. Besides alleviating the com-
plexity for large systems and respective proofs, decomposition allows team development
in parallel over the same model which is very attractive in the industrial environment.
Moreover the proof obligations of the original (non-decomposed) model can be reused
by the sub-components. This chapter describes the work on decomposition, which is one
of the main goals of this thesis. Part of this work was accepted as a workshop paper
in Workshop on Tool Building in Formal Methods as [165] in the conference ABZ 2010
and afterwards selected to be extended and appear in a special edition of the journal
Software: Practice and Experience as [166]. This work was carried out in collaboration
with Thai Son Hoang and Carine Pascal. Our contribution was the development of the
shared event approach in terms of methodology and in terms of tool support. This is
described in more detail in Chapter 5. The decomposition tool developed for the Rodin
platform has been successfully used in several case studies such as a ash system de-
velopment [62, 60], decomposition of a space craft system [73], development of a cruise
control system, development of a pipeline system, among other works.
4.1 Introduction
The \top-down" style of development used in Event-B allows the introduction of new
events and data-renement of variables during renement steps. A consequence of this
development style is an increasing complexity of the renement process when dealing
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with many events and state variables. The main purpose of the model decomposition
is precisely to address such diculty by cutting a large model into smaller components.
The complexity of the whole model (also referred as original model) is decreased by
studying, and thus rening, each part independently of the others [124]. Two methods
have been identied for the Event-B decomposition: shared variable [15, 8] and shared
event [45, 47]. Moreover the decomposition also partitions the POs which are expected
to be easier to be discharged in the sub-components. From another point of view, shared
event decomposition is the inverse operation of shared event composition described in
Chapter 2. There it was proved that the shared approach is monotonic and therefore the
resulting sub-components could be further rened. That proof is applied to decomposi-
tion in a similar fashion following the failure-divergence denition of CSP as described
in Sect. 1.6.2. The properties of parallel composition in CSP are also the properties of
shared event decomposition. The most relevant property is monotonicity: as long as the
partition of events maintains the original events interface, the decomposition properties
hold which allow the independent renement of sub-components. For the shared variable
composition, the monotonicity is proved in [8]. Therefore we can introduce team devel-
opment: several developers share parts of the same model but work independently and
in parallel. We propose a plug-in developed in the Rodin platform [151] that supports
these two decomposition methods for Event-B.
Section 4.2 introduces decomposition using a simple example, describing how model
properties are partition, proof obligations are split and the possibility of rening sub-
components. The denition and validity of the decomposition is illustrated in Sect. 4.3.
Section 4.4 describes the limitations of this approach. We conclude this chapter in
Sect. 4.5 with a summary of this study, discussion about related work, applications and
future work.
4.2 Decomposition Styles
The discussion about the two styles of decomposition was introduced in Sect. 1.7. The
semantics of decomposition is the syntactic composition of M1 and M2 and the proof obli-
gations for M are then derived via that syntactic composition. Consequently, machines
M1 and M2 are constructed according to descriptions in Sect. 1.7.1 and Sect. 1.7.2. The
denition of decomposition is described in Sect. 4.3. Here an example is presented to
illustrate the use of both kind of decompositions. A simple communication process is
modelled. The abstract model can be seen in Fig. 4.1.
The variable a is initialised with the constant d0 and variable b is assigned a value
non-deterministically. The initial model contains only the event copy that copies the
value of a to variable b in one single step as described in Fig. 4.2(a). A renement
of Communication (Communication M1) introduces a middleware entity that storesChapter 4 Decomposition 93
 Communication_M0
 machine Communication_M0
 
 sees Communication_C0
 
 variables a b
 
 invariants
   @inv1 a   DATA
   @inv2 b   DATA
 
 events
   event INITIALISATION
     then
       @act1 a   d0
       @act2 b :  DATA
   end
 
   event copy
     then
       @act1 b   a
   end
 end
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(a) Machine Communication M0
 Communication_C0
 context Communication_C0
 
 constants d0 
 
 sets DATA 
 
 axioms
   @axm1 d0   DATA
 end
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(b) Context Communication C0
Figure 4.1: Event-B model of the Communication example
temporarily the value of a before copying it to b as seen in Fig. 4.2(b). Variable m
represents the middleware.
(a) Diagram of abstract ma-
chine Communication M0
(b) Diagram of Communication M1, rene-
ment of Communication M0
Figure 4.2: Diagrams corresponding to the Simple Communication example
Butler [47, 46] suggests an event renement diagram to decompose atomicity and we use
it to show the renement relationship between the events in Communication M0 and
Communication M1 as seen in Fig. 4.3. In fact we are decomposing the initial single
atomic operation into two steps using a middleware. The diagram is read from left to
Figure 4.3: Event renement diagram illustrating atomicity decomposition
right and that indicates its sequential control. In other words, the abstract event copy
is rened by rst executing the initialisation event (Init), then event copy 1 and after-
wards copy 2. In the same gure, the lines that link the events are relevant: a dashed
line represents events that rene skip (such as Init and copy 1(p)). A solid line denes
a renement relation between events. Thus event copy 2 must be proved to rene copy.
The renement Communication M1 can be seen in Fig. 4.4. Note that a control variable94 Chapter 4 Decomposition
ctrl is introduced to ensure when the content of m can be copied to b. Invariant inv3 ex-
 Communication_M1
 machine Communication_M1 refines Communication_M0
 
 sees Communication_C0
 
 variables a b m ctrl
 
 invariants
   @inv1 m   DATA
   @inv2 ctrl   BOOL
   @inv3 ctrl = TRUE 㱺 m = a
 
 variant {ctrl,TRUE}
 
 events
   event INITIALISATION
     then
       @act1 a   d0
       @act2 b :  DATA
       @act3 m :  DATA
       @act4 ctrl   FALSE
   end
 
   convergent event copy_1
     any p
     where
       @grd1 p = a
       @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
     then
       @act1 m   p
       @act2 ctrl   TRUE
   end
 
   event copy_2 refines copy
     where
       @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
     then
       @act1 b   m
       @act2 ctrl   FALSE
   end
 end
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 Communication_M1
 machine Communication_M1 refines Communication_M0
 
 sees Communication_C0
 
 variables a b m ctrl
 
 invariants
   @inv1 m   DATA
   @inv2 ctrl   BOOL
   @inv3 ctrl = TRUE 㱺 m = a
 
 variant {ctrl,TRUE}
 
 events
   event INITIALISATION
     then
       @act1 a   d0
       @act2 b :  DATA
       @act3 m :  DATA
       @act4 ctrl   FALSE
   end
 
   convergent event copy_1
     any p
     where
       @grd1 p = a
       @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
     then
       @act1 m   p
       @act2 ctrl   TRUE
   end
 
   event copy_2 refines copy
     where
       @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
     then
       @act1 b   m
       @act2 ctrl   FALSE
   end
 end
 
 Page 1 Figure 4.4: Machine Communication M1 renement of Communication M0
presses that when variable ctrl is true, the value of the middleware m corresponds to the
value of source a. This invariant can be seen as a requirement for the renement between
abstract event Communication M0.copy and concrete event Communication M1.copy 2.
The convergent event copy 1 requires a variant that guarantees that this event is not
enabled forever. Such variant is expressed as fctrl;TRUEg which means that eventually
the control variable ctrl will be TRUE and in that case copy 1 event is not enabled.
Depending on the chosen decomposition style, a system can be decomposed into dierent
number of sub-components as seen in the following sections. In the rest of this section, we
give an informal introduction to the two decomposition styles using a running example.
In Sect. 4.3 we give decomposition a precise denition and show that they represent
valid renements.
4.2.1 Shared Event Decomposition of Communication
From the modeller's point of view, the decomposition starts by dening which sub-
components will be generated. The following step is to dene the partition of variables
over the sub-components. The rest of the model decomposition (events, parameters,
invariants, contexts) is a consequence of the variables allocation as dened below. For
the shared event decomposition, we decompose Communication M1 in three parts: MA,
MB and MM as seen in Fig. 4.5.
Variable a is allocated to machine MA, variables m and ctrl to machine MM and variable
b to machine MB. It follows that event copy 1 is split between MA and MM and event
copy 2 is split between MB and MM. The resulting machines can be seen in Fig. 4.6.
Next we describe the steps for a machine decomposition focusing on invariants, events,Chapter 4 Decomposition 95
Figure 4.5: Decomposition of Communication M1 into machines MA,MB and MM
 MA
 machine MA
 
 sees Communication_C0
 
 variables a
 
 invariants
   @inv1 a   DATA
 
 events
   event INITIALISATION
     then
       @act1 a   d0
   end
 
   event copy_1
     any
       p
     when
        @grd1 p = a
   end
 
 end
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(a) Machine MA
 MM
 machine MM
 
 sees Communication_C0
 
 variables m ctrl
 
 invariants
     @inv1 m   DATA
   @inv2 ctrl   BOOL
 
 events
   event INITIALISATION
     then
       @act1 m :  DATA
       @act2 ctrl   FALSE
   end
 
   event copy_1
     any p
     where
       @grd1 p   DATA
       @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
     then
       @act1 m   p
       @act2 ctrl   TRUE
   end
 
   event copy_2
     any p
     where
       @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
       @grd2 p = m
     then
       @act2 ctrl   FALSE
   end
 end
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(b) Machine MM
 MB
 machine MB
 
 sees Communication_C0
 
 variables b
 
 invariants
   @inv1 b   DATA
 
 events
   event INITIALISATION
     then
       @act2 b :  DATA
    end
 
   event copy_2
     any
        p
     when
       @grd1 p   DATA
     then
       @act1 b   p
   end
 end
 
 Page 1
(c) Machine MB
Figure 4.6: Machines MA, MM and MB
variant and contexts. The initial partition of variables between the sub-components
denes the rest of the decomposition as detailed below.
Invariants: The decomposition of the invariants depends on the scope of the variables.
Therefore the minimal set of invariants must include the variable type denitions
as illustrated by inv1 and inv2 in Communication M1 (Fig. 4.4) or inv1 and inv2
in MM (Fig. 4.6(b)). And these are the required invariants for a valid renement.
Additional ones depend on the user, as they may be useful in later renements
or to help in reusing the sub-components. An example of partition of invariants
among the sub-components is inv3 in Communication M1:96 Chapter 4 Decomposition
ctrl = TRUE ) m = a
This invariant contains three variables: ctrl, m and a. According to the dened
decomposition, ctrl and m are variables of MM and a is a variable of MA. This
suggests that inv3 can be a constraint of the composition of the sub-components
and not a constraint of the individual sub-components. As a result, invariant
clause inv3 in Communication M1 is not part of any of the sub-components. Al-
ternatively when an invariant clause is demanded and uses variables placed outside
the scope of a sub-component, a further renement of the composed component
might be required to make an explicit separation of the variables. If we consider
again inv3 and we would like to add this invariant to the sub-components, we
would need to nd a rewrite that invariant without including variables ctrl, m and
a in the same predicate.
Events: The partition of the events depends on the partition of the variables. For
instance, variables m and ctrl are part of MM so their initialisation is allocated
to the same sub-component. Event copy 1 in machine Communication M1 has a
parameter p. When the decomposition occurs, that parameter is shared between
the decomposed events. But the guards referring to that parameter are dierent
in each decomposed event: in MA the guard is similar to Communication M1
(p = a); in MM only the type of the parameter p is dened (p 2 DATA). The
type of p is an implicit guard in the original event and during the decomposition,
the type of p is made explicit:
p = a , p 2 DATA ^ p = a
The guards of a decomposed event inherits the guards on the composed event
according to the variable partition. Variable a is not within the scope of machine
MM so only the type of p is dened in the guard of MM.copy 1.
A dierent situation occurs for event copy 2 in machine Communication M1. Al-
though the original event does not have parameters, the decomposed events have
a new parameter p. Action act1 in Communication M1.copy 2 refers to two vari-
ables (b and m) belonging to two dierent sub-components:
@act1 b := m
This assignment needs to be rewritten in a way that these variables are not part
of the same expression. A solution is to rene this event in a way that the guards
and actions do not refer to variables allocated to dierent sub-components. Before
the decomposition, we rene event copy 2 by adding parameter p:
copy 2 b = ANY p WHERE ctrl = TRUE ^ p = m THEN b := p k ctrl := FALSE END:Chapter 4 Decomposition 97
Parameter p receives the value of variable m. Then the value of p is assigned to
variable b. Whereas variable m is within the scope of MM only, the guard p = m
is added to MM.copy 2 while MB.copy 2 contains the guard p 2 DATA and the
action b := p.
Non-shared parameters do not need to be maintained in the sub-components. Since
parameters are local to events, only parameters explicitly used in guards or actions
are included in the sub-events.
Variant: Variant is only necessary when new events are introduced in a renement.
Decomposed events in sub-components are inherit from the composed component
so no new events are introduced meaning that variants are not required.
Contexts: The context Communication C0 used in the example is shared between all
the machines. That context (and possible others) can be attened into a single
context and decomposed. The context decomposition results from the exclusion
of elements (sets, constants, axioms) that are not used by the sub-component
that sees that context. On the one hand, decomposing contexts can inadvertently
remove relevant information. On the other hand, not decomposing it can add
too many (not relevant and unnecessary) hypotheses which is not benecial for
the proofs: on the contrary, it might be harmful and complicate the discharge
of proofs. Therefore, the context decomposition is optional as it varies with the
system being modelled.
The events in the sub-components maintain the interface of the original events. By event
interface we refer to the structure of the original event excluding elements referring to
variables not in the scope of the sub-event.
4.2.1.1 Renement of Sub-Components
An advantage of the decomposition is the possibility to further rene sub-components
independently from the original component and other partitions. This advantage leads
to the concept of team development over the same model by dierent modellers which
it is an attractive option, in particular for the industry. In this section we introduce
a database table as a renement of the sub-component MB (resulting from the shared
event decomposition of Communication M1) to store the received values (registries).
The database table contains three elds: REGID, DATA and PRIORITY. The new
elds are introduced in the new context MB C0 as seen in Fig. 4.7. REGID is the iden-
tication eld of all elements in the table of the database. It is dened as a constant and
represented by a subset of natural numbers (axiom axm1 in Fig. 4.7). The PRIORITY
eld corresponds to the priority that a registry is processed: LOW, MEDIUM or HIGH.
The constants id0 and p0 initialise the database elds. New variables are introduced
to represent the database registries: idR and priority. An auxiliary boolean variable98 Chapter 4 Decomposition
 MB_C0
 context MB_C0
 
 constants REGID LOW MEDIUM HIGH id0 p0
 
 sets PRIORITY
 
 axioms
   @axm1 REGID    
   @axm2 partition(PRIORITY, {LOW}, {MEDIUM}, {HIGH})
   @axm3 id0   REGID
   @axm4 p0   PRIORITY
 end
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Figure 4.7: Context MB C0 seen by renement of MB
processQueue is used as a ag to enable the enqueueing of a registry in the database
when a new value is copied to b as seen in Fig. 4.8.
 MB_1
 machine MB_1 refines MB sees Communication_C0 MB_C0
 
 variables b idR processQueue priority
 
 invariants
   @inv1 idR   REGID   DATA
   @inv2 processQueue   BOOL
   @inv4 priority   dom(idR)   PRIORITY
 
 variant {processQueue,FALSE}
 
 events
   event INITIALISATION
     then
       @act1 b :  DATA
       @act2 processQueue   FALSE
       @act3 idR   id0   {d0}
       @act4 priority   id0   {p0}
   end
 
   event copy_2 refines copy_2
     any p
     where
       @grd1 p   DATA
       @grd2 processQueue = FALSE
     then
       @act1 b   p
       @act2 processQueue   TRUE
   end
 
    convergent event enqueueDB
     any i p
     where
       @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
       @grd2 p   PRIORITY
       @grd3 i   REGID dom(idR)
     then
       @act1 processQueue FALSE
       @act3 priority(i) p
       @act4 idR(i) b
   end
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 machine MB_1 refines MB sees Communication_C0 MB_C0
 
 variables b idR processQueue priority
 
 invariants
   @inv1 idR   REGID   DATA
   @inv2 processQueue   BOOL
   @inv4 priority   dom(idR)   PRIORITY
 
 variant {processQueue,FALSE}
 
 events
   event INITIALISATION
     then
       @act1 b :  DATA
       @act2 processQueue   FALSE
       @act3 idR   id0   {d0}
       @act4 priority   id0   {p0}
   end
 
   event copy_2 refines copy_2
     any p
     where
       @grd1 p   DATA
       @grd2 processQueue = FALSE
     then
       @act1 b   p
       @act2 processQueue   TRUE
   end
 
    convergent event enqueueDB
     any i p
     where
       @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
       @grd2 p   PRIORITY
       @grd3 i   REGID dom(idR)
     then
       @act1 processQueue FALSE
       @act3 priority(i) p
       @act4 idR(i) b
   end
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Figure 4.8: Machine MB 1 which is a renement of MB
After event copy 2 is executed, new event enqueueDB adds an element to the database.
The added registry must have a fresh identication (not used before in the idR function)
and the priority of the registry is dened non-deterministically in guard grd2. A variant
is necessary for the new convergent event enqueueDB which is easily found by dening
that eventually processQueue is FALSE. A possible renement for the current model is to
process the registries according to the priority. The priority eld can also be dened more
deterministically according to the message data. In a team development environment,
the middleware could be rened while in parallel with other sub-components.
4.2.2 Shared Variable Decomposition of Communication
For the shared variable approach, we decide to do a further renement. After copying
the values, they are processed by being stored in a simple database similar to the one
used in the shared event renement described by context Communication C1 (equal to
MB C0 in Fig. 4.7). A boolean variable processQueue and new event enqueueDB are
also introduced as seen in Fig. 4.9. Concrete event copy 2 extends the abstract copy 2,
meaning that the concrete event is a copy of the abstract one plus additional concrete
guards, actions, parameters.Chapter 4 Decomposition 99
 Communication_M2
 1  machine Communication_M2 reﬁnes Communication_M1
 2  sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
 3  
 4  variables a b m ctrl idR processQueue priority
 5  
 6  invariants
 7    @inv1 idR   REGID   DATA
 8    @inv2 processQueue   BOOL
 9    @inv4 priority dom(idR)   PRIORITY
 10  
 11  variant {processQueue,FALSE}
 12  
 13  events
 14    event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION
 15      then
 16        @act5 processQueue   FALSE
 17        @act6 idR   id0   {d0}
 18        @act7 priority   id0   {p0}
 19    end
 20  
 21    event copy_2 extends copy_2
 22      where
 23        @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
 24      then
 25        @act3 processQueue   TRUE
 26    end
 27  
 28    convergent event enqueueDB
 29      any i p
 30      where
 31        @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
 32        @grd2 p   PRIORITY
 33        @grd3 i   REGID dom(idR)
 34      then
 35        @act1 processQueue FALSE
 36        @act3 priority(i) p
 37        @act4 idR(i) b
 38    end
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 Communication_M2
 1  machine Communication_M2 reﬁnes Communication_M1
 2  sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
 3  
 4  variables a b m ctrl idR processQueue priority
 5  
 6  invariants
 7    @inv1 idR   REGID   DATA
 8    @inv2 processQueue   BOOL
 9    @inv4 priority dom(idR)   PRIORITY
 10  
 11  variant {processQueue,FALSE}
 12  
 13  events
 14    event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION
 15      then
 16        @act5 processQueue   FALSE
 17        @act6 idR   id0   {d0}
 18        @act7 priority   id0   {p0}
 19    end
 20  
 21    event copy_2 extends copy_2
 22      where
 23        @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
 24      then
 25        @act3 processQueue   TRUE
 26    end
 27  
 28    convergent event enqueueDB
 29      any i p
 30      where
 31        @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
 32        @grd2 p   PRIORITY
 33        @grd3 i   REGID dom(idR)
 34      then
 35        @act1 processQueue FALSE
 36        @act3 priority(i) p
 37        @act4 idR(i) b
 38    end
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Figure 4.9: Excerpt of machine Communication M2
Communication M2 is shared variable decomposed by separating the copy of the values
and the processing, described by machines MCopy and MProcess respectively. Events
copy 1 and copy 2 are allocated to MCopy while event enqueueDB is allocated to MPro-
cess. The variables separation depends on the event allocation leading to private vari-
ables (accessed by a single sub-component) or shared variables (accessed by multiple
sub-components). The shared variables are used in events copy 2 and enqueueDB: pro-
cessQueue and b. All the other variables are private. The invariants splitting depends
on the initial separation of variables, similar to the shared event approach.
The following step is to separate the private events and create the external events. Pri-
vate events are allocated according to the user's choice. External events are based on the
original events, preserving the shared variables and turning private variables into event
parameters. If an original event depends on a shared variable, then an external event
is created in the sub-components that use that variable. Events copy 2 and enqueueDB
use shared variables and consequently external events are required. An external event
copy 2 is created in MProcess using the shared variable b. The other variables used by
the original copy 2 become parameters in the external event as they are not in the scope
of that sub-component (ctrl and m). Event enqueueDB is similarly built. The resulting
machines can be seen in Fig. 4.10.
4.3 Denition and Validity of Decomposition
We want to formally prove that a machine M can be decomposed into machines M1
and M2. We shall prove through renement POs that M v M1 k M2. The proofs are
described in the following sections.100 Chapter 4 Decomposition
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 MCopy
 1  machine MCopy sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
 2  
 3  variables m // Private variable
 4            a // Private variable
 5            ctrl // Private variable
 6            processQueue // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
 7            b // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
 8  
 9  invariants
 10    theorem @typing_m m   DATA
 11    theorem @typing_a a   DATA
 12    theorem @typing_ctrl ctrl   BOOL
 13    theorem @typing_processQueue processQueue   BOOL
 14    theorem @typing_b b   DATA
 15    @Communication_M0_inv1 a   DATA
 16    @Communication_M0_inv2 b   DATA
 17    @Communication_M1_inv1 m   DATA
 18    @Communication_M1_inv2 ctrl   BOOL
 19    @Communication_M1_inv3 ctrl = TRUE 㱺 m = a
 20    @Communication_M2_inv2 processQueue   BOOL
 21  
 22  events
 23    event INITIALISATION
 24      then
 25        @act1 a   d0
 26        @act2 b :  DATA
 27        @act3 m :  DATA
 28        @act4 ctrl   FALSE
 29        @act5 processQueue   FALSE
 30    end
 31  
 32    event copy_1
 33      any p
 34      where
 35        @grd1 p = a
 36        @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
 37      then
 38        @act1 m   p
 39        @act2 ctrl   TRUE
 40    end
 41  
 42  
 43  
 44  
 45  
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 1  machine MCopy sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
 2  
 3  variables m // Private variable
 4            a // Private variable
 5            ctrl // Private variable
 6            processQueue // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
 7            b // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
 8  
 9  invariants
 10    theorem @typing_m m   DATA
 11    theorem @typing_a a   DATA
 12    theorem @typing_ctrl ctrl   BOOL
 13    theorem @typing_processQueue processQueue   BOOL
 14    theorem @typing_b b   DATA
 15    @Communication_M0_inv1 a   DATA
 16    @Communication_M0_inv2 b   DATA
 17    @Communication_M1_inv1 m   DATA
 18    @Communication_M1_inv2 ctrl   BOOL
 19    @Communication_M1_inv3 ctrl = TRUE 㱺 m = a
 20    @Communication_M2_inv2 processQueue   BOOL
 21  
 22  events
 23    event INITIALISATION
 24      then
 25        @act1 a   d0
 26        @act2 b :  DATA
 27        @act3 m :  DATA
 28        @act4 ctrl   FALSE
 29        @act5 processQueue   FALSE
 30    end
 31  
 32    event copy_1
 33      any p
 34      where
 35        @grd1 p = a
 36        @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
 37      then
 38        @act1 m   p
 39        @act2 ctrl   TRUE
 40    end
 41  
 42  
 43  
 44  
 45  
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 46    event copy_2
 47      any p
 48      where
 49        @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
 50        @grd2 p = m
 51        @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
 52      then
 53        @act1 b   p
 54        @act2 ctrl   FALSE
 55        @act3 processQueue   TRUE
 56    end
 57  
 58    event enqueueDB // External event, DO NOT REFINE
 59      any i p idR
 60      where
 61        @typing_idR idR    (    DATA)
 62        @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
 63        @grd2 p   PRIORITY
 64        @grd3 i   REGID dom(idR)
 65      then
 66        @act1 processQueue FALSE
 67    end
 68  end
 69  
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Figure 10. Excerpt of the output of shared variable decomposition of
Communication M2: MCopy and MProcess
automatic decomposition method using LOTOS [16]: the correctness is ensured if the combined
behavior of decomposed sub-speciﬁcations is the same as the system’s behavior before the
decomposition. The method decomposes a process into two processes composed by the parallel
operator and automatically generates an additional process that gives some information about
the synchronization. The additional process corresponds to the middleware in a shared event
decomposition in Event-B.
There is a need for modularisation and reuse of sub-components in order to model large
systems and manage better the respective POs. Event-B lacks a sub-component mechanism so
we propose to tackle that problem through the decomposition of a system by their events
or variables. The shared variable (state-based) approach is suitable for designing parallel
algorithms while the shared event (event-based) is suitable for message-passing distributed
systems [10]. [3] suggests the shared variable decomposition where variables are shared
and introduces the notion of external events. [10] suggests the shared event decomposition
where events are partition through the sub-components and the interaction occurs via shared
parameters. The work developed by Butler in [7] for action system is strongly related with
the same approach for shared event decomposition in Event-B [10] as both approaches are
Copyright c   2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Softw. Pract. Exper. 2000; 00:1–7
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 MProcess
 1  machine MProcess sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
 2  
 3  variables processQueue // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
 4            b // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
 5            priority // Private variable
 6            idR // Private variable
 7  
 8  
 9  invariants
 10    theorem @typing_processQueue processQueue   BOOL
 11    theorem @typing_b b   DATA
 12    theorem @typing_priority priority    (    PRIORITY)
 13    theorem @typing_idR idR    (    DATA)
 14    @Communication_M0_inv2 b   DATA
 15    @Communication_M2_inv1 idR   REGID   DATA
 16    @Communication_M2_inv2 processQueue   BOOL
 17    @Communication_M2_inv4 priority dom(idR)   PRIORITY
 18  
 19  events
 20    event INITIALISATION
 21      then
 22        @act2 b :  DATA
 23        @act5 processQueue   FALSE
 24        @act6 idR   id0   {d0}
 25        @act7 priority   id0   {p0}
 26    end
 27  
 28    event copy_2 // External event, DO NOT REFINE
 29      any p ctrl m
 30      where
 31        @typing_ctrl ctrl   BOOL
 32        @typing_m m   DATA
 33        @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
 34        @grd2 p = m
 35        @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
 36      then
 37        @act1 b   p
 38        @act3 processQueue   TRUE
 39    end
 40  
 41  
 42  
 43  
 44  
 45  
 46    event enqueueDB
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 1  machine MProcess sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
 2  
 3  variables processQueue // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
 4            b // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
 5            priority // Private variable
 6            idR // Private variable
 7  
 8  
 9  invariants
 10    theorem @typing_processQueue processQueue   BOOL
 11    theorem @typing_b b   DATA
 12    theorem @typing_priority priority    (    PRIORITY)
 13    theorem @typing_idR idR    (    DATA)
 14    @Communication_M0_inv2 b   DATA
 15    @Communication_M2_inv1 idR   REGID   DATA
 16    @Communication_M2_inv2 processQueue   BOOL
 17    @Communication_M2_inv4 priority dom(idR)   PRIORITY
 18  
 19  events
 20    event INITIALISATION
 21      then
 22        @act2 b :  DATA
 23        @act5 processQueue   FALSE
 24        @act6 idR   id0   {d0}
 25        @act7 priority   id0   {p0}
 26    end
 27  
 28    event copy_2 // External event, DO NOT REFINE
 29      any p ctrl m
 30      where
 31        @typing_ctrl ctrl   BOOL
 32        @typing_m m   DATA
 33        @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
 34        @grd2 p = m
 35        @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
 36      then
 37        @act1 b   p
 38        @act3 processQueue   TRUE
 39    end
 40  
 41  
 42  
 43  
 44  
 45  
 46  
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 47    event enqueueDB
 48      any i p
 49      where
 50        @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
 51        @grd2 p   PRIORITY
 52        @grd3 i   REGID dom(idR)
 53      then
 54        @act1 processQueue FALSE
 55        @act3 priority(i) p
 56        @act4 idR(i) b
 57    end
 58  end
 59  
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Figure 10. Excerpt of the output of shared variable decomposition of
Communication M2: MCopy and MProcess
automatic decomposition method using LOTOS [16]: the correctness is ensured if the combined
behavior of decomposed sub-speciﬁcations is the same as the system’s behavior before the
decomposition. The method decomposes a process into two processes composed by the parallel
operator and automatically generates an additional process that gives some information about
the synchronization. The additional process corresponds to the middleware in a shared event
decomposition in Event-B.
There is a need for modularisation and reuse of sub-components in order to model large
systems and manage better the respective POs. Event-B lacks a sub-component mechanism so
we propose to tackle that problem through the decomposition of a system by their events
or variables. The shared variable (state-based) approach is suitable for designing parallel
algorithms while the shared event (event-based) is suitable for message-passing distributed
systems [10]. [3] suggests the shared variable decomposition where variables are shared
and introduces the notion of external events. [10] suggests the shared event decomposition
where events are partition through the sub-components and the interaction occurs via shared
parameters. The work developed by Butler in [7] for action system is strongly related with
the same approach for shared event decomposition in Event-B [10] as both approaches are
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Figure 4.10: Excerpt of the output of shared variable decomposition of Communica-
tion M2: MCopy and MProcess
4.3.1 Shared Event Style
Assume a machine M with two set of disjoint variables v1;v2. For the shared event
decomposition, events can be categorised in 3 ways: evt1(p1;v1), evt2(p2;v2) and
evt3(p3;v1;v2). evt1(p1;v1) is local to M1, evt2(p2;v2) is local to M2 and evt3(p3;v1;v2)
is split into evt30(p3;v1) and evt300(p3;v2). The invariant of M is represented by I(v1;v2)
(for simplicity we exclude the use of context elements). Machine M1 is represented by
variable v1;w1 and events evt1(p1;v1) and evt30(p3;v1). The invariant of M1 is rep-
resented by J1(v1;w1). Machine M2 is similar to M1 with variable v2;w2, events
evt2(p2;v2), evt300(p3;v2) and invariant J2(v2;w2).
We want to prove that M1 and M2 when composed in parallel are a valid renement
of M. The renement POs need to be veried for M1 k M2 in order to ensure that is
a concrete renement of the abstraction M: M v M1 k M2. Events of the form evt3
have the following shape:
evt3 b = ANY p3 WHERE G31(p3;v1) ^ G32(p3;v2) THEN S31(p3;v1;v0
1) k S32(p3;v2;v0
2) END:
Denition 4.1. After the decomposition, event evt3 is decomposed into events evt30Chapter 4 Decomposition 101
and evt300 that are dened as:
evt30 b = ANY p3 WHERE G31(p3;v1) THEN S31(p3;v1;v0
1) END
evt300 b = ANY p3 WHERE G32(p3;v2) THEN S32(p3;v2;v0
2) END:
in a way such that evt3 v evt30jjevt300.
Abstract machine M(v1;v2) is decomposed into machines M1(v1) and M2(v2). When
the events resulting from the shared event decomposition are composed, they are a valid
renement of the respective abstract event. Abstract event evt3(p3;v1;v2) is decomposed
into events evt30(p3;v1) and evt300(p3;v2) as long as the set of variables v1 and v2 are
disjoint. Moreover, the guards and actions of events evt30(p3;v1) and evt300(p3;w2) result
from the original abstract event referring only to their respective set of variables. The
set of parameters p3 is the same for the three events. We consider that sub-components
do not introduce additional invariants.
Theorem 4.1. If M1 and M2 are the resulting machines from shared event decomposition
of M, then M v M1 k M2. In other words, REFevtiv(evti0kevti00) holds, where evti is an
abstract event, evti0 is the resulting decomposed event in machine M1 and evti00 is the
resulting decomposed event in machine M2.
From the renement PO for machines (1.5), we need to prove that the resulting events
after the decomposition rene the original abstract ones. Sub-components do not intro-
duce additional invariants. Consequently J1(v1;w1) = J2(v2;w2) = TRUE. For events
of form evt1 and evt2, the resulting events are exactly the same as the original ones.
For events of form evt3:
REFevt3v(evt30kevt300) : I1(v1;v2)
^ J1(v1;w1) ^ J2(v2;w2)
^ H31(p3;v1) ^ H32(p3;v2)
^ T31(p3;v1;v0
1) ^ T32(p3;v2;v0
2)
` 9v0
1;v0
2G31(p3;v1) ^ G32(p3;v2)
^ S31(p3;v1;v0
1) ^ S32(p3;v2;v0
2)
^ J1(v0
1;w0
1) ^ J2(v0
2;w0
2); (4.1)
w1 and w2 are concrete variables in the renement.102 Chapter 4 Decomposition
Also assume:
v1 \ v2 = ?
J1(v1;w1) = TRUE (4.2)
J2(v2;w2) = TRUE (4.3)
H31(p3;v1) = G31(p3;v1) (4.4)
H32(p3;v2) = G32(p3;v2) (4.5)
T31(p3;v1;v0
1) = S31(p3;v1;v0
1) (4.6)
T32(p3;v2;v0
2) = S32(p3;v2;v0
2) (4.7)
Prove: REFevt3v(evt30kevt300).
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of REFevt1v(evt10kevt100):
I1(v1;v2)
J1(v1;w1) ^ J2(v2;w2)  TRUE fFrom (4.2) and (4.3)g (4.8)
H31(p3;v1) ^ H32(p3;v2)  G31(p3;v1) ^ G32(p3;v2) fFrom (4.4) and (4.5)g (4.9)
T31(p3;v1;v0
1) ^ T32(p3;v2;v0
2)
 S31(p3;v1;v0
1) ^ S32(p3;v2;v0
2) fFrom (4.6) and (4.7)g (4.10)
Prove:
` 9v0
1;v0
2G31(p3;v1) ^ G32(p3;v2) ^ S31(p3;v1;v0
1) ^ S32(p3;v2;v0
2) ^ J1(v0
1;w0
1) ^ J2(v0
2;w0
2):
The proof proceeds as follows:
9v0
1;v0
2G31(p3;v1) ^ G32(p3;v2)
^ S31(p3;v1;v0
1) ^ S32(p3;v2;v0
2)
^ J1(v0
1;w0
1) ^ J2(v0
2;w0
2)
 9v0
1;v0
2G31(p3;v1) ^ G32(p3;v2)
^ S31(p3;v1;v0
1) ^ S32(p3;v2;v0
2)
^ TRUE fFrom (4.8)g
 G31(p3;v1) ^ G32(p3;v2)
^ 9v0
1;v0
2S31(p3;v1;v0
1) ^ S32(p3;v2;v0
2) fG1 and G2 have free varsg
 TRUE
^ TRUE fFrom hypotheses (4.9) and (4.10)g
M1 k M2 is a valid renement of M. In fact, they are syntactically the same apart
from the invariants that can be lost during the decomposition: M 6= M1 k M2 but
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4.3.2 Shared Variable Style
Abrial and Hallerstede [15] use renement POs to prove that the shared variable de-
composition is monotonic. In Fig. 4.111, machine M is decomposed into N and P
(represented by the diagonal arrows) which are further rened by NR and PR respec-
tively (vertical arrows). Afterwards, NR and PR are composed originating MR. To prove
monotonicity, it is necessary to prove that MR is a valid renement of M.
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Clearly NR and PR are reﬁned by MR, but it is not obvious that M is reﬁned by MR, this is precisely what we have
to prove. The situation is illustrated in the following diagram, where the arrows indicates a reﬁnement relationship:
NP
  
  M  
NR   ? PR
  
MR
In what follows we shall prove that, provided e1r and e2r are reﬁnements of e1 and e2 respectively in NR,
then they also are correct reﬁnements of e1 and e2 in MR. Similar proofs can be conducted for the other events of
MR. We ﬁrst treat the case e1. We have to show that e1r is also a reﬁnement of e1 in MR. The correct reﬁnement
condition REF1 (Section 5.2) of e1 to e1r within NR is the following:
J(v1,w1,v2)   G1r(w1)   E1r(w1,w1 )
 
G1(v1)    v1 · (E1(v1,v1 )   J(v1 ,w1 ,v2))
Under this hypothesis, the following correct reﬁnement condition of e1 to e1r within MR clearly holds:
J(v1,w1,v2)   K(v3,w3,v2)   G1r(w1)   E1r(w1,w1 )
 
G1(v1)    v1 · (E1(v1,v1 )   J(v1 ,w1 ,v2)   K(v3,w3,v2))
As can be seen, condition K(v3,w3,v2) can be extracted from the existential quantiﬁcation in the consequent of
this implication (this is so because variable v1  does not occur free in it). It is then easily discharged because it is
already present in the antecedent of the implication.
The situation is a bit different in the case of the event e2: this is because this event modiﬁes variable v2. We
have to prove that e2r is a reﬁnement of e2 in MR. Next is the correct reﬁnement condition REF1 (Section 5.2)
of e2 into e2r within NR:
J(v1,w1,v2)   G2r(w1,v2)   E2r(w1,w1 ,v2,v2 )
 
G2(v1,v2)    v1 · (E2(v1,v1 ,v2,v2 )   J(v1 ,w1 ,v2 ))
The correct reﬁnement condition of e2 into e2r within MR is:
Figure 4.11: Shared Variable Decomposition Diagram
Abrial [8] proves this property by means of state relations between the original machine
and sub-components.
4.4 Limitations
The decomposition should have a nal goal: a misleading decomposition may harm the
development of a system instead of helping. For the shared variable decomposition the
partition of events is always possible in the sense that it is always possible to gener-
ate sub-components. On the other hand, that decomposition might be less signicant
despite being possible: a further renement may be more complex and not benet the
development. The point of decomposition (correct abstraction level) is important, since
if it is done too early, the sub-component might be too abstract and will not be able to
be rened (without knowing more about the other sub-systems). If the system is de-
composed too late, it will not benet from the approach anymore. For the shared event
decomposition, the partition of variables is not always possible for all developments.
An additional \preparation step" may be required to solve complex predicates (invari-
ants, guards, axioms) or assignments (actions) involving variables allocated to dierent
sub-components. This step can be achieved through renement. Another limitation is
that the overlapping of elements in the sub-components is not allowed which sometimes
may be useful. Even in the shared variable approach, the overlapped (shared) elements
cannot be further rened independently.
1Extracted from [15]104 Chapter 4 Decomposition
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents the decomposition of Event-B models and tool support in the
Rodin platform. Decomposition can advantageously be used to decrease the complexity
and increase the modularity of large systems, especially after several renements. Main
benets are the distribution of POs over the sub-components which are expected to be
easier to be discharged and the further renement of independent sub-components in
parallel introducing team development of a model. Our goal is to develop a robust tool
to model distributed systems that can be used by academic institution and industrial
companies.
The decomposition benets has been exploited as seen in the literature: [30, 29] study
the formal development of MAS (Multi-Agent Systems) which are complex distributed
systems to be used for critical applications using abstraction and decomposition for clas-
sical B and Event-B. Lanoix [110] also studies MAS using shared variable decomposition
to model a platoon of vehicles using Event-B. Butler [44] uses the shared event approach
in classical B to decompose a railway system into three sub-components: Train, Track
and Communication. The system is modelled and reasoned as a whole in an event-
based approach, both the physical system and the desired control behaviour.Go and
Shiratori [83] propose an automatic decomposition method using LOTOS [98]: the cor-
rectness is ensured if the combined behavior of decomposed sub-specications is the
same as the system's behavior before the decomposition. The method decomposes a
process into two processes composed by the parallel operator and automatically gener-
ates an additional process that gives some information about the synchronization. The
additional process corresponds to the middleware in a shared event decomposition in
Event-B. Rezazadeh and Butler [148] use classical B to model a distributed monitoring
and control system for vehicles entering and leaving a controlled area. After some rene-
ments, the model is decomposed into asynchronous sub-systems. Rezazadeh [147] and
Butler [149] introduce some guidelines for formal development of web-based applications
(distributed systems that can be accessed using a Web browser) in B-method. That for-
mal modelling considers only safety properties and a decomposition is suggested based
on the CSP style message-passing channels. Iliasov [96] suggests a kind of decomposition
based on modularization. The modules are introduced as a special case of shared vari-
able decomposition by modelling sequential systems and Event-B is extended to model a
system in the space domain. Separation logic [146, 144], an extension of the Hoare logic,
supports reasoning about shared mutable data structures in a \bottom-up" approach
where sub-components are put together and some composition properties can be proved.
Such an approach is dierent from ours: we follow a \top-down" approach proving the
global properties in the abstraction and decomposing only after proving the composi-
tion properties. Nevertheless Hoare and O'Hearn [93] combine the concurrent separation
logic (CSL) and CSP aiming to reason about the communication between concurrent
processes. In this work, trace semantics of parallel composition uses a composition op-Chapter 4 Decomposition 105
eration on traces that partition channel ends between processes. The communication
occurs via point to point channels with value passing messages not covering divergence
nor refusals. The traces of parallel processes correspond to the separation conjunction
of the processes traces: traces(P k Q) = traces(P)  traces(Q) where the alphabet
of processes P and Q are disjoint. Comparing to our shared event decomposition also
based in the CSP, value passing channels correspond to sub-components events that
communicate via shared parameters.
There is a need for modularisation and reuse of sub-components in order to model large
systems and manage better the respective POs. Event-B lacks a sub-component mech-
anism. Thus we propose to tackle that problem through the decomposition of a system
by their events or variables. The shared variable (state-based) approach is suitable
for designing parallel algorithms while the shared event (event-based) is suitable for
message-passing distributed systems [45]. Following any of these two approaches, the
parallel components of a distributed system can be rened and decomposed separately
without making any assumptions about the rest of the system. The shared variable
style relies on the work of Abrial and Hallerstede [15] where variables are shared and
exists the notion of external events. Butler [45] suggests the shared event decomposition
where events are partitioned through the sub-components and the interaction occurs via
shared parameters. The work developed by Butler in [40] for action system is strongly
related with the same approach for shared event decomposition in Event-B [45] as both
approaches are state-based formalism combined with event-based CSP. The end-user
chooses a decomposition style depending on specic systems and on its modelling pref-
erences. The decomposition conguration is stored persistently for replaying/editing
although further study is still required for this matter. We present an example of the
dierent styles of decomposition. A tool was developed to model distributed systems
in the Rodin platform that can be used by the industry (cf. Sect. 5.5). A visualisation
view for decomposition seems intuitive and we intend to explore it using GMF [82].Chapter 5
Tool Support
The adoption of a technology or even a theory in detriment of another can rely on the
tool support [89]. The eciency of the tool, how practical it is, the range of problems
it can solve and user support are some of the important points when developing a
tool. Formal methods are not dierent: tool support is important to add automation,
eciency and ease the task of developing formal models. Mathematical rigour enables
modellers to analyse and verify models at any part of the program lifecycle: requirements
engineering, specication, architecture, design, implementation, testing, maintenance,
and evolution [188]. To a long time, formal methods has been primarily restricted to
various research organisations. However, it is becoming apparent that formal methods
is in the transition process from academic research to industrial application. Formal
methods tools are also in the process of transition from academic toys to industrial-
strength tools [58]. In this document we address this topic by giving tool support to the
previous described techniques: composition, decomposition and generic instantiation.
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, three techniques that help the modelling of complex systems
were described. The semantics behind each one of the techniques and their advan-
tages/disadvantages were explained with the usage of small examples. Nevertheless the
broad usage of such techniques requires tool support to allow automation, to ease the
user's eort of applying the techniques and to be more ecient. Moreover, the tool
implementation ofter unveils constraints that are not taken into account while study-
ing the techniques such as scaling, optimisation or miscellaneous other issues. A user
friendly tool can be a powerful support to a dened theory and often is the reason why
the theory may be adopted or not. Therefore we strive to have suitable tool support not
only to more easily test the strength of the technique but also to allow others to quickly
use it.
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As aforementioned, the Rodin platform [151] is the result of an EU research project.
It is a software toolset, based on modern software programming tools developed to use
Event-B notation. It is open source, based on Eclipse Platform [66] and it works has
a complement for rigorous modelling developments [49]. The aim is to benet industry
by permitting the integration of any necessary functionality in the same tool. Rodin
contains a Static Checker that analyses Event-B components for syntactical errors (well-
formedness and typing of models), a Proof Obligation Generator for generating PO and
these obligations can be discharged by a theorem prover. An important Rodin feature is
the high level of extensibility reected by, for instance, the ability to contribute plug-ins.
Plug-ins are components providing a certain type of service within the context of the
Eclipse workbench. By components here we mean objects that may be congured into a
system at system deployment time [66], such as the default theorem prover (B4free [21])
or model checking systems (ProB [141]). Three tools (plug-ins) resulted from the study
of the three previous techniques: shared event composition plug-in, refactory plug-in
and decomposition plug-in. These were developed for the Rodin platform although the
methodology behind them could be implemented in other platforms and even for other
formalisms.
This chapter is organised as follows: we described the tool support for shared event
composition in Section 5.2. After the generic instantiation (Section 5.3) and refactory
(Section 5.4) are outlined. Section 5.5 illustrates the decomposition tool before the
conclusions in Section 5.6.
5.2 Shared Event Composition Plug-in
A plug-in for composed machines was developed to support the shared event composition.
We extend the Rodin static checker to validate composed machines based on checks
dened in Sect. 2.3.2. POs ought to be automatically generated over the composed
machines. Currently this feature is not available but we will address this issue in the
future. The current solution to address POs is to generate a standard machine from
the composed machine. In Fig. 5.1(a), composed machine cM2 includes machines M3
and M4. cM2 is then \expanded" as a standard machine M20 which itself renes
abstract machine M1. The composition POs (including renement) are generated in
M20. Generating a new machine allows the further development of the composed model.
Moreover the inspection of the composed events is benecial based on the experience of
using the tool. In the future, we would like to still have the option to generate a new
machine, but the POs should be discharged at the composed machine as depicted in
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Composition structure: current(a) and future(b)
5.2.1 Composed Machines
The tool implementation follows the structure described in Sect. 2.3.1 as seen in Fig. 5.2.
A new constructor is added to the Event-B syntax. This constructor, composed machine,
allows standard machines to be included: they are structured and saved in a single le.
The interaction between standard machines occur by dening which events are composed
in parallel. Moreover additional invariants, can be added to composed machine. This
is the only way to relate the state space of the included machines, since the machines
remain independent of each other. Composed machines can rene standard machines.
Consequently the abstract events must be rened by concrete ones to comply with the
renement proof obligations.
In Fig. 5.2, composed machine Carriage M1 cmp (extracted from the case study in Chap-
ter 6) renes machine Carriage M1 and sees context Train C4. Moreover two machines
are included: Doors and CarriageInterface. In other words, we want to express that
Carriage M1 v Carriage M1 cmp ^ Carriage M1 cmp  (Doors k CarriageInterface).
Moreover invariant inv1 is an additional invariant for this composed machine. There-
fore ICM(v Doors;v CarriageInterface) = I(v Doors) ^ I(v CarriageInterface) ^
carriage door = ?, where v Doors;v CarriageInterface are the variables of machine
Doors and CarriageInterface respectively. The label in the front (Invariant not in-
cluded) means that the invariant clauses of the individual machines will not be in-
cluded if this composed machine is \expanded" as explained in Sect. 5.2. The interac-
tion is achieved with the composition of events: the initialisation events are composed
in parallel; also the composed event openDoors result from the composition of event
Doors:openDoors and CarriageInterface:openDoors. This composed event renes
the abstract event Carriage M1:openDoors. More composed events can be added in
a similar fashion. As future work, proof obligations should be generated directly for
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Figure 5.2: Pretty print of the composed machine tool
5.3 Generic Instantiation Plug-in
Generic instantiation is a technique to help the development of models. In particular
if a development matches or ts an existing pattern, that pattern (and possibly its
renement chain) can be instantiated and reused. This is particular interesting when
we are targeting multiple instances of a generic pattern because we can benet from the
existing proofs of the pattern (that are expected to be discharged) and customise the
instance according to a particular purpose.
In Sects. 3.3.3 and 3.5.3, we suggest a methodology for the implementation of the generic
instantiation of Event-B machines through instantiated machine (Fig. 5.3) and instan-
tiated renement 5.4 les. The instantiation is a result of the mandatory replacement
of pattern's sets and constants and the optional renaming of variables, parameters and
events. The user needs to supply an instance context to be used for the replacement of
sets and constants (context D in Fig. 5.3). Furthermore if the instance corresponds to a
renement of an existing development, the abstract machine (M0) needs to be specied.
Consequently, renement proof obligations are generated and need to be discharged by
the user.
For instantiated renements, a pattern renement chain is instantiated. We de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INSTANTIATED MACHINE IM
INSTANTIATES M VIA Ctx
REFINES M0 /* abstract machine */
SEES D /* context containing the instance properties */
REPLACE /* replace parameters defined in context C */
SETS S1 := DS1;:::;Sm := DSm /* Carrier Sets */
CONSTANTS C1 := DC1;:::;Cn := DCn /* Constants */
RENAME /*rename elements in machine M */
VARIABLES v1 := nv1;:::;vq := nvq /* optional */
EVENTS ev1 := nev1 /* optional */
p1 := np1;:::;ps := nps /* parameters: optional */
:
evr := nevr
END
Figure 5.3: An Instantiated Machine
INSTANTIATED REFINEMENT IR
INSTANTIATES Mt VIA Ctxt
REFINES IR0 /* abstract machine */
SEES Dw /* context containing the instance properties */
REPLACE /* replace parameters defined in context C */
SETS S1 := DS1;:::;Sm := DSm /* Carrier Sets */
CONSTANTS C1 := DC1;:::;Cn := DCn /* Constants */
RENAME /*rename variables, events and params in M1 to Mt */
VARIABLES v1 := nv1;:::;vq := nvq
EVENTS ev1 := nev1 =  optional  =
p1 := np1;:::;ps := nps =  parameters :optional  =
:::
evr := nevr
END
Figure 5.4: An Instantiated Renement
starting point of the instantiation the most abstract machine of the renement chain (in
the future, the abstract machine selection might be more exible). Besides the instance
context (Dw in Fig. 5.4), the mandatory replacement of sets and constants and the
denition of the abstract machine (IR0), the modeller is given the choice to explicitly
dene the last renement machine to be rened (machine Mt).
The output of the instantiation is a new Event-B machine/renement chain similar to
the pattern apart from the dierences originated by the renaming and replacements
according to instantiated machine/renement. Moreover to reuse the pattern proofs,
pattern axioms must be preserved in the instance and therefore theorems (refactored
from the pattern axioms) are automatically generated in the instances.
Although the structure of instantiated machines and instantiated renements are de-
ned, we were not able to develop the tool support for instantiation due to time con-
straints. We also intend to build a library of patterns that could easily be instantiated.
This library should be categorised according to the formal modelling pattern as sug-
gested by Stepney [178]. Nevertheless the need to rename Event-B model elements, in
particular when the renaming involved a renement chain, was strong enough for tool
support to be developed. That tool is intended to be used as part of generic instantiation
tool support. The renaming refactory framework is described in more detail in the next
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5.4 Renaming Refactory Framework
The instantiation implies the renaming/replacing of some properties in the pattern. A
renaming supporting tool is required in a tool implementation of generic instantiation.
Moreover one of the most recurring requirements from users of the Rodin platform is
to have simple means for renaming modelling elements. Users want to have a unique
operation that will rename an element both at its declaration and all its occurrences. A
renaming operation entails that the renaming of an element does not modify its existing
proof state (no loss of proof) [160]. These requirements fall in the more general context
of refactoring. In software engineering, \refactoring source code" means improving the
source code without changing its overall results, and is sometimes informally referred
to as \cleaning it up". In the case of the Rodin platform, the refactoring framework
is not intended to change the overall behaviour of the les/elements nor losing proofs.
Note that this tool is also useful for the shared event composition (Sect. 5.2) where
the occurrence of variables with the same name results in the renaming of at least one
of them (shared variables are not allowed). This section describes the developed work
for the renaming/refactory framework, giving an overview of the architecture and how
the framework works. Initially the renaming framework was designed and developed by
Stefan Hallerstede and Sonja Holl [94].
The basic requirement for the renaming framework is the ability to rename Event-
B elements. Moreover renamings involving machine renements or context extensions
should propagate through all the occurrences of the elements even in dierent les
keeping the consistency of the model. \Renaming" simply renames the free identiers
and by checking possible renaming clashes we ensure that we are not changing the
meaning of the model (apart from the change of names or labels). As a consequence,
the overall proof obligations state should not change after the renaming.
Figure 5.51 shows the renaming framework architecture. It is considered a framework
because it is designed in a generic way allowing the incorporation of other languages
(i.e. not restricted to Event-B).
The renaming framework is an Eclipse plug-in [66, 36]. The renaming operation starts
at the RefactoryManager which loads the refactoring tree in the extension points. The
refactoring tree corresponds to the structure of the language to be used: that structure
is used to navigate and nd occurrences in the les. Afterwards Operation Scheduler re-
trieves the related les, the symbols (possible name clashes) and the individual renaming
operations (renaming operation is dierent for each element) to be applied. The run()
method checks for possible clashes, returns a clash report and requests a conrmation
before executing the renaming. Upon conrmation, the renaming is propagated in a
\top-down" style (from the abstract to the concrete level) throughout the model and
1Extracted from [160] and designed by Stefan Hallerstede and Sonja HollChapter 5 Tool Support 113
Figure 5.5: Renaming/Refactory Architecture
related les. The possible clashes are overestimated: if the les are somehow related (for
instance, two machines share the same context but are not a renement of each other)
a clash can be reported. Currently the refactory plug-in also uses the Rodin Indexer
plug-in [184] to accelerate the search of elements and nd clashes.
The renaming can be applied to the following Event-B elements:
• variables
• carrier sets
• constants
• event parameters
• labelled elements like events, invariants, actions, guards, axioms
• machines
• contexts
Figure 5.62 represents the refactory trees when an invariant label is renamed.
The renaming operation creates a list of related les and proofs to be renamed according
to the refactory tree in the extension points.
2Extracted from [160] and designed by Hallerstede and Sonja Holl114 Chapter 5 Tool Support
Figure 5.6: Refactoring Trees after processing the extension points
5.4.1 User interface
This section briey describes how the renaming plug-in is used. After installing this plug-
in (available under the main Rodin Update site http://rodin-b-sharp.sourceforge.
net/updates) in the Event-B explorer perspective, the user selects the element to re-
name as seen in Fig. 5.7(a). After the introduction of the new name (Fig. 5.7(b)), a
list of related les is created and the possible clashes are reported as seen in Fig. 5.7(c).
Thereafter the user decides to proceed or not by conrming the renaming execution.
5.4.2 Renaming Proof Obligations
One of the initial requirements for the renaming plug-in is the renaming of proofs.
The current version (v1.1.0) supports the renaming of proofs including the renaming of
carrier sets (that was not possible in previous versions). In the Rodin platform, proof
obligations for a model are divided in three dierent les: Proof Obligation le (bpo),
Proof le (bpr) and Proof Status le (bps). The proof obligation (bpo) contains the
proof obligations generated by the Proof Generator (Sect. 1.5.7) for a model. The proof
le (bpr) contains the proof tree for each proof obligation including generated hypotheses
to be discharged, applied proof rules (device used to construct proofs of sequents) and
the elements (variables, carrier sets, constants, etc) that are part of the proof. Finally
the proof status le (bps) contains the state of the proof obligation: not proved or
discharged. Any change in the model regenerates a new bpo and bps le. The bpr les
are heavier (proof tree needs to be reconstructed and loaded to memory) so the proof
trees are reused whenever possible. For the renaming of proof obligation, three possible
solutions arised:
• Adding new hypotheses: after the renaming execution terminates, the proof obli-Chapter 5 Tool Support 115
(a) Refactory menu
(b) New name wizard
(c) Report wizard
Figure 5.7: Refactory User Interface
gation les are updated by adding new hypotheses (something like old name =
new name) to the proof trees (in bpr les). This approach has its advantages
(fast, since proofs do not have to be replayed) and disadvantages (it is not really
refactoring since you can still see the old variables in the refactored proof). Also
it does not work for carrier sets (in Event-B, two carrier sets are always distinct).
• Renaming the proof obligation: the occurrences of the names to be changed
(old name) in the proof obligations are renamed to the new name (new name).
There are two possible implementations of this option:116 Chapter 5 Tool Support
{ Renaming proof tree: The occurrences of the old name are replaced with
new name at the level of the proof tree. The reasoners (generates proof
rules) for those proofs are rerun returning a new (renamed) version of the
original proof rule. The reasoners input elements in the style old name !
new name, which will be used to re-compute the reasoners recursively when
replaying the proof tree [123].
{ Renaming proof les: just as machine and context les, the structure of
proof les is added to the plug-in extension-points (corresponding to bpr).
The result is renaming the occurrences directly over bpr whenever necessary.
The disadvantage of using this approach is the dependence on the proof le
structure: changes in the proof le structure would require the change of the
plug-in which is cumbersome.
We opt to use the second solution where proof trees are renamed. The leaves of the trees
need to be explored to nd and rename all the occurrences but in the end, the proof
trees completely reect the renamed element. The disadvantage is that the operation
can take some time to nish when there are many proof trees with several long leaves
(complex proofs). We intend to work on an optimisation of such renaming in the future.
5.5 Decomposition tool
Using the extensibility of the Rodin platform, a plug-in was developed for the semi-
automatic decomposition of models. The tool allows shared event and shared variable
decomposition. This work was developed in collaboration with Thai Son Hoang and
Carine Pascal. With Michael Butler, we agreed that the correct methodology to sup-
port decomposition should be dierent for each style: for shared variable decomposition,
the events to be allocated to each sub-component should be selected by the user; for the
shared event decomposition, variables instead are selected by the user; as much as pos-
sible, the rest of the decomposition process should not require the user's input. Hoang
started the development of the tool by creating the interface corresponding to the de-
composition for the shared variable decomposition. Pascal continued that development
by introducing the required validations, creation of external external and shared vari-
ables. Our contribution was the development of the shared event approach in terms of
validations, splitting events, validating predicates and generating the sub-components.
Moreover, we developed the persistency le where the decomposition conguration can
be saved and re-run as many times as desired.
The decomposition originates sub-components according to the decomposition congu-
ration (allocation of variables). That conguration is stored persistently in a composed
machine (cf. Chapter 2 and [162]) for possible future reuse or editing as seen in Fig. 5.8.Chapter 5 Tool Support 117
(a)
COMPOSED MACHINE CM
REFINES Mn
INCLUDES
N
P
Q
EVENTS
evt 1 REFINES Mn.evt 1
Combines Events N.evt 1 k P.evt 1
...
evt n REFINES Mn.evt n
Combines Events P.evt n k Q.evt n
END
(b)
Figure 5.8: Decomposition tool diagram for a machine Mn and composed machine
CM
The input for the decomposition is a machine of a given Rodin project selected by the
end-user. After the selection of decomposition conguration, the tool generates the
sub-components automatically. The steps to be followed in order to decompose are (we
decompose machine Mn in Fig. 5.8(a)):
1. End-user selects a machine Mn to decompose.
2. End-user denes sub-components to be generated: N, P, Q ....
3. End-user selects the decomposition style to use:
Shared Variable: end-user selects the events to be allocated to sub-components.
The tool automatically decomposes the rest of the model according to the
event partition (shared/private variables, external events).
Shared Event: the end-user selects the variables to be allocated for each sub-
component. The rest is done automatically.
4. The end-user can opt to decompose the seen contexts into the sub-components
similarly to the machine decomposition.
5. Sub-components are fullled according to the decomposition conguration. Invari-
ants depending on variables allocated to a single sub-component (private variables)
are automatically added.
6. The decomposition conguration is stored as a composed machine.
7. Sub-components N, P, Q ...can be further rened.
For the shared event decomposition, a validation might be required to ensure that the
selected machine (Machine Mn) does not have complex predicates or assignments in-118 Chapter 5 Tool Support
Figure 5.9: Graphical User Interface for the Decompositon tool
volving variables of dierent sub-components. That would be a hint that a further
requirement is required in the model before the decomposition.
The decomposition conguration is performed through a wizard using the Rodin's Graph-
ical User Interface as depicted in Fig. 5.9. The decomposition conguration is stored
persistently for replaying/editing although further study is still required for this matter.
A visualisation view for decomposition seems intuitive and we intend to explore it using
GMF [82].
5.6 Conclusions
The progression and the maturity of formal methods shifted the way they are applied
nowadays. In the 1980s the application of the Z notation to the IBM CICS transaction
processing system was recognised as a major (award-winning) technical achievement,
but it is signicant that it used only very simple tools: syntax and type-checkers. In the
1990s, the Mondex project was largely a paper-and-pencil exercise, but it still achieved
the highest level of certication [188]. Modelling and proving manually by hand it is still
possible but slowly the need for less error-prone methodologies, in particular for repet-
itive tasks, requires the use of tools. Developing tools to support the formal methods
process has been an activity that started with the rst developments of formal methods
technology. Both the underlying formal methods technology and formal methods tools
have evolved substantially over the past four decades [58]. Today many people feel that
it would be inconceivable not to use some kind of verication tool [188]. Consequently
the tool development in formal methods and best practices to reach it are currently
subject of study within our community [107].
In this document, we address this topic by envisaging tool support to the previous
described techniques: composition, decomposition and generic instantiation. In all tech-
niques we have suggested methodologies for the implementation of tools. Nevertheless
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support. As a result of our study, we addressed the need of other tools (such as refac-
toring of Event-B elements throughout renement chain while maintaining the validity
of discharged proofs). Our goal was to develop prototype tools that with experience and
application to more complex case studies, could become more mature and robust. Con-
sequently further challenges regarding formal modelling to be found and tackled. And
even as prototypes, the developed plug-ins have been used already to model dierent
systems such as ash systems [62, 60], a spacecraft system [73] or cruise control sys-
tem [190], among others with success. With the received feedback, the tools undertook
several changes resulting in performance improvements, becoming more user friendly
and sometimes having additional features. There are still plenty of tool challenges to be
explored and developed as described in Chapter 7.Chapter 6
Case Study
A case study involving the specication and renement of an Event-B model is presented.
This chapter describes how the techniques presented in the previous chapters may be
used in practice. Throughout the case study, some design rules for Event-B are presented.
These rules are specialisations of Event-B techniques already presented. These rules were
suggested by the needs of the case study, but are general enough to be useful in other
cases.
6.1 Introduction
Case studies can be described as a process or record of research in which detailed con-
sideration is given to the development of a particular matter over a period of time. They
have two main purposes: the explanation and description of the application of a par-
ticular technique (illustration purposes) and to validate the usefulness of the technique
in a variety of systems (validation purpose). The described case study fulls the rst
purpose: modelling a complex system from an abstraction to a more concrete model.
Consequently the number of events, variables and proof obligations increase in a way
that the model starts becoming hard to manage. Therefore a suitable solution at this
stage is to use our decomposition technique. This procedure is repeatedly applied to
the rest of the renements. The application of decomposition in simple, abstract cases
has very little or no real advantage. As aforementioned in Section. 4.4, the point of
decomposition (correct abstraction level) is important, since if it is done too early, the
sub-component might be too abstract and will not be able to be rened (without know-
ing more about the other sub-systems); if the system is decomposed too late, it will not
benet from the approach anymore. Therefore the application of decomposition only
occurs after several renements as expected.
The second purpose of case studies is usually achieved through the development of
dierent models that represent dierent kind of systems. Their application allows the
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assessment of techniques, their suitability, advantages and disadvantages when applied
in dierent manners. Besides the case study in this chapter, the presented techniques
have already been used for dierent systems:
• Flash System Development [62, 60]: use of shared event composition and decom-
position.
• Decomposition of a Spacecraft System [73]: use of shared event decomposition.
• Development of a Cruise Control System [190]: use of shared event composition
and decomposition.
• Development of a Pipeline System [56, 12]: use of shared event composition and
decomposition.
• Development of Parallel Programs [90]: use of shared variable decomposition over
shared data accessed by dierent components.
• Development of a Multi-directional Communication Channel [163]: use of generic
instantiation.
Here, a safety-critical metro system case study is developed. This version is a simplied
version of a real system but tackles points where there the model becomes complex and
where the presented techniques are suitable: stepwise incrementation of the complexity
of the system being modelled, sub-components communication, stepwise addition of
requirements at each renement level, renement of decomposed sub-components. We
develop a metro system model introducing several details including notion of tracks,
switches, several safety measures and doors functionality among others. If the presented
techniques were not used, the metro system model would be extremely complex and hard
to manage after the inclusion of all the requirements due to the high number of variables,
events, properties to be added and proof obligations to be discharged. Decomposition
and generic instantiation alleviate that issue by introducing modularity and reusing
existing sub-components allowing further manageable renements to be reached.
The metro doors requirements are based on real requirements. The case study is devel-
oped in the Rodin platform using the developed tools whenever possible. We use the
shared event composition/decomposition and generic instantiation. The metro system
can be seen as a distributed system. Nevertheless the modelling style suggested can be
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6.2 Overview of the safety-critical metro system
The safety-critical metro system case study describes a formal approach for the devel-
opment of embedded controllers for a metro system1. Butler [44] makes a description
of embedded controllers for a railway using classical B. The railway system is based
on the french train system and it was subject of study as part of the european project
MATISSE [121]. Our starting point is based on that work but applied to a metro sys-
tem. That work goes as far as our rst decomposition originating three sub-components.
We augment that work by rening each sub-component, introducing further details and
more requirements to the model. Moreover in the end we instantiate emergency and
service doors for the metro system.
The metro system is characterised by trains, tracks circuits (also called sections or
CDV:Circuit De Voie, in French) and a communication entity that allows the interaction
between trains and tracks. The trains circulate in sections and before a train enters or
leaves a section, a permission notication must be received. In case of a hazard situation,
trains receive a notication to brake. The track is responsible for controlling the sections,
changing switch directions (switch is a special track that can be divergent or convergent
as seen in Fig. 6.1) and sending signalling messages to the trains.
(a) Divergent Switch (b) Convergent Switch
Figure 6.1: Dierent types of Switches: divergent and convergent
Figure 6.22 shows a schematic representation of the metro system decomposed into three
sub-components. Initially the metro system is modelled as a whole. Global properties
are introduced and proved to be preserved throughout renement steps. The abstract
model is rened in three levels (MetroSystem M0 to MetroSystem M3) before we apply
the rst decomposition. We follow a general top-down guideline to apply decomposition:
Stage 1 : Model system abstractly, expressing all the relevant global system properties.
Stage 2 : Rene the abstract model to t the decomposition (preparation step).
Stage 3 : Apply decomposition.
Stage 4 : Develop independently the decomposed parts.
1A version of this model is available online at http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/23135/
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For instance, Stage 1 is expressed by renements MetroSystem M0 to MetroSystem M3.
MetroSystem M3 is also used as the preparation step before the decomposition corre-
sponding to Stage 2. The model is decomposed into three parts: Track, Train and
Middleware as described in Stage 3. This step allows further renements of the indi-
vidual sub-components corresponding to Stage 4. The following decompositions follow
a similar pattern.
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Figure 6.2: Components of metro system
An overview of the entire development can be seen in Fig. 6.3. After the rst decompo-
sition, sub-components can be further rened. Train global properties are introduced in
Train leading to several renements until Train M4 is reached. Train M4 is decomposed
into LeaderCarriage and Carriage. We are interested in rening the sub-component cor-
responding to carriages in order to introduce doors requirements. These requirements
are extracted from real requirements for metro carriage doors.Carriage is rened and
decomposed until it ts in a generic model GCDoor corresponding to a Generic Carriage
Door development as seen in Fig. 6.4. We then instantiate GCDoor into two instances:
EmergencyDoors and ServiceDoors beneting from the renements in the pattern. We
describe in more detail each of the development steps in the following sections.
6.3 Abstract Model: MetroSystem M0
We model a system constituted by trains that circulate in tracks. The tracks are di-
vided into smaller parts called sections. The most important (safety) global property
introduced at this stage states that two trains cannot be in the same section at the same
time (which would mean that the trains had clashed).
We need to ensure some properties regarding the routes (set of track sections):
• Route sections are all connected: sections should be all connect and cannot have
empty spaces between them.Chapter 6 Case Study 125
Figure 6.3: Overall view of the safety-critical metro system development
Figure 6.4: Carriage Renement Diagram and Door Instantiation126 Chapter 6 Case Study
• There are no loops in the route sections: sections cannot be connected to each
other and cannot introduce loops.
These properties can be preserved if we represent the routes as a transitive closure
relation. We use the no-loop property proposed by Abrial [9] applied to model a tree
structured le system in Event-B [61]: a context is dened and this property is proved
over track section relations and functions. The reason we choose this formulation, instead
of transitive closure which is generally used is to make the model simpler and easier to
prove. Context TransitiveClosureCtx containing the transitive closure property can
be seen in Fig. 6.5.
context TransitiveClosureCtx  
 
constants cdvrel // type of relation on sections 
          tcl // transitive closure of an cdvrel 
          cdvfn // type of function on sections */ 
 
sets CDV // Track Sections 
 
axioms 
  @axm1 cdvrel = CDV ! CDV 
  @axm2 cdvfn = CDV " CDV 
  @axm3 tcl # cdvrel $ cdvrel 
  @axm4 %r·(r#cdvrel & r ' tcl(r)) // r included in tcl(r) 
  @axm5 %r·(r#cdvrel &r;tcl(r) ' tcl(r)) // unfolding included in tcl(r) 
  @axm6 %r,t·(r#cdvrel ( r't ( r;t't & tcl(r)'t) // tcl(r) is least 
  theorem @thm1 cdvfn ' cdvrel 
  theorem @thm2 %r·r#cdvrel & tcl(r) = r ) (r;tcl(r)) // tcl(r) is a fixed 
point 
  theorem @thm3 %t·t#cdvfn((%s·s't*[s]&s=+)&tcl(t),(CDV - id)=+  
theorem @thm4 tcl(+) = + 
end 
!
Figure 6.5: Context TransitiveClosureCtx
Set CDV represents all the track sections in our model. Constant tcl which is a transitive
closure, it is dened as a total function mapped from CDV $ CDV to CDV $ CDV .
Giving r 2 CDV $ CDV , the transitive closure of r is the least x satisfying x =
r[r;x [61]. Dicult transitive closure proofs in machines are avoided by using theorems
such as theorem thm3 shown in Fig. 6.5: for s  CDV and t as a partial function
CDV 7 !CDV , s  t 1[s] means that s contains a loop in the t relationship. Hence, this
states that the only such set that can exist is the empty set and thus the t structure
cannot have loops. This theorem has been proved using the interactive prover of Rodin.
The strategy to prove this theorem is to use proof by contradiction [61].
We dene the environment of the case study (static part) with context MetroSystem C0
that extends TransitiveClosureCtx as seen in Fig. 6.6. Set TRAIN represent all the
trains in our model. Several track properties are described in the axioms:
• The constant net represents the total possible connectivity of sections (all possible
routes subject to the switches positions) dened as relation CDV $CDV (axm1).
No circularity is allowed as described by axm2. Moreover, the no loop propertyChapter 6 Case Study 127
context MetroSystem_C0 extends TransitiveClosureCtx 
 
constants aig_cdv // Switches 
          net // Total connectivity of sections */ 
          div_aig_cdv // divergent switches 1->2 
          cnv_aig_cdv // convergent switches 2->1 
          next0 
 
sets TRAIN 
 
axioms 
  @axm1 net ! CDV " CDV // net represents the connectivity between track sections /* 
  @axm2 net #(CDV $ id)=% // no cdv is connected to itself 
  @axm3 aig_cdv & CDV // aig_cdv is a subset of CDV representing cdv that are switches 
  @axm4 div_aig_cdv  & aig_cdv // div_aig_cdv ! aig_cdv 
  @axm5 cnv_aig_cdv & aig_cdv 
  @axm6 div_aig_cdv # cnv_aig_cdv = % 
  @axm7 finite(net) // explicite declaration to simplify the proving 
  @axm8 (aig_cdv ' aig_cdv) # net = % // switches are not directly connected 
  @axm9 (cc·(cc ! (CDV)aig_cdv) * card(net[{cc}]) +1 , card(net-[{cc}])+1) // non 
switch cdv has at most one successor and at most one predecessor 
  @axm10 (cc·( cc ! aig_cdv * ( (card(net[{cc}])+2 , card(net-[{cc}])+1) . ( 
card(net[{cc}]) +1 , card( net-[{cc}])+2 ))) // switch cdv has at most two predecessors  
and one successor or one predecessor and two successors 
  @axm11 tcl(net)#id=% // No-loop property 
  theorem @thm1 tcl(net) = net / (net;tcl(net))// the transitive closure of net is 
equal to net " net;tcl(net) 
end 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Figure 6.6: Context MetroSystem C0
for net is expressed by axiom axm11. Theorems thm1 states that net preserves
transitive closure.
• Switches (aiguillages in French) are sections (axm3) that cannot be connected
to each others (axm6). They are represented by aig cdv divided into two kinds:
div aig cdv for divergence switches and cnv aig cdv for convergent switches. More-
over switches have at most two predecessors and one successor or one predecessor
and two successors (axm10).
• Non-switches have at most one successor and at most one predecessor (axm9).
Besides the global property described before dened by invariant inv13 in Fig. 6.7(a),
some other properties of the system are added:
1. The trains (variable trns) circulate in tracks. The current route based on current
positions of switches is dened by next: a partial injection CDV 7  CDV . next
is a subset of net (inv1) preserving the transitive closure property as described
by theorem thm1,thm2 and does not have loops (thm3). Sections occupied by
trains are represented by variable occp. These sections also preserve the transitive
closure property as seen by thm4.
2. A train occupies at least one section and the section corresponding to the beginning
and end of the train is represented by variables occpA and occpZ respectively. Note
that next does not indicate the direction that a train is moving in: the direction
can be occpA to occpZ or occpZ to occpA. These two variables point to the same
section if the train only occupies one section (inv11).128 Chapter 6 Case Study
The system proceeds as follows: trains modelled in the system circulate by entering and
leaving sections (events enterCDV and leaveCDV in Fig. 6.7(b)), ensuring that the
next section is not occupied (grd9 in enterCDV ) and updating all the sections occupied
by the train (act1 and act2 in both events). At this abstract level, event modifyTrain
modies a train dening the set of occupied sections for a train t. A train changes speed,
brakes or stops braking in events changeSpeed, brake and stopBraking. When event
brake occurs, train t is added to a set of braking trains (variable braking). Variable
next represents the current connectivity of the trail based on the positions of switches.
The current connectivity can be updated by changing convergent/divergent switches in
events switchChangeDiv and switchChangeCnv as seen in Fig. 6.7(b).
6.4 First Renement: MetroSystem M1
MetroSystem M1 renes MetroSystem M0, incorporating the communication layer and
an emergency button for each train. The communication work as follows: a message is
sent from the tracks, stored in a buer and read in the recipient train. The properties
to be preserved for this renement are:
1. Messages are exchanged between trains and tracks. If a train intends to move to
an occupied section, track sends a message negating the access to that section and
the train should brake.
2. As part of the safety requirements, all trains have an emergency button.
3. While the emergency button is enabled, the train continues braking and cannot
speed up.
Now the system proceeds as follows: trains that enter and leave sections must take
into account the messages sent by the tracks. Therefore events corresponding to enter
and leaving section need to be strengthened to preserve this property. The requirement
concerning the space required for the train to halt is a simplication of a real metro
system and could require adjustments to replicate the real behaviour (for instance the
occupied sections of a train could be dened as the sum of the sections directly occupied
by the train and the sections indirectly occupied by the same train that correspond to the
sections required for the train to halt). Nevertheless in real systems, trains can have in-
built a way to detect the required space to break. For instance in Communication Based
Train Control (CBTC [97, 72]) systems, that is called the stopping distance downstream.
The messages are represented by variables tmsgs that stores the messages (buer) sent
from the tracks and permit that receives the message in the train, expressing property
1. At this level, the messages are just boolean values assessing if a train can move to theChapter 6 Case Study 129
machine MetroSystem_M0 sees MetroSystem_C0 
 
variables next // Currrent connectivity based on switch positions 
          trns // Set of trains on network 
          occp // Occupancy function for section 
          occpA // Initial cdv occupied by train 
          occpZ // Final   cdv occupied by train 
          braking speed 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 next ! net 
  @inv2 next " CDV # CDV 
  @inv3 trns ! TRAIN 
  @inv4 occp " CDV $ trns 
  @inv5 occpA " trns % CDV 
  @inv6 &tt·(tt"trns ' occpA(tt) " occp([{tt}]) 
  @inv7 occpZ " trns % CDV 
  @inv8 &tt·(tt"trns ' occpZ(tt) " occp([{tt}]) 
  @inv9 braking ! trns 
  @inv10 speed " trns % ) 
  @inv11 &tt·tt"trns * card(occp([{tt}])>1 ' occpA(tt) + occpZ(tt)  
  @inv12 finite(occp() 
  @inv13 &t1,t2·t1"trns * t2"trns * t1+t2 ' occp([{t1}],occp([{t2}]=- 
  theorem @thm1 next " cdvfn 
  theorem @thm2 tcl(next) = next . (next;tcl(next)) // tcl(next) is a fixed 
point 
  theorem @thm3 (&s·s!next([s]'s=-)'tcl(next),(CDV / id)=- // next has no 
loops 
  theorem @thm4 &tt,s·tt"trns * s ! next0occp([{tt}] ' tcl(s) = s .  
(s;tcl(s)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 next 1 next0 
      @act2 trns 1 - 
      @act3 occp 1 - 
      @act4 occpA 1 - 
      @act5 occpZ 1 - // occpZ ! " 
      @act6 braking 1 - 
      @act7 speed 1 - 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Variables, invariants in MetroSystem M0
  event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1))  
      @grd8  tt·tt trns   card((occp   {c2   t1}) [{tt}])>1  
              (occpZ {t1   c2})(tt)   occpA(tt)  
      @grd9 c2   dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 occpZ(t1)   c2 
      @act2 occp occp   { c2   t1} 
  end 
 
  event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1) occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2   (occp {c1 t1}) [{t1}] 
      @grd10  tt·tt trns   card(((occp   {c1   t1})) [{tt}])>1  
               (occpA {t1   c2})(tt) occpZ(tt) 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1) c2 
      @act2 occp   occp {c1 t1} 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed 
    any t1 s1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 s1     
      @grd3 t1  braking   s1<speed(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 speed(t1)   s1 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  event brake 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1 trns braking 
    then 
      @act1 braking braking  {t1} 
  end 
 
  event stopBraking 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1 braking 
    then 
      @act1 braking braking {t1} 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv 
    any ac c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 ac   div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd8 c2   ran (next) 
      @grd4 (ac   c1)   next 
      @grd5 (ac   c2)   net 
      @grd6 c1   c2 
      @grd7 ac   dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   next   {ac   c2} 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeCnv 
    any ac c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 ac   cnv_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd8 c2   dom (next) 
      @grd4 (c1   ac)   next 
      @grd5 (c2   ac)   net 
      @grd6 c1   c2 
      @grd7 ac   dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   ({c1} next)   {c2   ac} 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
  event addTrain 
    any t oc 
    where 
      @grd1 t   TRAIN trns 
      @grd2 oc   CDV 
      @grd3 oc   dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 trns trns  {t} 
      @act2 speed(t) 0 
      @act3 occpA(t)   oc 
      @act4 occpZ(t)   oc 
      @act5 occp   occp   {oc t} 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain 
    any t ocA oc 
    where 
      @grd1 ocA dom(next) 
      @grd2 t   trns 
      @grd3 oc   CDV 
      @grd4 ocA   oc 
      @grd5 oc   dom(occp)=  
      @grd6 finite(oc) 
      @grd7 occpZ(t) dom(next) 
      @grd8 card(oc)=0  ocA = occpZ(t) 
      @grd9 card(oc) 1  
              occpZ(t)   ocA   next(occpZ(t)) oc 
      @grd10 next(ocA) oc 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t)   ocA 
      @act2 occp   occp   (oc {t}) 
   end 
end 
 
(b) Events of MetroSystem M0
Figure 6.7: Variables, invariant and events of MetroSystem M0130 Chapter 6 Case Study
following section (check if the section is free): if TRUE the train can move; if FALSE the
next section is occupied and the train should brake. New event sendTrainMsg models
the message sending. The reception of messages is modelled in event recvTrainMsg
where the message is stored in permit before tmsgs is reset. The guards of event
brake are strengthened to allow a train to brake when permit(t) = FALSE or when
the emergency button is activated (guard grd3 in Fig. 6.8(b)). Property 2 is expressed
by adding variable emergency button. The activation/deactivation of the emergency
button occurs in the new event toggleEmergencyButton. Property 3 is expressed by
guard grd3 in event stopBraking: a train can only stop braking if the emergency button
is not enabled.
machine MetroSystem_M1 refines MetroSystem_M0  sees MetroSystem_C0  
 
variables next trns occp occpA occpZ  
           braking speed  
           tmsgs permit emergency_button  
 
invariants 
  @inv1 tmsgs   trns    (BOOL) 
  @inv2 permit   trns   BOOL 
  @inv3 emergency_button   trns   BOOL 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 next   next0 
      @act2 trns     
      @act3 occp     
      @act4 occpA     
      @act5 occpZ     
      @act6 braking     
      @act7 speed     
      @act8 tmsgs     
      @act9 permit     
      @act12 emergency_button     
  end 
 
  event enterCDV refines enterCDV  
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1))  
      @grd8  tt·tt trns   card((occp   {c2   t1}) [{tt}])>1  
              (occpZ {t1   c2})(tt)   occpA(tt)  
      @grd9 c2   dom(occp) 
      @grd10 permit(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 occpZ(t1)   c2 
      @act2 occp occp   { c2   t1} 
  end 
 
  event leaveCDV refines leaveCDV  
    any t1 c1 c2  
(a) Variables and invariants in MetroSystem M1
  event brake refines brake 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1 trns braking 
      @grd3 permit(t1) = FALSE  
              emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 braking braking   {t1} 
  end 
 
  event stopBraking refines stopBraking 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1 braking 
      @grd3 emergency_button(t1) = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 braking braking {t1} 
  end 
 
  event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1) =   
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)  {bool( 
           occpZ(t1) dom(next) 
            next(occpZ(t1))   dom(occp))} 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 bb   tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 permit(t1)   bb 
      @act2 tmsgs(t1)     
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv refines switchChangeDiv 
    any ac c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 ac   div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 ( ac   c1 )   next 
      @grd5 ( ac   c2 )   net 
      @grd6 c2   ran (next) 
      @grd7 c1   c2 
      @grd8 ac   dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   next   {ac   c2} 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeCnv refines switchChangeCnv 
    any ac c1 c2 
event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1) =   
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)  {bool( 
           occpZ(t1) dom(next) 
            next(occpZ(t1))   dom(occp))} 
  end 
 
event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 bb   tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 permit(t1)   bb 
      @act2 tmsgs(t1)     
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value 
    where 
      @guard t   trns 
      @guard1 value   BOOL 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)  value 
  end 
 
  event addTrain extends addTrain 
    then 
      @act6 tmsgs(t)   
      @act7 permit(t) FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t) FALSE 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain extends modifyTrain 
  end 
end 
 
event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1) =   
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)  {bool( 
           occpZ(t1) dom(next) 
            next(occpZ(t1))   dom(occp))} 
  end 
 
event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 bb   tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 permit(t1)   bb 
      @act2 tmsgs(t1)     
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value 
    where 
      @guard t   trns 
      @guard1 value   BOOL 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)  value 
  end 
 
  event addTrain extends addTrain 
    then 
      @act6 tmsgs(t)   
      @act7 permit(t) FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t) FALSE 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain extends modifyTrain 
  end 
end 
 
(b) Some events of MetroSystem M1
Figure 6.8: Excerpt of MetroSystem M1
6.5 Second Renement: MetroSystem M2
In this renement, we introduce train doors and platforms where the trains can stop to
load/unload. When stopped, a train can open its doors. The properties to be preserved
are:
1. If a train door is opened, then the train is stopped. In contrast, if the train is
moving, then its doors are closed.Chapter 6 Case Study 131
2. If a train door is opened, that either means that the train is in a platform or there
was an emergency and the train had to stop suddenly.
3. A train door cannot be allocated to dierent trains.
We consider that platforms are represented by single sections. A train is in a platform
if one of the occupied sections correspond to a platform. Doors are introduced as illus-
trated in Fig. 6.9(a) by sets DOOR and their states are represented by DOOR STATE.
Variables door and door state represent the train doors and their current states as seen
in Fig. 6.9(b): all trains have allocated a subset of doors (inv2). Several invariants are
introduced to preserve the desired properties: property 1 is dened by invariants inv4
and inv5; property 2 is dened by invariant inv7; property 3 is stated by inv3; theorem
thm1 is used for proving purposes (if no doors are open, then all doors are closed).
To preserve inv5, the guards of changeSpeed (in Fig. 6.8(b)) are strengthened by
grd4 ensuring that whilst the train is moving, the train doors are closed. Also events
that model entering and leaving sections are aected, with the introduction of a sim-
ilar guard (grd11 in leaveCDV ). Adding/removing train doors is modelled in events
addDoorTrain and removeDoorTrain respectively: to add/remove a door, the respec-
tive train must be stopped. If the train is stopped and either one of the occupied sections
corresponds to a platform or the emergency button is activated (guard grd3), doors can
be opened as seen in event openDoor. For safety reasons, event toggleEmergencyButton
is strengthened by guard grd3 to activate the emergency button whenever doors are open
and the train is not in a platform.
6.6 Third Renement and First Decomposition: MetroSys-
tem M3
This renement does not introduce new details to the model. It corresponds to the prepa-
ration step before the decomposition. We want to implement a three way shared event
decomposition and therefore we need to separate the variables that will be allocated to
each sub-component. In particular for exchanged messages between the sub-components,
the protocol will work as follows: messages are sent from Track and stored in the Mid-
dleware. After receiving the message, the Middleware forwards it to the corresponding
Train. Train reads the message and processes it according to the content. This protocol
allows a separation between Train and Track with the Middleware working as a bridge
between these two sub-components.
The decomposition follows the steps described in Sect. 5.5. Variables are distributed
according to Fig. 6.10. To avoid constraints during the decomposition process, predi-
cates and assignments containing variables that belong to dierent sub-components are
rearranged in this renement step.132 Chapter 6 Case Study
MetroSystem_C1
context MetroSystem_C1 extends MetroSystem_C0 
constants OPEN CLOSED PLATFORM 
sets DOOR_STATE DOOR 
axioms
  @axm1 partition(DOOR_STATE, {OPEN}, {CLOSED})
  @axm2 PLATFORM   CDV
end
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(a) Context MetroSystem C1
machine MetroSystem_M2 refines MetroSystem_M1  sees MetroSystem_C1 
 
variables next trns occp occpA occpZ  
           braking speed tmsgs permit 
           door door_state emergency_button 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 door_state   DOOR   DOOR_STATE 
  @inv2 door   trns    (DOOR) 
  @inv3  t1,t2·t1   dom(door)   t2   dom(door)   t1  t2  
          door(t1)   door(t2) =   
  @inv4  t·t   dom(door)  ( d·d door(t)   door_state[d]={OPEN}  
          speed(t)=0)  
  @inv5  t·t   dom(door)   speed(t) > 0  
          door(t)   door_state [{CLOSED}]  
  @inv6  t,d·t   dom(door)   d   door(t)   PLATFORM   occp [{t}]    
          door_state(d)   {OPEN, CLOSED}  
  @inv7  t·t   dom(door)   door(t)   door_state [{OPEN}]      
          PLATFORM   occp [{t}]     emergency_button(t) = TRUE 
  theorem @thm1  t·t   dom(door)   door(t)   door_state [{OPEN}] =   
             door(t) door_state [{CLOSED}] 
   
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act13 door    
      @act14 door_state   DOOR   {CLOSED} 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV refines enterCDV 
    any t1 
        /* Start occupying the successor of occpZ, i.e., 
           change from 
           ... -> 0 -> t1 -> ... -> t1 -> 0  -> 0 -> ... 
           to 
           ... -> 0 -> t1 -> ... -> t1 -> t1 -> 0 -> ... */ 
        c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1)) // card(occp [{t1}])>1   
next(occpZ(t1))   occpA(t1) 
      @grd8  tt·tt trns   card((occp   {c2   t1}) [{tt}])>1   
(b) Variables, invariants in MetroSystem M2
  event toggleEmergencyButton  
  refines toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 value   BOOL 
      @grd3 door(t)   door_state [{OPEN}]     
              PLATFORM   occp [{t}]=   
              value = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)  value 
  end 
 
  event openDoor 
    any t ds 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 occp [{t}]   PLATFORM      
              emergency_button(t) = TRUE 
      @grd4 ds   door(t) 
      @grd5  d·d ds door_state(d)=CLOSED 
      @grd6 ds   
    then 
      @act1 door_state  door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoor 
    any t ds 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 ds   door(t) 
      @grd4 door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd5 ds   
    then 
      @act1 door_state  door_state   (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  event addDoorTrain 
    any t d  
    where 
      @grd1 t   trns 
      @grd2 d   DOOR 
      @grd3  tr·tr dom(door)   tr t  
           door(tr)   d door(tr)=  
      @grd5 speed(t)=0  
      @grd7 d door(t)=  
    then 
      @act1 door(t) door(t) d  
      @act2 door_state  
           door_state (d {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoorTrain 
    any t d  
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 d   DOOR 
      @grd3 d   door(t)  
      @grd4 door_state[d]={CLOSED} 
      @grd5 speed(t)=0 
    then 
      @act1 door(t)   door(t) d 
  end 
 
  event addTrain extends addTrain  
    then 
      @act9 door(t)   
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain extends modifyTrain  
  end 
end 
 
  event leaveCDV refines leaveCDV  
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @grd1 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1) occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2   (occp {c1 t1}) [{t1}] 
      @grd10  tt·tt trns  
        card(((occp   {c1   t1})) [{tt}])>1  
        (occpA {t1   c2})(tt) occpZ(tt) 
      @grd11 door(t1) door_state [{OPEN}]=  
      @grd12 permit(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1) c2 
      @act2 occp   (occp {c1 t1}) 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed refines changeSpeed  
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd2 s1     
      @grd3 t1  braking   s1<speed(t1)  
      @grd4 door(t1) door_state [{OPEN}]=  
    then 
      @act1 speed(t1)   s1 
  end 
 
  event brake refines brake  
    any t1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1 trns braking 
      @grd3 permit(t1) = FALSE    emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 braking braking   {t1} 
  end 
 
  event stopBraking refines stopBraking  
    any t1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1 braking 
      @grd3 emergency_button(t1) = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 braking braking {t1} 
  end 
 
  event sendTrainMsg extends sendTrainMsg  
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg extends recvTrainMsg  
  end 
 
(c) Some events of MetroSystem M2
Figure 6.9: Excerpt of MetroSystem M2Chapter 6 Case Study 133
Figure 6.10: MetroSystem M3 (shared event) decomposed into Track, Train and
Middleware
Some guards need to be rewritten in the rened events. For instance, guard grd10
in event leaveCDV needs to be rewritten in order not to include both variables trns
(sub-component Train) and occp (sub-component Track). Therefore it is changed from:
8tttt 2 trns ^ card((occp [ fc2 7! t1g) 1[fttg]) > 1 ) (occpZ    ft1 7! c2g)(tt) 6= occpA(tt)
to:
8tttt 2 dom(occpZ)^card((occp [ fc2 7! t1g) 1[fttg]) > 1)(occpZ   ft1 7! c2g)(tt) 6= occpA(tt) (Fig. 6.11).
Both predicates represent the same property since trns corresponds to the domain
of variable occpZ (see inv7 in Fig. 6.7(a)). In Fig. 6.11, the original guard grd3 in
toggleEmergencyButton is rewritten to separate variables occp and door. In this case,
an additional parameter occpTrns representing the variable occp is added (grd4). This
additional parameter will represent the value passing between the resulting decomposed
events: parameter occpTrns is written the value of occp and afterwards it is read in
guard grd3. Similarly guard grd4 in event openDoor must not include variables occp
and emergency button and consequently parameter occpTrns is added.
Sub-components Train, Track and Middleware are described in the following sec-
tions. The composed machine corresponding to the dened decomposition can be seen
in Fig. 6.12 where it is illustrated how the original events are decomposed.
6.6.1 Machine Track
Machine Track contains the properties concerning the sections in the metro system.
Events corresponding to entering, leaving tracks and changing switch positions are part
of this sub-component resulting from the variables allocation for this sub-component:
next, occp, occpA and occpZ. Event sendTrainMsg is also added since the messages are134 Chapter 6 Case Study
event toggleEmergencyButton  
refines toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value occpTrns 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 value   BOOL 
      @grd3 door(t)   door_state [{OPEN}]      
              PLATFORM   occpTrns=   
              value = TRUE 
      @grd4 occpTrns = occp [{t}] 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)  value 
  end 
 
 event openDoor refines openDoor 
    any t occpTrns ds 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 occpTrns = occp [{t}] 
      @grd4 occpTrns   PLATFORM      
              emergency_button(t) = TRUE 
      @grd5 ds   door(t) 
      @grd6  d·d ds door_state(d)=CLOSED 
      @grd7 ds   
    then 
      @act1 door_state  door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoor refines closeDoor  
    any t ds  
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 ds   door(t) 
      @grd4 door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act1 door_state  door_state   (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  
  event addDoorTrain extends addDoorTrain  
  end 
 
  event removeDoorTrain extends removeDoorTrain  
  end 
end 
 
 event leaveCDV refines leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1) occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2   (occp {c1 t1}) [{t1}] 
      @grd10  tt·tt dom(occpZ)  
               card(((occp   {c1   t1})) [{tt}])>1  
               (occpA {t1   c2})(tt) occpZ(tt) 
      @grd11 door(t1) door_state [{OPEN}]=  
      @grd13 permit(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1) c2 
      @act2 occp   (occp {c1 t1}) 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv refines switchChangeDiv  
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @grd1 ac div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 (ac   c1)   next 
      @grd5 (ac   c2)   net 
      @grd6 c2   ran (next) // Added for helping the proving. Confirms that 
section(CDV) c2 is not the end connected of any other section 
      @grd7 c1   c2 
      @grd8 ac   dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   next   {ac   c2} 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeCnv refines switchChangeCnv  
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @grd1 ac   cnv_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 c2   dom (next) 
      @grd5 c1   ac   next 
      @grd6 c2   ac   net 
      @grd7 c1   c2 
      @grd8 ac   dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   (({c1} next)   {c2   ac}) 
  end 
Figure 6.11: Preparation step before decomposition of MetroSystem M3
sent from the tracks as seen in Fig. 6.13. The original events toggleEmergencyButton
and openDoor require occp in their guards. Consequently part of these original events
are included in this sub-component.
Note that the invariants dening the variables may change: in MetroSystem M1 variable
occp is dened as occp 2 CDV $trns (inv4 in Fig. 6.7(a)); in Track is occp 2 CDV $
TRAIN (which is the same as theorem typing occp : occp 2 P(CDV  TRAIN) in
Fig. 6.13). This is a consequence of the variable partition since trns is not part of
Track and therefore the occp relation is updated with trns's type: TRAIN (cf. inv3 in
Fig. 6.7(a)). Variables occpA and occpZ are subject to the same procedure where the
original invariant is a total function trns!CDV and in the sub-component both become
P(TRAINCDV ). The sub-components invariants are derived from the dierent initial
abstract models (cf. their labels in Fig. 6.13). Invariants that only restrain the sub-
component variables are automatically included although additional ones can be added
manually.
6.6.2 Machine Train
Machine Train models the trains in the metro system. Trains entering/leaving a sec-
tion, modelled by events enterCDV and leaveCDV are part of this sub-component,
in spite of the decomposed events do not execute any actions (see Fig. 6.14(b)). The
interaction with sub-component Track occurs through parameters t1, c1 and c2 (see
events Track:leaveCDV in Fig. 6.13). Variables door and door state are part of this
sub-component and consequently the events that modify these variables: openDoor and
closeDoor. Moreover, since the emergency button is part of a train, the respective vari-
able emergencyButton (and the modication event toggleEmergencyButton) is also
included in this sub-component. Event recvTrainMsg receives messages sent to theChapter 6 Case Study 135
COMPOSED MACHINE MetroSystem M3 cmp
REFINES MetroSystem M3
INCLUDES
Track Train Middleware
EVENTS
addTrain renes addTrain
Combines Events Train.addTrain k Middleware.addTrain kTrack.addTrain
modifyTrain renes modifyTrain
Combines Events Train.modifyTrain kTrack.modifyTrain
sendTrainMsg renes sendTrainMsg
Combines Events Track.sendTrainMsg k Middleware.sendTrainMsg
recvTrainMsg renes recvTrainMsg
Combines Events Train.recvTrainMsg k Middleware.recvTrainMsg
changeSpeed renes changeSpeed
Combines Events Train. changeSpeed
brake renes brake
Combines Events Train.brake
stopBraking renes stopBraking
Combines Events Train.stopBraking
enterCDV renes enterCDV
Combines Events Train.enterCDV k Track.enterCDV
leaveCDV renes leaveCDV
Combines Events Train.leaveCDV k Track.leaveCDV
openDoor renes openDoor
Combines Events Train.openDoor k Track.openDoor
closeDoor renes closeDoor
Combines Events Train.closeDoor
toggleEmergencyButton renes toggleEmergencyButton
Combines Events Train.toggleEmergencyButton k Track.toggleEmergencyButton
addDoorTrain renes addDoorTrain
Combines Events Train.addDoorTrain
removeDoorTrain renes removeDoorTrain
Combines Events Train.removeDoorTrain
switchChangeDiv renes switchChangeDiv
Combines Events Track.switchChangeDiv
switchChangeCnv renes switchChangeCnv
Combines Events Track.switchChangeCnv
END
Figure 6.12: Composed machine tool view corresponding to MetroSystem M3 decom-
position
trains and the content is stored in the variable permit. Although variable permit is set
based on the content of the messages exchanged between Train and Track, that variable
is read by trains. This is the reason why it is allocated to this sub-component. The
events that change the speed of the train are also included in this sub-component: brake,
stopBraking, changeSpeed due to variables speed and braking as depicted in Fig. 6.14.
6.6.3 Machine Middleware
Finally the communication layer in modelled by Middleware as seen in Fig. 6.15. Mid-
dleware bridges Track and Trains, by receiving messages (sendTrainMsg) from the
tracks and delivering to the trains (recvTrainMsg). Variable tmsgs is used as a buer.
Beneting from the monotonicity of the shared event approach, the resulting sub-
components can be further rened. Following Fig. 6.3, Train is rened as described136 Chapter 6 Case Study
machine Track sees MetroSystem_C1  
 
variables next occp occpA occpZ  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_occpZ occpZ    (TRAIN   CDV) 
  theorem @typing_occp occp    (CDV   TRAIN) 
  theorem @typing_next next    (CDV   CDV) 
  theorem @typing_occpA occpA    (TRAIN   CDV) 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv1 next   net 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv2 next   CDV   CDV 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv12 finite(occp ) 
 
  event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
      @grd3 bb = bool (occpZ(t1) dom(next)  
              next(occpZ(t1)) dom(occp) ) 
  end 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act6 next     
      @act7 occp     
      @act8 occpA     
      @act9 occpZ     
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1)) 
      @grd8  tt·tt dom(occpZ)  
              card((occp   {c2   t1}) [{tt}])>1  
              (occpZ {t1   c2})(tt)   occpA(tt) 
      @grd9 c2 dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 occpZ(t1)   c2 
      @act2 occp occp   { c2   t1} 
  end 
 
  event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd5 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1) occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2   (occp {c1 t1}) [{t1}] 
      @grd10  tt·tt dom(occpZ)  
               card(((occp   {c1   t1})) [{tt}])>1  
               (occpA {t1   c2})(tt) occpZ(tt) 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1) c2 
      @act2 occp   (occp {c1 t1}) 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv 
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_ac ac   CDV 
      @grd1 ac div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 (ac   c1)   next 
      @grd5 (ac   c2)   net 
      @grd6 c2   ran (next) 
      @grd7 c1   c2 
      @grd8 ac   dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   next   {ac   c2} 
  event switchChangeCnv 
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_ac ac   CDV 
      @grd1 ac   cnv_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 c2   dom (next) 
      @grd5 c1   ac   next 
      @grd6 c2   ac   net 
      @grd7 c1   c2 
      @grd8 ac   dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   (({c1} next)   {c2   ac}) 
  end 
 
event openDoor 
    any t occpTrns ds  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd3 occpTrns = occp [{t}] 
      @grd7 ds   
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value occpTrns  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @grd2 value   BOOL 
      @grd4 occpTrns = occp [{t}] 
  end  
end 
 
 
 event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1)) 
      @grd8  tt·tt dom(occpZ)  
              card((occp   {c2   t1}) [{tt}])>1  
              (occpZ {t1   c2})(tt)   occpA(tt) 
      @grd9 c2 dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 occpZ(t1)   c2 
      @act2 occp occp   { c2   t1} 
  end 
 
  event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd5 c1 dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1) occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2   (occp {c1 t1}) [{t1}] 
      @grd10  tt·tt dom(occpZ)  
               card(((occp   {c1   t1})) [{tt}])>1  
               (occpA {t1   c2})(tt) occpZ(tt) 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1) c2 
      @act2 occp   (occp {c1 t1}) 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv 
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_ac ac   CDV 
      @grd1 ac div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 (ac   c1)   next 
      @grd5 (ac   c2)   net 
      @grd6 c2   ran (next) 
      @grd7 c1   c2 
      @grd8 ac   dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   next   {ac   c2} 
  event switchChangeCnv 
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_ac ac   CDV 
      @grd1 ac   cnv_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 c2   dom (next) 
      @grd5 c1   ac   next 
      @grd6 c2   ac   net 
      @grd7 c1   c2 
      @grd8 ac   dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next   (({c1} next)   {c2   ac}) 
  end 
 
event openDoor 
    any t occpTrns ds  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd3 occpTrns = occp [{t}] 
      @grd7 ds   
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value occpTrns  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @grd2 value   BOOL 
      @grd4 occpTrns = occp [{t}] 
  end  
end 
 
Figure 6.13: Excerpt of Track
in the following section.
6.7 Renement of Train: Train M1
In Train M1, carriages are introduced as parts of a train. Each carriage has an individual
alarm that when activated, triggers the train alarm (enables the emergency button of
the train). Each train has a limited number of carriages. Each carriage has a set of
doors and the sum of carriage doors corresponds to the doors of a train. The properties
to be preserved are:
1. There is a limit to the number (MAX NUMBER CARRIAGE) of carriages per
train.
2. Whenever a carriage alarm is activated, then the emergency button of that same
train is activated.
3. The sum of carriage doors corresponds to the doors of a train.
The denition of these requirements require the introduction of some static elements
like a carrier set CARRIAGE, constants MAX NUMBER CARRIAGE and
DOOR CARRIAGE (function between DOOR and CARRIAGE). The latter is dened
as a constant because the number of doors in a carriage does not change. ContextChapter 6 Case Study 137
machine Train sees MetroSystem_C1  
 
variables trns speed permit braking emergency_button door_state door  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_trns trns    (TRAIN) 
  theorem @typing_door_state door_state    (DOOR   DOOR_STATE) 
  theorem @typing_braking braking    (TRAIN) 
  theorem @typing_speed speed    (TRAIN    ) 
  theorem @typing_permit permit    (TRAIN   BOOL) 
  theorem @typing_door door    (TRAIN    (DOOR)) 
  theorem @typing_emergency_button emergency_button    (TRAIN   BOOL) 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv3 trns   TRAIN 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv9 braking   trns 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv10 speed   trns     
  @MetroSystem_M1_inv2 permit   trns   BOOL 
  @MetroSystem_M1_inv7 emergency_button   trns   BOOL 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv1 door_state   DOOR   DOOR_STATE 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv2 door   trns    (DOOR) 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv3  t1,t2·t1   dom(door)   t2   dom(door)   t1  t2   door(t1)   door(t2) =   
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv4  t·t   dom(door)  ( d·d door(t)   door_state[d]={OPEN}   speed(t)=0) 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv5  t·t   dom(door)   speed(t) > 0   door(t)   door_state [{CLOSED}] 
  theorem @MetroSystem_M2_thm1  t·t   dom(door)   door(t)   door_state [{OPEN}] =   
                                  door(t) door_state [{CLOSED}] 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act2 trns     
      @act3 speed     
      @act4 permit     
      @act5 braking     
      @act10 door    
      @act11 emergency_button     
      @act12 door_state   DOOR   {CLOSED} 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
(a) Variables and invariants in Train
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
    then 
      @act2 permit(t1) bb 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed 
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_s1 s1     
      @grd1 s1     
      @grd2 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd3 t1   braking   s1 < speed (t1) 
      @grd4 door(t1)   door_state [{OPEN}] =  
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1)   s1 
  end 
 
  event brake 
    any t1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1   trns braking 
      @grd2 t1   dom(emergency_button) 
      @grd3 permit(t1) = FALSE  
              emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 braking   braking   {t1} 
  end 
 
event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd11 door(t1) door_state [{OPEN}]=  
      @grd12 permit(t1)=TRUE 
  end 
 
 
  event stopBraking 
    any t1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1 braking 
      @grd3 emergency_button(t1) = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 braking braking {t1} 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
  event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd11 door(t1) door_state [{OPEN}]=  
      @grd12 permit(t1)=TRUE 
  end 
 
  event openDoor 
    any t occpTrns ds  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd4 occpTrns   PLATFORM      
              emergency_button(t) = TRUE 
      @grd5 ds   door(t) 
      @grd6  d·d ds door_state(d)=CLOSED 
      @grd7 ds   
    then 
      @act1 door_state  door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoor 
    any t ds  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 ds   door(t) 
      @grd4 door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd5 ds   
    then 
      @act1 door_state  door_state   (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value occpTrns  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 value   BOOL 
      @grd3 door(t)   door_state [{OPEN}]      
              PLATFORM   occpTrns=   
              value = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)  value 
  end 
 
  event addDoorTrain 
    any t d  
event addDoorTrain 
    any t d  
    where 
      @typing_d d    (DOOR) 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t   trns 
      @grd2 d   DOOR 
      @grd3  tr·tr dom(door)   tr t  
              door(tr)     d door(tr)=  
      @grd5 speed(t)=0 
      @grd7 d door(t)=  
    then 
      @act1 door(t) door(t) d 
      @act2 door_state door_state (d {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoorTrain 
    any t d  
    where 
      @typing_d d    (DOOR) 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 d   DOOR 
      @grd3 d   door(t) 
      @grd4 door_state[d]={CLOSED} 
      @grd5 speed(t)=0 
    then 
      @act1 door(t)   door(t) d 
  end 
 
  event addTrain 
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @guard t   TRAIN trns 
      @grd1 oc   CDV 
    then 
      @act1 trns trns  {t} 
      @act2 speed(t) 0 
      @act7 permit(t) FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t) FALSE 
      @act9 door(t)   
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain 
    any t ocA oc  
    where 
      @typing_ocA ocA   CDV 
      @typing_oc oc    (CDV) 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t   trns 
      @grd3 oc   CDV 
      @grd4 ocA   oc 
      @grd6 finite(oc) 
      @grd10 speed(t)=0 
  end 
end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
    then 
      @act2 permit(t1) bb 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed 
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_s1 s1     
      @grd1 s1     
      @grd2 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd3 t1   braking   s1 < speed (t1) 
      @grd4 door(t1)   door_state [{OPEN}] =  
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1)   s1 
  end 
 
  event brake 
    any t1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1   trns braking 
      @grd2 t1   dom(emergency_button) 
      @grd3 permit(t1) = FALSE  
              emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 braking   braking   {t1} 
  end 
 
event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1   CDV 
      @grd3 c2   CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd11 door(t1) door_state [{OPEN}]=  
      @grd12 permit(t1)=TRUE 
  end 
 
 
  event stopBraking 
    any t1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1 braking 
      @grd3 emergency_button(t1) = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 braking braking {t1} 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
(b) Some events of Train
Figure 6.14: Excerpt of Train
Train C2 is depicted in Fig. 6.16(a). Several variables are added such as train carriage
relating carriages with trains and carriage alarm that is a total function between
CARRIAGE and BOOL, illustrated in Fig. 6.16(b). Property 1 is expressed by invari-
ant inv6 stating that trains have a maximum of MAX NUMBER CARRIAGE carriages.
Property 2 is dened in inv7 as seen in Fig. 6.16(b). Events activateEmergencyCarriage-
Button and deactivateEmergencyTrainButton rene abstract event toggleEmergencyBut-
ton: the rst event enables a carriage alarm and consequently enables the emergency
button of the train; the later occurs when the emergency button of a train is active138 Chapter 6 Case Study
machine Middleware sees MetroSystem_C1  
 
variables tmsgs  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_tmsgs tmsgs    (TRAIN    (BOOL)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs     
  end 
 
  event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
      @grd1 t1   dom(tmsgs) 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1)=  
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)   {bb} 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
      @grd1 t1   dom(tmsgs) 
      @grd2 bb   tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)   
  end 
 
  event addTrain 
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @grd1 oc   CDV 
    then 
      @act6 tmsgs(t)   
  end 
end 
 
machine Middleware sees MetroSystem_C1  
 
variables tmsgs  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_tmsgs tmsgs    (TRAIN    (BOOL)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs     
  end 
 
  event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
      @grd1 t1   dom(tmsgs) 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1)=  
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)   {bb} 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
      @grd1 t1   dom(tmsgs) 
      @grd2 bb   tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)   
  end 
 
  event addTrain 
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @grd1 oc   CDV 
    then 
      @act6 tmsgs(t)   
  end 
end 
 
Figure 6.15: Machine Middleware
and corresponds to the deactivation of the last enabled carriage alarm which results in
deactivating the emergency button; a new event deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton
is added to model the deactivation of a carriage alarm when there is still another alarm
enabled for the same train (guards grd4 and grd5). The allocation and removal of
carriages (events allocateCarriageTrain and removeCarriageTrain) rene addDoorTrain
and removeDoorTrain respectively. In these two events, the parameter d representing
a set of doors, is replaced in the witness section by the doors of the added/removed
carriage: d = DOOR CARRIAGE 1[fcg]. We continue the renement of Train in the
following section.
6.8 Second Renement of Train: Train M2
In this renement of Train, carriages requirements are added. We specify carriage
doors instead of the more abstract train doors. As a consequence, variable doors is
data rened and disappears. Each train contains two cabin carriages (type A) and two
ordinary carriages (type B) allocated as follows: A+B+B+A. Only one of the two cabin
carriages is set to be the leader carriage controlling the set of carriages and the moving
direction. Trains have states dening if they are in maintenance or if they are being
driven manually or automatically. More safety requirements are introduced: if the speed
of a train exceeds the safety maximum speed, the emergency brake for that train must
be activated. The abstract event representing the change of speed is rened by several
concrete events and includes the behaviour of the system when a train is above the
maximum speed. The properties to be preserved in this renement are:
1. If a train is not in maintenance, then it must have the correct number of carriages
and the leader carriage must be dened already. Consequently, this is a condition
to be veried before the train can change speed.Chapter 6 Case Study 139
context Train_C1 extends MetroSystem_C1 
 
constants MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE  
           DOOR_CARRIAGE 
 
sets CARRIAGE 
 
axioms 
  @axm1 MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE    1  
  @axm2 DOOR_CARRIAGE   DOOR CARRIAGE 
  @axm3  c·c ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
                 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   
end 
 
(a) Context Train C1
machine Train_M1 refines Train  sees Train_C1  
 
variables trns speed permit braking door_state door emergency_button  
          train_carriage carriage_alarm  
 
invariants 
  @inv1 finite(trns) 
  @inv2 carriage_alarm   CARRIAGE   BOOL 
  @inv3 train_carriage   CARRIAGE   trns 
  @inv4 finite(train_carriage) 
  @inv5 finite(dom(train_carriage)) 
  @inv6  t·t   trns   card(train_carriage [{t}]) MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
  @inv7  c·(c   dom(train_carriage)   carriage_alarm(c) = TRUE  
    c   dom(train_carriage)   emergency_button(train_carriage(c))= TRUE) 
  @inv8  t·t dom(door)   door(t)=DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns     
      @act2 speed     
      @act3 permit     
      @act4 braking     
      @act5 door    
      @act6 door_state   DOOR   {CLOSED} 
      @act7 carriage_alarm  CARRIAGE   {FALSE} 
      @act8 train_carriage     
      @act9 emergency_button     
  end 
 
    event recvTrainMsg refines recvTrainMsg  
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   trns 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
    then 
      @act2 permit(t1) bb 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed refines changeSpeed  
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1   TRAIN 
      @grd2 s1     
      @grd3 s1     
      @grd4 t1   dom(door) 
      @grd5 t1   braking   s1 < speed (t1) 
      @grd6 door(t1)   door_state [{OPEN}] =  
      @grd7 door(t1)   
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1)   s1 
  end 
 
  event brake extends brake  
  end 
 
  event stopBraking refines stopBraking  
    any t1  
    where 
(b) Variables and Invariants of Train M1
  event activateEmergencyCarriageButton  
  refines toggleEmergencyButton  
    any c occpTrns  
    where 
      @grd1 occpTrns    (CDV)  
      @grd2 c   dom(train_carriage)  
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
    with 
      @value value = TRUE 
      @t t = train_carriage(c) 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_alarm(c)   TRUE 
      @act2 emergency_button(train_carriage(c))   TRUE 
  end 
 
  event deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton 
    any c  
    where 
      @grd1 c   dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) = TRUE 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = TRUE 
      @grd4 {c}   (dom(carriage_alarm   {TRUE})  
                   train_carriage [{train_carriage(c)}])  
      @grd5 card(train_carriage {train_carriage(c)})>1 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_alarm(c)  FALSE 
  end 
 
  event deactivateEmergencyTrainButton  
  refines toggleEmergencyButton  
    any c occpTrns  
    where 
      @grd1 occpTrns    (CDV)  
      @grd2 c   dom(train_carriage)  
      @grd3 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) = TRUE 
      @grd4 carriage_alarm(c) = TRUE 
      @grd5 {c} = (dom(carriage_alarm   {TRUE})  
                    train_carriage [{train_carriage(c)}]) 
      @grd6 door(train_carriage(c)) door_state [{OPEN}] =    
    with 
      @value value = FALSE 
      @t t = train_carriage(c) 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_alarm(c)  FALSE 
      @act2 emergency_button(train_carriage(c))   FALSE 
  end 
 
  event alocateCarriageTrain refines addDoorTrain  
    any c t  
    where 
      @grd1 c   CARRIAGE dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd4  tr·tr dom(door)   tr t   door(tr)     DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door(tr)=  
      @grd5 t   trns 
      @grd6 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd7 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
      @grd8 card(dom(train_carriage   {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd9 speed(t)=0 
      @grd10 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   door(t)=  // @grd11 t   dom(door)   
  event alocateCarriageTrain refines addDoorTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 c   CARRIAGE dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd3  tr·tr dom(door)   tr t   door(tr)    
              DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door(tr)=  
      @grd4 t   trns 
      @grd5 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd6 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
      @grd7 card(dom(train_carriage   {t})) 
                             <MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd8 speed(t)=0 
      @grd9 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   door(t)=  
    with 
      @d d=(DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]) 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage(c)  t 
      @act2 door(t) door(t)   DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
      @act3 door_state  
        door_state (DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeDoorTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door) 
      @grd2 c t   train_carriage 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
      @grd4 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd5 speed(t)=0 
      @grd6 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door(t) 
      @grd7 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   
      @grd8 door_state[DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]]={CLOSED} 
    with 
      @d d = (DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]) 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage   {c} train_carriage 
      @act2 door(t) door(t) DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
  end 
 
  event addTrain extends addTrain 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain extends modifyTrain 
  end 
end 
 
(c) Some events of Train M1
Figure 6.16: Excerpt of machine Train M1
2. If a train is in maintenance, then it must be stopped.
3. If the speed of a train exceeds the maximum speed, the emergency brake must be
activated.
Figure 6.17(a) illustrates two new carrier sets: SIDE corresponding to which side a car-
riage door or a platform is located (constants LEFT or RIGHT) and TRAIN STATE
that denes the state of a train (MAINTENANCE, MANUAL or AUTOMATIC).
There are some new constants added as well: CABIN CARRIAGE dened as a sub-140 Chapter 6 Case Study
set of CARRIAGE, NUMBER CABIN CARRIAGE dening the number of cabin
carriages allowed per train, DOOR SIDE dened as a total function between DOOR
and SIDE representing which side a door is located, MAX SPEED dening the up-
per speed limit for running a train before the activation of the emergency brake and
PLATFORM SIDE dening the side of a platform.
Figure 6.17 shows Train M2 where several new variables are introduced: leader carriage
dening the leader carriage for a train (inv6), trns state dening the state of a train
(inv8), emergency brake that denes which trains have the emergency brake activated
(inv11) and carriage door state dening the state of the carriage doors (inv15). More-
over door train carriage denes the train doors based on the carriages (inv2, inv3 and
inv4) and each door belongs to at most one train (inv4) although a train can have
several doors (inv2). This variable renes door that disappears in this renement level,
plus some gluing invariants: inv1, inv5 and theorem thm2 state that the range of door
for a train t is the same as the range of door train carriage as long as t has doors.
Property 1 is expressed by inv9. Property 2 is expressed by inv10 and property 3
by inv12. inv13 and inv14 state that the doors in the domain of door state are the
same as the ones in carriage door state and therefore their state must match. Theorem
thm1 relates the carriages doors with variables door train carriage and train carriage.
Theorem thm3 states that the domain of carriage door state is a subset of the domain
of door state since both variables refer to the same set of doors.
New events are added dening the allocating of a leader carriage to a train (event
allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain in Fig. 6.17(c)). This event is enabled only if the
train is in maintenance (grd5), already has the required number of carriages (grd6)
but does not have a leader carriage yet (grd7). To deallocate the leader carriage in
event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain, the train must be in maintenance. A
train change state in event modifyTrain: to change to MAINTENANCE, the train
must be stopped (grd2); for the other states, the number of cabin carriages must be
NUMBER CABIN CARRIAGE and a leading carriage have to be allocated already
(grd3). Abstract event changeSpeed is rened by four events: two to increase the
speed (increaseSpeed and increaseMaxSpeed in Fig. 6.17(c)) and two to reduce the
speed (reduceSpeed and reduceMaxSpeed). If the speed of a train is increasing in a
way that is superior to MAX SPEED, event increaseMaxSpeed is enabled and if it
occurs, the emergency brake is activated. If the current speed of a train is superior to
MAX SPEED but the new speed is decreasing in a way that is inferior to the maximum
speed then the emergency brake can be deactivated (event reduceMaxSpeed).Chapter 6 Case Study 141
context Train_C2 extends Train_C1  
 
constants CABIN_CARRIAGE NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE  
           LEFT RIGHT DOOR_SIDE PLATFORM_SIDE 
           MAINTENANCE MANUAL AUTOMATIC MAX_SPEED  
 
sets SIDE TRAIN_STATE  
 
axioms 
  @axm1 CABIN_CARRIAGE   CARRIAGE 
  @axm2 NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE    1 
  @axm3 DOOR_SIDE   DOOR   SIDE 
  @axm4 partition(SIDE, {LEFT}, {RIGHT}) 
  @axm5 partition(TRAIN_STATE, {MAINTENANCE}, 
        {MANUAL},{AUTOMATIC}) 
  @axm6 MAX_SPEED    1 
  @axm7 PLATFORM_SIDE   PLATFORM   SIDE 
  @axm8 finite(CABIN_CARRIAGE) 
  @axm9 PLATFORM    
  @axm10 CABIN_CARRIAGE   
  @axm11 CABIN_CARRIAGE  ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
end 
 
(a) Context Train C2
machine Train_M2 
/* Introduction of more details about doors in the carriages. 
   Doors of a train is defined by the doors of each carriage that is part of that train 
   Each train contains two cabin carriages (A) and two ordinary carriages (B): A+B+B+A. 
   From the cabin carriages, only one is the leaderCarriage (all trains have a leaderCarriage when not in 
maintenance) 
   if the speed of a train is superior MAX_SPEED, then the emergency brake for that train should be 
activated 
   Based on the requirements sent by Dinho (Aryldo Russo) for Door System. */ 
 refines Train_M1  sees Train_C2 
 
variables trns speed permit braking door_state emergency_button train_carriage carriage_alarm 
leader_carriage trns_state emergency_brake carriage_door_state door_train_carriage 
 
invariants 
  @inv1  t·t  dom(door_train_carriage)   t   dom(door)   door(t) = door_train_carriage[{t}]   door(t)   
  @inv2 door_train_carriage   trns   DOOR 
  @inv3 door_train_carriage = (DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)  
  @inv4 door_train_carriage   DOOR   trns 
  @inv5  t·t  dom(door)   door(t)     door(t) = door_train_carriage[{t}]  
  @inv6 leader_carriage   trns   CABIN_CARRIAGE 
  @inv7 finite(leader_carriage) 
  @inv8 trns_state   trns   TRAIN_STATE 
  @inv9  t,c·t ran(train_carriage)   trns_state(t) MAINTENANCE   c = train_carriage [{t}]  
          finite(CABIN_CARRIAGE)   t   dom(leader_carriage) 
          card(c CABIN_CARRIAGE)=NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE   leader_carriage(t)   c 
  @inv10  t·t trns   trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE   speed(t)=0 
  @inv11 emergency_brake  trns  
  @inv12  t·((t trns   speed(t)>MAX_SPEED)   t   emergency_brake)  
  @inv13 carriage_door_state   DOOR_CARRIAGE   DOOR_STATE 
  @inv14  d·d   dom(door_state)   door_state(d)=OPEN   carriage_door_state(d DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))=OPEN 
  @inv15  d·d dom(door_state) door_state(d)=CLOSED   carriage_door_state(d DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))=CLOSED    
  theorem @thm1  c·c ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE)   c dom(train_carriage)  
                   DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door_train_carriage[{train_carriage(c)}] 
  theorem @thm2  c·c   dom(train_carriage)   door(train_carriage(c))   door_state [{OPEN}]=   
             door(train_carriage(c))     DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door(train_carriage(c))  
             DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   door_state [{OPEN}]=   
  theorem @thm3 dom(dom(carriage_door_state))   dom(door_state) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns     
      @act2 speed     
      @act3 permit     
      @act4 braking     
      @act5 door_state   DOOR   {CLOSED} 
      @act6 carriage_alarm   CARRIAGE   {FALSE} 
      @act7 train_carriage     
      @act8 emergency_button     
      @act9 leader_carriage     
      @act10 trns_state    
      @act11 emergency_brake    
      @act12 carriage_door_state   DOOR_CARRIAGE   {CLOSED} 
      @act13 door_train_carriage     
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg extends recvTrainMsg 
  end 
(b) Variables and Invariants
 
  event increaseMaxSpeed refines changeSpeed 
    any t1 s1 
    where 
      @grd1 s1     
      @grd2 t1   dom(door_train_carriage) braking 
      @grd3 trns_state(t1)   MAINTENANCE 
      @grd4 s1 > MAX_SPEED 
      @grd5 speed(t1)<s1 
      @grd6 t1   emergency_brake 
      @grd7 speed(t1)  MAX_SPEED 
      @grd8 door_train_carriage[{t1}]  
              door_state [{OPEN}] =  
      @grd9 door_train_carriage[{t1}]   
      @grd10 permit(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1)   s1 
      @act2 emergency_brake  emergency_brake   {t1} 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain refines modifyTrain 
    any t state 
    where 
      @grd1 t   trns 
      @grd2 state = MAINTENANCE   speed(t)=0 
      @grd3 card(train_carriage [{t}] CABIN_CARRIAGE) 
             =NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE  
               t   dom(leader_carriage)  
              leader_carriage(t)   train_carriage [{t}] 
      @grd4 state   TRAIN_STATE  
      @grd5 state   trns_state(t)  
    then 
      @act1 trns_state(t) state 
  end 
end 
 
  end 
 
  event deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton extends deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton 
  end 
 
  event deactivateEmergencyTrainButton refines deactivateEmergencyTrainButton 
    any c 
    where 
      @grd2 c   dom(train_carriage) // @grd5 t = train_carriage(c) 
      @grd3 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) = TRUE 
      @grd4 carriage_alarm(c) = TRUE 
      @grd5 {c} = (dom(carriage_alarm   {TRUE})   train_carriage [{train_carriage(c)}]) 
      @grd6 ((DOOR_CARRIAGE);train_carriage) [{train_carriage(c)}]   
door_state [{OPEN}] =   // doors must be closed to deactivate emergency button 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_alarm(c)  FALSE 
      @act2 emergency_button(train_carriage(c))   FALSE 
  end 
 
  event allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain 
    any c 
    where 
      @grd1 c   dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 finite(train_carriage [{train_carriage(c)}]) 
      @grd3 c   CABIN_CARRIAGE 
      @grd4 c   dom(train_carriage   {train_carriage(c)}) 
      @grd5 trns_state(train_carriage(c))=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd6 card(dom(train_carriage   {train_carriage(c)})) 
            =MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd7 train_carriage(c)   dom(leader_carriage) 
    then 
      @act1 leader_carriage(train_carriage(c))   c 
  end 
 
  event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain 
    any t 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd2 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
      @grd3 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd4 card(dom(train_carriage   {t})) 
            =MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
    then 
      @act1 leader_carriage   {t} leader_carriage 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain refines alocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 c   CARRIAGE dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd4  tr·tr   dom(door_train_carriage)   tr t  
           DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door_train_carriage[{tr}]=  
      @grd5 t   trns 
      @grd6 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd7 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
      @grd8 card(dom(train_carriage   {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd9 speed(t)=0 
      @grd10 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   door_train_carriage[{t}]=  // @grd11 t   
(c) Some events of Train M2
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6.9 Third Renement of Train: Train M3
As a continuation of the renement of the train doors by carriage, we data rene vari-
able door state. The opening doors event needs to be strengthened to specify which
doors to open when a train is stopped in a platform. Figure 6.18 shows an excerpt of
Train M3. Some additional properties related to the allocation of the leader carriage
are dened: when a train has already allocated a leader carriage, then it has the cor-
rect number of carriages (inv2) and the leader carriage belongs to the set of carriage
of that train (inv3). These two invariants could have been included in the previous
renement. Nevertheless due to the high number of proof obligations already existing
in the previous renement, they were added later. Variable door state disappears being
rened by door carriage state and gluing invariants inv1 and thm2. Theorem thm1
is added to help with the proofs: the carriage doors of a train t are the same as the
doors dened by the constant DOOR CARRIAGE restricted to the carriages. Some
existing events are strengthened in this renement to be consistent with the invariants
as illustrated in Fig. 6.18(b). Due to inv2, event allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
needs to be strengthened by adding guard grd8: this event is only enabled if the number
of carriages for that train is equal to NUMBER CABIN CARRIAGE. Also events
allocateCarriageTrain and removeCarriageTrain require an additional guard (grd4
and grd11 respectively) stating that the events are only enabled if train t does not have
a leader carriage yet. Therefore we reinforce some ordering in the events: rst car-
riages are allocated/removed; after the leader carriage can be allocated. Rened event
openDoors is strengthened with the inclusion of guard grd8: the set of carriage doors
ds that are opened are located in the same side as the platform.
6.10 Fourth Renement of Train and Second Decomposi-
ton: Train M4
The fourth renement of Train corresponds to the preparation step before the decom-
position. Context Train C4, illustrated in Fig. 6.19(a), introduces an enumerated car-
rier set TRAIN MOV ING STATE dening the moving state of a train: MOV ING,
NOT READY (not ready to move) and NEUTRAL (not moving but ready to move).
We use additional control variables to help in the separation of aspects resulting in
adding variables ready train and train doors closed. Both are total functions between
trns and BOOL (inv1 and inv2 in Fig. 6.19(b)). ready train denes trains that are
ready to move or moving (which therefore have a leader carriage and the correct number
of carriages to move (inv3)); train doors closed denes trains that have all their doors
closed (inv4). These variables are somehow redundant and are mainly added as a prepa-
ration for the shared event decomposition: they will be allocated to LeaderCarriage and
represent a combination of states dened by Carriage variables. They also simplifyChapter 6 Case Study 143
machine Train_M3 refines Train_M2  sees Train_C2 
 
variables trns speed permit braking emergency_button train_carriage carriage_alarm leader_carriage  
           trns_state emergency_brake carriage_door_state door_train_carriage 
 
invariants 
  @inv1  d,ds·d   dom(door_state)   ds   DOOR_STATE   carriage_door_state(d DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))=ds   door_state(d)=ds 
  @inv2  t·t trns   t   dom(leader_carriage)   card(train_carriage [{t}])=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE  
          card(train_carriage [{t}] CABIN_CARRIAGE)=NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE 
  @inv3  t·t trns   t   dom(leader_carriage)   leader_carriage(t)   train_carriage [{t}] 
  theorem @thm1  t·t dom(door_train_carriage)   door_train_carriage[{t}]=DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] 
  theorem @thm2  d,ds·d   dom(door_state)   ds   DOOR_STATE   carriage_door_state[d DOOR_CARRIAGE[d]]={ds} 
                  door_state[d]={ds} 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns     
      @act2 speed     
      @act3 permit     
      @act4 braking     
      @act5 carriage_alarm   CARRIAGE   {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage     
      @act7 emergency_button     
      @act8 leader_carriage     
      @act9 trns_state    
      @act10 emergency_brake    
      @act11 carriage_door_state   DOOR_CARRIAGE   {CLOSED} 
      @act12 door_train_carriage     
  end 
 
  event reduceSpeed refines reduceSpeed 
    any t1 s1 
    where 
      @grd1 s1     
      @grd2 t1   dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage) ) 
      @grd4 trns_state(t1)   MAINTENANCE 
      @grd5 speed(t1)   MAX_SPEED 
      @grd6 speed(t1)>s1 
      @grd7  d·d    door_train_carriage[{t1}]   
carriage_door_state(d DOOR_CARRIAGE(d)) OPEN 
      @grd8 door_train_carriage[{t1}]   
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1)   s1 
  end 
 
  event brake refines brake 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1   trns 
      @grd2 permit(t1) = FALSE   emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
      @grd3 t1   braking 
    then 
      @act1 braking   braking   {t1} 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV refines enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 c2   CDV 
(a) Variables and invariants
  event allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
  refines allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain 
    any c 
    where 
      @grd1 c   dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 finite(train_carriage [{train_carriage(c)}]) 
      @grd3 c   CABIN_CARRIAGE 
      @grd4 c   dom(train_carriage   {train_carriage(c)}) 
      @grd5 trns_state(train_carriage(c))=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd6 card(train_carriage [{train_carriage(c)}]) 
            =MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd7 train_carriage(c)   dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd8 card(train_carriage [{train_carriage(c)}] CABIN_CARRIAGE) 
            =NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE 
    then 
      @act1 leader_carriage(train_carriage(c))   c 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain refines allocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 c   CARRIAGE dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd3  tr·tr   dom(door_train_carriage)   tr t  
              DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door_train_carriage[{tr}]=  
      @grd4 t   trns dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd5 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd6 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
      @grd7 card(dom(train_carriage   {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd8 speed(t)=0 
      @grd9 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   door_train_carriage[{t}]=   
      @grd10 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage(c)  t 
      @act2 door_train_carriage   door_train_carriage  
                                    ({t}   DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]) 
      @act3 carriage_door_state  carriage_door_state  
                                  ((DOOR_CARRIAGE {c}) {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeCarriageTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door_train_carriage) 
      @grd2 c t   train_carriage 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
      @grd4 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd5 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd6 speed(t)=0 
      @grd8 carriage_door_state[DOOR_CARRIAGE {c}]={CLOSED} //  d·d DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
  carriage_door_state(d DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))=CLOSED // 
door_state[door_train_carriage[{t}]]={CLOSED} 
      @grd10  d·d DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   t = door_train_carriage (d) 
      @grd11 c   ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
      @grd12 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door_train_carriage[{t}] 
      @grd13 t   dom(leader_carriage) // no leader carriage allocated 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage   {c} train_carriage 
      @act2 door_train_carriage   door_train_carriage  DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
    where 
      @grd1 c   CARRIAGE dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd3  tr·tr   dom(door_train_carriage)   tr t  
              DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door_train_carriage[{tr}]=  
      @grd4 t   trns dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd5 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd6 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
      @grd7 card(dom(train_carriage   {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd8 speed(t)=0 
      @grd9 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   door_train_carriage[{t}]=   
      @grd10 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage(c)  t 
      @act2 door_train_carriage   door_train_carriage  
                                    ({t}   DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]) 
      @act3 carriage_door_state  carriage_door_state  
                                  ((DOOR_CARRIAGE {c}) {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
event openDoors refines openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds 
    where 
      @grd1 t   TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 t   dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage) ) 
      @grd6 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd7 ({platform}    )   emergency_button(t) = TRUE  
      @grd8 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd9 ds   DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]]        
      @grd10  d·d ds  
              carriage_door_state[{d} DOOR_CARRIAGE]={CLOSED} 
      @grd11 ds   
    then 
      @act1 carriage_door_state  carriage_door_state  
                            ((ds DOOR_CARRIAGE) {OPEN})  
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeCarriageTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 t   dom(door_train_carriage) 
      @grd2 c t   train_carriage 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
      @grd4 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd5 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd6 speed(t)=0 
      @grd7 carriage_door_state[DOOR_CARRIAGE {c}]={CLOSED}  
      @grd8  d·d DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]  
              t = door_train_carriage (d) 
      @grd9 c   ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
      @grd10 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door_train_carriage[{t}] 
      @grd11 t   dom(leader_carriage) 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage   {c} train_carriage 
      @act2 door_train_carriage   door_train_carriage  
                                   DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
(b) Renement of some events in Train M3
Figure 6.18: Excerpt of machine Train M3
the event splitting by replacing predicates that contain variables related to carriages.
For instance, in Fig. 6.19(c) guard grd8 of event increaseMaxSpeed replaces guard
grd8 in the abstract event (Fig. 6.17(c)): this event does not need to refer to variable
door train carriage since it is only required to ensure that all the train doors are closed
when a train increases its speed (train doors closed(t1) = TRUE). The consequence of
adding these variables is that they need to be consistent throughout the events. For in-
stance, act2 needs to be added to the actions of deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
when a leader carriage is deallocated from a train which implies that the train is no
longer ready to move (Fig. 6.19(c)). Therefore these control variables should be added
with care in particular when it is intended to further rene the resulting sub-events after
an event decomposition. Invariants inv5 and inv6 are gluing invariants resulting from
the added variables: the rst states that if a train has its doors opened, then the train
must be stopped; the second states that if a train is ready, then the set of carriages for144 Chapter 6 Case Study
that train is not empty. All other events are updated reecting the introduction of the
new variables.
context Train_C4 extends Train_C2  
 
constants MOVING NOT_READY NEUTRAL  
 
sets TRAIN_MOVING_STATE  
 
axioms 
  @axm1 partition(TRAIN_MOVING_STATE, {MOVING}, {NOT_READY}, {NEUTRAL}) 
end 
 
(a) Context Train C4
machine Train_M4 refines Train_M3  sees Train_C4  
 
variables trns speed permit braking emergency_button train_carriage  
carriage_alarm leader_carriage trns_state emergency_brake  
carriage_door_state door_train_carriage ready_train train_doors_closed  
 
invariants 
  @inv1 ready_train   trns   BOOL 
  @inv2 train_doors_closed   trns   BOOL 
  @inv3  t·t dom(ready_train)   ready_train(t) = TRUE   t trns  
           card(train_carriage [{t}])=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE  
           card(train_carriage [{t}] CABIN_CARRIAGE) 
           =NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE  
           t   dom(leader_carriage) 
  @inv4  t·t dom(train_doors_closed)  
          train_doors_closed(t) = TRUE  
          ( d·d  door_train_carriage[{t}]  
              carriage_door_state(d DOOR_CARRIAGE(d)) OPEN) 
  @inv5  t·t dom(train_doors_closed)  
          train_doors_closed(t) = FALSE   speed(t) = 0    
  @inv6  t·t dom(ready_train)   ready_train(t) = TRUE  
          DOOR_CARRIAGE train_carriage [{t}]   
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns     
      @act2 speed     
      @act3 permit     
      @act4 braking     
      @act5 carriage_alarm   CARRIAGE   {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage     
      @act7 emergency_button     
      @act8 leader_carriage     
      @act9 trns_state    
      @act10 emergency_brake    
      @act11 carriage_door_state   DOOR_CARRIAGE   {CLOSED} 
      @act12 door_train_carriage     // @act13 train_moving_state    
      @act14 ready_train     
      @act15 train_doors_closed     
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg extends recvTrainMsg  
    where 
      @grd3 train_doors_closed(t1) = TRUE  
      /* @grd3 ( d·d   door_train_carriage[{t1}]   
carriage_door_state(d DOOR_CARRIAGE(d)) OPEN) 
         @grd4 train_moving_state(t1)=MOVING */ 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Variables and invariants
event increaseMaxSpeed refines increaseMaxSpeed  
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @grd1 s1     
      @grd2 t1   trns 
      @grd3 t1   braking 
      @grd4 trns_state(t1)   MAINTENANCE 
      @grd5 s1 > MAX_SPEED 
      @grd6 speed(t1)<s1 
      @grd7 t1   emergency_brake 
      @grd8 speed(t1)  MAX_SPEED 
      @grd9 train_doors_closed(t1) = TRUE 
      @grd10 permit(t1)=TRUE 
      @grd11 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd12 ready_train(t1) = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1)   s1 
      @act2 emergency_brake   emergency_brake   {t1} 
  end 
 
event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
refines deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
  any t lc  
  where 
    @grd1 t   dom(leader_carriage)  
    @grd2 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
    @grd3 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
    @grd4 card(dom(train_carriage   {t}))=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
    @grd5 lc = leader_carriage  
  then 
    @act1 leader_carriage   {t} leader_carriage 
    @act2 ready_train(t)   FALSE 
end 
 
  event addTrain refines addTrain  
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @guard t   TRAIN trns 
      @grd1 oc   CDV 
    then 
      @act1 trns trns  {t} 
      @act2 speed(t) 0 
      @act7 permit(t) FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t) FALSE 
      @act9 trns_state(t) MAINTENANCE // @act10 train_moving_state(t) NOT_READY 
      @act11 ready_train(t)   FALSE 
      @act12 train_doors_closed(t) TRUE 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain refines modifyTrain  
    any t ocA oc state  
    where 
      @typing_ocA ocA   CDV 
      @typing_oc oc    (CDV) 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t   trns 
      @grd2 ocA   oc 
      @grd3 finite(oc) 
event increaseMaxSpeed refines increaseMaxSpeed  
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @grd1 s1     
      @grd2 t1   trns 
      @grd3 t1   braking 
      @grd4 trns_state(t1)   MAINTENANCE 
      @grd5 s1 > MAX_SPEED 
      @grd6 speed(t1)<s1 
      @grd7 t1   emergency_brake 
      @grd8 speed(t1)  MAX_SPEED 
      @grd9 train_doors_closed(t1) = TRUE 
      @grd10 permit(t1)=TRUE 
      @grd11 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd12 ready_train(t1) = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1)   s1 
      @act2 emergency_brake   emergency_brake   {t1} 
  end 
 
event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
refines deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
  any t lc  
  where 
    @grd1 t   dom(leader_carriage)  
    @grd2 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
    @grd3 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
    @grd4 card(dom(train_carriage   {t}))=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
    @grd5 lc = leader_carriage  
  then 
    @act1 leader_carriage   {t} leader_carriage 
    @act2 ready_train(t)   FALSE 
end 
 
  event addTrain refines addTrain  
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @guard t   TRAIN trns 
      @grd1 oc   CDV 
    then 
      @act1 trns trns  {t} 
      @act2 speed(t) 0 
      @act7 permit(t) FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t) FALSE 
      @act9 trns_state(t) MAINTENANCE // @act10 train_moving_state(t) NOT_READY 
      @act11 ready_train(t)   FALSE 
      @act12 train_doors_closed(t) TRUE 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain refines modifyTrain  
    any t ocA oc state  
    where 
      @typing_ocA ocA   CDV 
      @typing_oc oc    (CDV) 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @grd1 t   trns 
      @grd2 ocA   oc 
      @grd3 finite(oc) 
(c) Renement of some events in Train M4
Figure 6.19: Excerpt of machine Train M4
Now we are ready to proceed to the next decomposition as described in Fig. 6.3. We want
to separate the aspects related to carriages from the aspects related to leader carriages:
Leader Carriage: Allocates the leader carriage, controls the speed of the train, modi-
es the state of the train, receives the messages sent from the central, handles the
emergency button of the train.
Carriage: Add and removes carriages, opens and closes carriage doors, handles the
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The decomposition is summarised in Table 6.1 (equivalent to view of Fig. 6.12 with the
addition of the variable partition):
LeaderCarriage Carriage
Variables trns;permit;braking;emergency button carriage alarm;leader carriage
trns state;speed;emergency brake carriage door state;door train carriage
ready train;train doors closed train carriage
Events openDoors;closeDoors openDoors;closeDoors
activateEmergencyCarriageButton activateEmergencyCarriageButton
deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton
deactivateEmergencyTrainButton deactivateEmergencyTrainButton
allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
allocateCarriageTrain allocateCarriageTrain
modifyTrain;removeCarriageTrain modifyTrain;removeCarriageTrain
increaseSpeed;increaseMaxSpeed
reduceSpeed;reduceMaxSpeed
recvTrainMsg;brake;stopBraking
addTrain;enterCDV;leaveCDV
Table 6.1: Decomposition summary of Train M4
6.10.1 Machine LeaderCarriage
Machine LeaderCarriage contains the variables that are not related to the carriages
(Fig. 6.20(a)). Some events are only included in this sub-component: events dealing
with the speed changes, entering and leaving sections, receiving messages and adding
trains. All the other events are shared between the two sub-components.
6.10.2 Machine Carriage
The variables related to carriages are included in sub-component Carriage (Fig. 6.20(b)).
All the events of Carriage result from splitting the original events as described in Ta-
ble. 6.1. We are interested in adding more details about the carriage doors, therefore we
further rene Carriage.
6.10.3 Renement of Carriage and Decomposition: Carriage M1
This renement is a preparation step before the next decomposition. We intend to
use an existing generic development of carriage doors as a pattern and apply a generic
instantiation to our model. We use the shared event decomposition to adjust our current
model to t the rst machine of the pattern. Carriage M1 renes Carriage and after is
decomposed in a way that one of the resulting sub-components ts the generic model of
carriage doors. The generic model is described in Sect. 6.11.
Two variables are introduced in this renement, representing the carriage doors (carriage door)
and their respective state (carriage ds) as seen in Fig. 6.21(a). The last variable is used146 Chapter 6 Case Study
machine LeaderCarriage sees LeaderCarriage_C0 
 
variables trns speed permit braking emergency_button trns_state  
           emergency_brake ready_train train_doors_closed  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_train_doors_closed train_doors_closed    (TRAIN   BOOL) 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M0_inv3 trns   TRAIN 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M0_inv9 braking   trns 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M0_inv10 speed   trns     
  @Train_MetroSystem_M1_inv2 permit   trns   BOOL 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M1_inv3 emergency_button   trns   BOOL 
  @Train_M1_inv1 finite(trns) 
  @Train_M2_inv8 trns_state   trns   TRAIN_STATE 
  @Train_M2_inv10  t·t trns   trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE   speed(t)=0 
  @Train_M2_inv11 emergency_brake  trns 
  @Train_M2_inv12  t·((t trns   speed(t)>MAX_SPEED)   t   emergency_brake) 
  @Train_M4_inv14 ready_train   trns   BOOL 
  @Train_M4_inv16 train_doors_closed   trns   BOOL 
  @Train_M4_inv18  t·t dom(train_doors_closed)   train_doors_closed(t) = FALSE  
                    speed(t) = 0 
  theorem @WD_Train_M4_inv6  t·t dom(ready_train) ready_train TRAIN   BOOL 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns     
      @act2 speed     
      @act3 permit     
      @act4 braking     
      @act7 emergency_button     
      @act9 trns_state    
      @act10 emergency_brake    
      @act14 ready_train     
      @act15 train_doors_closed     
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb   BOOL 
      @grd1 bb   BOOL 
      @grd2 t1   trns 
      @grd3 train_doors_closed(t1) = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 permit(t1) bb 
  end 
 
  event increaseSpeed 
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1   TRAIN 
      @typing_s1 s1     
      @grd1 s1     
      @grd2 t1   trns 
      @grd3 t1   braking 
      @grd4 trns_state(t1)   MAINTENANCE 
      @grd5 s1   MAX_SPEED 
(a) sub-component LeaderCarriage
machine Carriage sees Carriage_C0  
 
variables train_carriage carriage_alarm leader_carriage carriage_door_state  
           door_train_carriage  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_leader_carriage leader_carriage    (TRAIN   CARRIAGE) 
  theorem @typing_door_train_carriage door_train_carriage    (TRAIN   DOOR) 
  theorem @typing_train_carriage train_carriage    (CARRIAGE   TRAIN) 
  theorem @typing_carriage_alarm carriage_alarm    (CARRIAGE   BOOL) 
  @Train_M1_inv2 carriage_alarm   CARRIAGE   BOOL 
  @Train_M1_inv4 finite(train_carriage) 
  @Train_M1_inv5 finite(dom(train_carriage)) 
  @Train_M2_inv3 door_train_carriage = (DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)  
  @Train_M2_inv7 finite(leader_carriage) 
  @Train_M2_inv13 carriage_door_state   DOOR_CARRIAGE   DOOR_STATE 
  theorem @Train_M2_thm1  c·c ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE)   c dom(train_carriage)  
            DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door_train_carriage[{train_carriage(c)}] 
  theorem @Train_M3_thm1  t·t dom(door_train_carriage) 
            door_train_carriage[{t}]=DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act5 carriage_alarm   CARRIAGE   {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage     
      @act8 leader_carriage     
      @act11 carriage_door_state   DOOR_CARRIAGE   {CLOSED} 
      @act12 door_train_carriage     
  end 
 
  event openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds  
    where 
      @typing_platform platform   CDV 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd1 t   TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 t   dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage) ) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd8 ds   DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] 
      @grd10  d·d ds carriage_door_state[{d} DOOR_CARRIAGE]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_door_state  carriage_door_state   ((ds DOOR_CARRIAGE) {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any t ds closed  
    where 
      @typing_closed closed   BOOL 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd1 t   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t   dom(((train_carriage );(DOOR_CARRIAGE ))) 
      @grd4 ds   ((train_carriage );(DOOR_CARRIAGE ))[{t}] 
      @grd5 ds   DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] 
      @grd6 carriage_door_state[ds DOOR_CARRIAGE[ds]]={OPEN} 
      @grd7 ( d·d DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] ds   
carriage_door_state[{d} DOOR_CARRIAGE] {CLOSED})   closed = FALSE 
    then 
(b) sub-component Carriage
Figure 6.20: Variables and invariants of LeaderCarriage and Carriage
to data rene carriage door state that disappears. The gluing invariant for this data
renement is expressed by inv4: the state of all the doors in carriage ds match the state
of the same door in carriage door state. As a result, some events need to be rened to
t the new variables. For instance, in Fig. 6.21(b), act1 in event openDoors updates
variable carriage ds instead of the abstract variable carriage door state. Also when
carriage doors are allocated, both new variables are assigned as seen in actions act3 and
act4 of event allocateCarriageTrain (similar for removeCarriageTrain).
Comparing with the generic model of carriage doors, the relevant events to t the instan-
tiation are openDoors, closeDoors, allocateCarriageTrain and removeCarriageTrain.
Not by coincidence, these events manipulate variables carriage ds and carriage door
that will instantiate generic variables generic door state and generic door respectively.
The decomposition summary is described in Table 6.2.
6.10.4 Machine CarriageInterface
Machine CarriageInterface contains the variables that are not related to the carriage
doors. This machine handles the activation/deactivation of the carriage alarm, the deac-Chapter 6 Case Study 147
machine Carriage_M1 refines Carriage sees Carriage_C0 
 
variables carriage_alarm leader_carriage train_carriage carriage_door carriage_ds door_train_carriage 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 carriage_door   DOOR 
  @inv2 carriage_ds   carriage_door   DOOR_STATE 
  @inv3  c·c dom(train_carriage)   DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] carriage_door  
  @inv4  d,c·d c dom(carriage_door_state)   d   dom(carriage_ds)   d ran(door_train_carriage)      
         carriage_ds(d)=carriage_door_state(d c) 
  @inv5 door_train_carriage  DOOR   TRAIN 
  @inv6  d·d ran(door_train_carriage)   d   carriage_door 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act5 carriage_alarm   CARRIAGE   {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage     
      @act8 leader_carriage     
      @act12 door_train_carriage     
      @act13 carriage_door    
      @act14 carriage_ds    
  end 
 
  event openDoors refines openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds 
    where 
      @typing_platform platform   CDV 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd1 t   TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 t   dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage) ) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd8 ds   DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] // @grd10 
 d·d ds carriage_door_state[{d} DOOR_CARRIAGE]={CLOSED} 
      @grd11 ds   dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds carriage_ds  (ds {OPEN}) // @act1 carriage_door_state  
carriage_door_state   ((ds DOOR_CARRIAGE) {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors refines closeDoors 
    any t ds closed cds 
    where 
      @typing_closed closed   BOOL 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd1 t   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t   dom(((train_carriage );(DOOR_CARRIAGE ))) 
      @grd4 ds   ((train_carriage );(DOOR_CARRIAGE ))[{t}] 
      /* @grd5 ds   DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] 
         @grd6 carriage_door_state[ds DOOR_CARRIAGE[ds]]={OPEN} */ 
      @gd13 cds = carriage_ds 
      @grd7 ( d·d DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] ds   cds(d) CLOSED)   closed = 
FALSE // ( d·d DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] ds   
carriage_door_state[{d} DOOR_CARRIAGE] {CLOSED})   closed = FALSE 
      @grd11 ds   dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
(a) Variables and invariants
machine Carriage_M1 refines Carriage  sees Train_C4 
 
variables carriage_alarm leader_carriage train_carriage  
            carriage_door carriage_ds door_train_carriage 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 carriage_door   DOOR 
  @inv2 carriage_ds   carriage_door   DOOR_STATE 
  @inv3  c·c dom(train_carriage)   DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] carriage_door  
  @inv4  d,c·d c dom(carriage_door_state)   d   dom(carriage_ds)  
          d ran(door_train_carriage)  
          carriage_ds(d)= carriage_door_state(d c)  
  @inv6 door_train_carriage  DOOR   TRAIN 
  @inv7  d·d ran(door_train_carriage)   d   carriage_door 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act5 carriage_alarm   CARRIAGE   {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage     
      @act8 leader_carriage     
      @act12 door_train_carriage     
      @act13 carriage_door    
      @act14 carriage_ds    
  end 
 
  event openDoors refines openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds 
    where 
      @typing_platform platform   CDV 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd1 t   TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 t   dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage) ) 
      @grd6 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd7 ds   DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]]  
      @grd8 ds   dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd9 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_ds carriage_ds  (ds {OPEN})  
  end 
 
  event closeDoors refines closeDoors 
    any t ds closed cds 
    where 
      @typing_closed closed   BOOL 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd1 t   TRAIN 
      @grd2 t   dom(((train_carriage );(DOOR_CARRIAGE ))) 
      @grd3 ds   ((train_carriage );(DOOR_CARRIAGE ))[{t}] 
      @grd4 cds = carriage_ds 
      @grd5 ( d·d DOOR_CARRIAGE [train_carriage [{t}]] ds  
               cds(d) CLOSED)   closed = FALSE  
      @grd6 ds   dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd7 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds carriage_ds   (ds {CLOSED})  
  end 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain refines allocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds 
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_c c   CARRIAGE 
      @grd1 c   CARRIAGE dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd3 t   dom(door_train_carriage) 
      @grd4  tr·tr   dom(door_train_carriage)   tr t  
              DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] door_train_carriage[{tr}]=  
      @grd5 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
      @grd6 card(dom(train_carriage   {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd7 DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   door_train_carriage[{t}]=   
      @grd8 t dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd9 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
      @grd10 ds dom(carriage_ds)=  
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage(c)  t 
      @act2 door_train_carriage   door_train_carriage  
              ({t}   DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]) 
      @act3 carriage_door   carriage_door   ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds   carriage_ds   (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds 
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_c c   CARRIAGE 
      @grd1 t   dom(door_train_carriage) 
      @grd2 c t   train_carriage 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
      @grd16 t   dom(door_train_carriage)  
      @grd10  d·d DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]  
               t = door_train_carriage (d) 
      @grd11 c   ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
      @grd12 t   dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd13 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
      @grd14 ds carriage_door 
      @grd15 carriage_ds[DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]] = {CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage   {c} train_carriage 
      @act2 door_train_carriage    
                door_train_carriage  DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
      @act3 carriage_door   carriage_door   ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds   ds carriage_ds 
  end 
 
  event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain refines deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain 
    any t lc 
    where 
      @typing_t t   TRAIN 
      @typing_lc lc    (TRAIN   CARRIAGE) 
      @grd5 t   dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd2 finite(train_carriage [{t}]) 
      @grd4 card(dom(train_carriage   {t}))=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd6 lc = leader_carriage 
(b) Renement of some events in Carriage M1
Figure 6.21: Excerpt of machine Carriage M1
tivation of the emergency button and the allocation/deallocation of the leader cabin car-
riage. Events openDoors, closeDoors, allocateCarriageTrain and removeCarriageTrain
are shared with CarriageDoor.
6.10.5 Machine CarriageDoor
CarriageDoors contains the variables related to carriage doors and the events resulting
from splitting the original events as described in Table 6.2. The resulting sub-events can
be seen in Fig. 6.22.148 Chapter 6 Case Study
CarriageInterface CarriageDoor
Variables carriage alarm;leader carriage carriage doors;carriage ds
train carriage;door train carriage
Events openDoors;closeDoors openDoors;closeDoors
allocateCarriageTrain allocateCarriageTrain
removeCarriageTrain removeCarriageTrain
activateEmergencyCarriageButton
deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton
deactivateEmergencyTrainButton
allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
modifyTrain
Table 6.2: Decomposition summary of Carriage M1
machine CarriageDoors sees CarriageDoors_C0  
 
variables carriage_door carriage_ds  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_carriage_door carriage_door ! ℙ(DOOR) 
  theorem @typing_carriage_ds carriage_ds ! ℙ(DOOR × DOOR_STATE) 
  @Carriage_M1_inv1 carriage_door ⊆ DOOR 
  @Carriage_M1_inv2 carriage_ds ! carriage_door " DOOR_STATE 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act13 carriage_door #$ 
      @act14 carriage_ds #$ 
  end 
 
  event openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds  
    where 
      @typing_platform platform ! CDV 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns ! ℙ(CDV) 
      @grd3 platform ! PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform ! (occpTrns ∩ PLATFORM) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd11 ds ⊆ dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds#carriage_ds  (ds×{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any t ds closed cds  
    where 
      @typing_cds cds ! ℙ(DOOR × DOOR_STATE) 
      @typing_closed closed ! BOOL 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t ! TRAIN 
      @gd13 cds = carriage_ds 
      @grd11 ds ⊆ dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds#carriage_ds   (ds×{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_c c ! CARRIAGE 
      @grd14 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE∼[{c}] 
      @grd15 ds∩dom(carriage_ds)=$ 
    then 
      @act3 carriage_door # carriage_door ∪ ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds # carriage_ds ∪ (ds×{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_c c ! CARRIAGE 
      @grd14 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE∼[{c}] 
      @grd15 ds∩dom(carriage_ds)=" 
    then 
      @act3 carriage_door # carriage_door ∪ ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds # carriage_ds ∪ (ds×{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_c c ! CARRIAGE 
      @grd11 c ! ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
      @grd13 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE∼[{c}] 
      @grd14 ds⊆carriage_door 
      @grd15 carriage_ds[DOOR_CARRIAGE∼[{c}]] = {CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act3 carriage_door # carriage_door ∖ ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds # ds!carriage_ds 
  end 
end 
!
Figure 6.22: Events of sub-component CarriageDoors
There are two kind of carriage doors: emergency doors and service doors. We intend to
instantiate twice the generic doors development, one per kind of door (the developments
are similar for both kind of doors). Specic details for each kind of door are added
as additional renements later on. We describe the generic model and afterwards the
instantiation.
6.11 Generic Model: GCDoor
The generic model for the carriage doors is based in three renements: GCDoor M0,
GCDoor M1 and GCDoor M2. In each renement step, more requirements and details
are introduced.Chapter 6 Case Study 149
6.11.1 Abstract machine GCDoor M0
We start by adding the carriage doors and respective states. Four events model carriage
doors. The properties to be preserved are:
1. Doors can be added or removed.
2. Doors can be in an opening or closing state. Doors can only be open if the train
is in a platform.
3. When adding/removing doors, they are closed by default for safety reasons.
The static part of the generic development is initially divided in two parts: context
GCDoor C0 for the doors and context GCTrack C0 for the tracks as seen in Fig. 6.23.
context GCDoor_C0 extends GCTrack_C0 
 
constants GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE 
           DOOR_SIDE 
           OPEN CLOSED 
 
sets DOOR DOOR_STATE 
     GEN_CARRIAGE 
     
axioms 
  @axm1 partition(DOOR_STATE, {OPEN}, {CLOSED}) 
  @axm2 GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE   DOOR   GEN_CARRIAGE 
  @axm3 DOOR_SIDE   DOOR   SIDE 
end 
 
(a) Context GCDoor C0
context GCTrack_C0 
 
constants RIGHT PLATFORM LEFT PLATFORM_SIDE  
 
sets SIDE TRACK  
 
axioms 
  @axm1 PLATFORM   TRACK 
  @axm2 partition(SIDE, {LEFT}, {RIGHT}) 
  @axm3 PLATFORM_SIDE   PLATFORM   SIDE 
end 
 
(b) Context GCTrack C0
Figure 6.23: Generic contexts
Context GCDoor C0 contains sets DOOR, DOOR STATE and GEN DOOR CARRIAGE,
representing carriage doors, dening if a door is opened or closed and dening the car-
riages to which a door belongs to, respectively. Context GCTrack C0 contains sets
SIDE and TRACK, dening the side (LEFT or RIGHT) of a door or platform
and each section of the track, respectively. Machine GCDoor M0 contains variables
generic door and generic door state. The invariants of this abstraction are quite weak
since we just add the type variables as can be seen in Fig. 6.24(a).
Property 1 is expressed by events addDoor and removeDoor. Property 2 is expressed by
variable generic door state and events openDoors and closeDoors. Event openDoors is
only enabled if the set of doors ds is closed and if the parameter occpTrns, corresponding
to the sections occupied by the carriage, intersects a platform. Doors are removed in
event removeDoor, if they are CLOSED conrming property 3. Next section describes
the renement of this machine.150 Chapter 6 Case Study
machine GCDoor_M0 sees GCDoor_C0 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 generic_door   DOOR 
  @inv2 generic_door_state   generic_door   DOOR_STATE 
 
event openDoors 
    any ds platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @grd ds   DOOR 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 ds    
      @grd6 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state generic_door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any ds 
    where 
      @grd ds   DOOR 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd3 ds    
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state generic_door_state  
                                       (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event addDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds   generic_door =   
      @grd2 ds     
      @grd3 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door   generic_door   ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state   generic_door_state  
                                       (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds   generic_door 
      @grd2 ds     
      @grd3 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd4 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door   generic_door   ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state    
                          ds generic_door_state 
  end 
 
(a) Variables, invariants and event openDoors
machine GCDoor_M0 sees GCDoor_C0 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 generic_door   DOOR 
  @inv2 generic_door_state   generic_door   DOOR_STATE 
 
event openDoors 
    any ds platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @grd ds   DOOR 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 ds    
      @grd6 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state generic_door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any ds 
    where 
      @grd ds   DOOR 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd3 ds    
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state generic_door_state  
                                       (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event addDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds   generic_door =   
      @grd2 ds     
      @grd3 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door   generic_door   ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state   generic_door_state  
                                       (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds   generic_door 
      @grd2 ds     
      @grd3 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd4 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door   generic_door   ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state    
                          ds generic_door_state 
  end 
 
(b) Some events in GCDoors M0
Figure 6.24: Machine GCDoors M0
6.11.2 Second renement of GCDoor: GCDoor M1
In this renement more details are introduced about the possible behaviour of the doors.
The properties to be preserved are:
1. The actions involving the doors may result from commands sent from the central
door control. These commands have a type (OPEN RIGHT DOORS,
OPEN LEFT DOORS, CLOSE RIGHT DOORS, CLOSE LEFT DOORS,
ISOLATE DOORS, REMOV E ISOLATION DOORS), a state (START, FAIL,
SUCCESS and EXECUTED) and a target (set of doors).
2. After the doors are closed, they must be locked for the train to move.
3. If a door is open, then an opening device was used: MANUAL PLATFORM if
opened manually in a platform, MANUAL INTERNAL if opened inside the car-
riage manually and AUTOMATIC CENTRAL DOOR if opened automatically
from the central control.
4. Doors can get obstructed when closed automatically (people/object obstruction).
If an obstruction is detected then it should be tried to close the doors again.
The context used in this renement (GCDoor C1) extends the existing one as seen in
Fig. 6.25(a). Abstract events are rened to include the properties de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context GCDoor_C1 extends GCDoor_C0 
 
constants MANUAL_PLATFORM MANUAL_INTERNAL AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR START FAIL SUCCESS EXECUTED 
OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS OPEN_LEFT_DOORS CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS ISOLATE_DOORS REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS 
 
sets OPENING_DEVICE COMMAND_STATE COMMAND_TYPE COMMAND 
 
axioms 
  @axm1 partition(OPENING_DEVICE, {MANUAL_PLATFORM}, {MANUAL_INTERNAL}, {AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR}) 
  @axm2 partition(COMMAND_STATE, {START}, {FAIL}, {SUCCESS},{EXECUTED}) 
  @axm3 partition(COMMAND_TYPE, {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS}, {OPEN_LEFT_DOORS}, {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS},  
                                  {CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS}, {ISOLATE_DOORS}, {REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS}) 
end 
 
(a) Context GCDoors C1
machine GCDoor_M1 refines GCDoor_M0  sees GCDoor_C1 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state locked_doors door_opening_device obstructed_door command  
           command_doors command_type command_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 locked_doors   DOOR 
  @inv2  d·d locked_doors   d   dom(generic_door_state)   generic_door_state(d) {OPEN} 
  @inv3 door_opening_device   generic_door    OPENING_DEVICE 
  @inv4  d·d generic_door   generic_door_state(d)=OPEN  d dom(door_opening_device) 
  @inv5 obstructed_door   dom(generic_door_state)  
  @inv6 command   COMMAND 
  @inv7 command_type   command   COMMAND_TYPE 
  @inv8 command_state   command   COMMAND_STATE 
  @inv9 command_doors   command    (generic_door)  
  @inv10  dos·dos ran(command_doors)   dos    
  @inv11  d,opDev·d   generic_door   opDev   OPENING_DEVICE   (d opDev) door_opening_device  
           opDev=AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR ( cmd·cmd command   d   command_doors(cmd)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors   
      @act2 door_opening_device   
      @act3 obstructed_door   
      @act4 command     
      @act5 command_doors    
      @act6 command_type    
      @act7 command_state    
  end 
 
  event commandCloseDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @guard doors   generic_door 
      @guard1 generic_door_state[doors] {CLOSED} 
      @guard2 cmd_type   {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd   COMMAND command 
      @grd4 doors    
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd) doors 
      @act3 command   command   {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd) cmd_type 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
event commandOpenDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors   generic_door 
(b) Variables, invariants
Figure 6.25: Excerpt of machine GCDoors M1
new invariants are added as seen in Fig. 6.25(b). Property 1 is dened by new variables
command, command type, command state and command doors (see invariants inv6
to inv9). Property 2 is dened by invariant inv2 (if a door is locked, then the door
is not opened) and events lockDoor/unlockDoor. Property 3 is dened by variables
door opening device, inv3 and inv11 (if a door is opened automatically, then a com-
mand has been issued to do so). Property 4 is dened by variable obstructed door, inv5
and events doorIsObstructed and closeObstructedDoor. The system works as follows:
doors can be opened/closed manually or automatically. To open/close a door automati-
cally, a command must be issued from the central door control dening which doors are
aected (for instance, to open a door automatically, event commandOpenDoors needs
to occur). A command starts with state START which can lead to a successful result
(SUCCESS) or failure (FAIL). Either way, it nishes with state EXECUTED. Ab-
stract event otherCommandDoors refers to commands not dened in this renement. If
a door gets obstructed when being closed automatically (event doorIsObstructed) then
event closeObstructedDoor models a successful attempt to close an obstructed door.
Otherwise, it needs to be closed manually.
The system works as follows: doors can be opened/closed manually or automatically. If
it is done automatically, a command sent from the central door control is issued den-
ing which doors are aected (for instance, event commandOpenDoors, illustrated in
Fig. 6.26, issues a command to open a set of doors automatically). Event otherCommandDoors
is left abstract the enough in order to refer to commands not dened in this renement.
If a door gets obstructed when closing automatically (event doorIsObstructed) then152 Chapter 6 Case Study
 
 
 
 
event commandOpenDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors   generic_door 
      @grd1 generic_door_state[doors]={CLOSED} 
      @grd2 cmd_type  
            {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd3 cmd   COMMAND command 
      @grd4 doors    
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd) doors 
      @act3 command   command   {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd) cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event otherCommandDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors   generic_door 
      @grd1 cmd_type   COMMAND_TYPE 
      @grd3 cmd   COMMAND command 
      @grd4 doors    
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd) doors 
      @act3 command   command   {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd) cmd_type 
  end 
 
event doorIsObstructed 
    any ds cmd 
    where 
      @grd ds    DOOR (locked_doors   obstructed_door) 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 cmd   command 
      @grd3 command_type(cmd)  
              {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd4 command_state(cmd) {START,FAIL} 
      @grd5 ds   command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd6 ds    
      @grd7 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act1 obstructed_door   obstructed_door   ds 
      @act2 command_state(cmd) FAIL 
  end 
 
  event updateCmdState 
    any state cmd 
    where 
      @guard3 cmd   command 
      @guard state   COMMAND_STATE {START} // @guard1 command_state(cmd)=START 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) state 
  end 
event openDoorAutomatically  
refines openDoors 
 any ds cmd 
 where 
  @grd ds   generic_door locked_doors 
  @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
  @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
  @grd3 cmd   command 
  @grd4 command_type(cmd)   
    {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
  @grd5 command_state(cmd)=START 
  @grd6 ds   command_doors(cmd) 
  @grd7 ds    
 then 
  @act1 generic_door_state  
          generic_door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
  @act2 door_opening_device   door_opening_device  
                  (ds {AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR}) 
 end 
 
  event closeObstructedDoor  
  refines closeDoors 
   any ds cmd st 
   where 
      @grd ds   obstructed_door 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 cmd   command 
      @grd3 command_type(cmd)  
      {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd4 command_state(cmd)=FAIL 
      @grd5 ds   command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd6 ds    
      @grd7 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd8 st   {SUCCESS,FAIL} 
      @grd9 st = SUCCESS   command_doors(cmd) ds=   
              generic_door_state[command_doors(cmd) ds] 
            ={CLOSED}        
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state  
                  generic_door_state (ds {CLOSED}) 
      @act2 obstructed_door   obstructed_door   ds 
      @act3 command_state(cmd) st 
  end 
 
  event lockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @guard d   generic_door locked_doors 
      @guard1 generic_door_state(d)=CLOSED 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors locked_doors   {d} 
  end 
 
  event unlockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @guard2 d   generic_door 
      @guard d   locked_doors 
    then 
  event lockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @grd d   generic_door locked_doors 
      @grd1 generic_door_state(d)=CLOSED 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors locked_doors   {d} 
  end 
 
  event unlockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @grd1 d   generic_door 
      @grd2 d   locked_doors 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors locked_doors   {d} 
  end 
 
event openDoorManually refines openDoors 
    any ds open_device platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @guard ds   generic_door locked_doors 
      @guard1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @guard2 generic_door_state[ds] {OPEN} 
      @guard3 open_device   {MANUAL_PLATFORM,MANUAL_INTERNAL} 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 ds    
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state generic_door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
      @act2 door_opening_device   door_opening_device   (ds {open_device}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors refines closeDoors 
    any ds cmd 
    where 
      @guard ds   DOOR 
      @guard1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @guard2 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @guard3 cmd   command 
      @guard4 command_type(cmd)   {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard5 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard6 ds   command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd3 ds    
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state generic_door_state   (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
 
  event addDoor extends addDoor 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor extends removeDoor 
    where 
      @grd6 ds dom(door_opening_device)=  
      @grd5  dos·dos ran(command_doors)   ds dos=  
  end 
end 
 
 
 
 
event commandOpenDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors   generic_door 
      @grd1 generic_door_state[doors]={CLOSED} 
      @grd2 cmd_type  
            {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd3 cmd   COMMAND command 
      @grd4 doors    
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd) doors 
      @act3 command   command   {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd) cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event otherCommandDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors   generic_door 
      @grd1 cmd_type   COMMAND_TYPE 
      @grd3 cmd   COMMAND command 
      @grd4 doors    
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd) doors 
      @act3 command   command   {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd) cmd_type 
  end 
 
event doorIsObstructed 
    any ds cmd 
    where 
      @grd ds    DOOR (locked_doors   obstructed_door) 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 cmd   command 
      @grd3 command_type(cmd)  
              {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd4 command_state(cmd) {START,FAIL} 
      @grd5 ds   command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd6 ds    
      @grd7 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act1 obstructed_door   obstructed_door   ds 
      @act2 command_state(cmd) FAIL 
  end 
 
  event updateCmdState 
    any state cmd 
    where 
      @guard3 cmd   command 
      @guard state   COMMAND_STATE {START} // @guard1 command_state(cmd)=START 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) state 
  end 
event openDoorAutomatically  
refines openDoors 
 any ds cmd 
 where 
  @grd ds   generic_door locked_doors 
  @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
  @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
  @grd3 cmd   command 
  @grd4 command_type(cmd)   
    {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
  @grd5 command_state(cmd)=START 
  @grd6 ds   command_doors(cmd) 
  @grd7 ds    
 then 
  @act1 generic_door_state  
          generic_door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
  @act2 door_opening_device   door_opening_device  
                  (ds {AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR}) 
 end 
 
  event closeObstructedDoor  
  refines closeDoors 
   any ds cmd st 
   where 
      @grd ds   obstructed_door 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 cmd   command 
      @grd3 command_type(cmd)  
      {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd4 command_state(cmd)=FAIL 
      @grd5 ds   command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd6 ds    
      @grd7 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd8 st   {SUCCESS,FAIL} 
      @grd9 st = SUCCESS   command_doors(cmd) ds=   
              generic_door_state[command_doors(cmd) ds] 
            ={CLOSED}        
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state  
                  generic_door_state (ds {CLOSED}) 
      @act2 obstructed_door   obstructed_door   ds 
      @act3 command_state(cmd) st 
  end 
 
  event lockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @guard d   generic_door locked_doors 
      @guard1 generic_door_state(d)=CLOSED 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors locked_doors   {d} 
  end 
 
  event unlockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @guard2 d   generic_door 
      @guard d   locked_doors 
    then 
Figure 6.26: Some events in GCDoors M1
event closeObstructedDoor models a successful attempt to close an obstructed door.
Otherwise, it needs to be closed manually.
6.12 Third renement of GCDoor: GCDoor M2
In the third renement, malfunctioning doors can be isolated and in that case, they
ignore the commands issued by the central command. Isolated doors can be either
opened or closed. After the execution of a command, the corresponding state is updated
according to the success/failure of the command. The properties to be preserved are:Chapter 6 Case Study 153
1. Doors can be isolated (independently of the respective door state) in case of mal-
function or safety reasons.
2. If a command is successful, it means that the command already occurred.
3. Two commands cannot have the same door as target except if the command has
already been executed.
4. If a door is obstructed, then it must be in a state corresponding to OPEN.
The properties to be preserved are mainly dened as invariants. Property 1 is de-
ned by new variable isolated door, inv1, inv6 and events commandIsolationDoors,
isolateDoor and removeIsolatedDoor as seen in Fig. 6.27(b). Property 2 is dened by
several invariants depending on the command: inv2 for opening doors, inv3 for closing
doors, inv4 to isolate doors, inv5 to lift the isolation from a door. Property 3 is dened
by inv7 and the last property by inv8.
An excerpt of GCDoors M2 is depicted in Fig. 6.27. New event commandIsolationDoors
models a command to add/remove doors from isolation rening the abstract event
otherCommandDoors. After this command is issued, the actual execution (or not) of
the command dictates the command state at rened event updateIsolationCmdState.
A command log is created corresponding to the end of the command's task in event
executeLogCmdState. Other commands could be added in a similar manner but we
restrict to these commands for now. The state update of other commands (opening and
closing doors) follows the same behaviour as the isolation one.
This model has three renement layers with all the proof obligations discharged. We
instantiate this model, beneting from the discharged proof obligations and renements
to model emergency and service doors.
6.13 Instantiation of Generic Carriage Door
We use the GCDoor development as a pattern to model emergency and service doors.
The instantiation is similar for both kind of doors: specic details for each type of door
are added later. We abstract ourselves from these details and focus in the instantiation
of one of the doors: emergency doors.
The pattern context is dened by contexts GCDoor C0 (and context GCTrack C0)
in Fig. 6.23 and GCDoor C1 in Fig. 6.25(a). The parameterisation context seen by
the instance results from the context seen by the abstract machine CarriageDoors as
illustrated in Fig. 6.28(a). CarriageDoors C0 does not contain all the sets and constants
that need to be instantiated. Therefore CarriageDoors C1 is created based on the
pattern context GCDoor C1 (Fig. 6.28(b)).154 Chapter 6 Case Study
machine GCDoor_M2 refines GCDoor_M1  sees GCDoor_C1 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state isolated_door locked_doors door_opening_device obstructed_door  
           command command_doors command_type command_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 isolated_door   DOOR 
  @inv2  cmd,d·cmd   command   command_type(cmd) {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS}  
         d   DOOR d   command_doors(cmd) command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS   d   isolated_door  generic_door_state(d)=OPEN 
  @inv3  cmd,d·cmd   command   command_type(cmd) {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS}  
          d   DOOR   d   command_doors(cmd) command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS d   isolated_door  generic_door_state(d)=CLOSED 
  @inv4  cmd,d·cmd   command   command_type(cmd)=ISOLATE_DOORS   d   DOOR  
          d   command_doors(cmd)   command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS   d  isolated_door 
  @inv5  cmd,d·cmd   command   command_type(cmd)=REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS  
          d   DOOR   d   command_doors(cmd)   command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS   d  isolated_door 
  @inv6  d·d isolated_door   d   dom(generic_door_state)   generic_door_state(d) {OPEN, CLOSED} 
  @inv7  cmd1,cmd2·cmd1 command   cmd2 command   cmd1 cmd2  
          command_state(cmd1) EXECUTED   command_state(cmd2) EXECUTED  command_doors(cmd1) command_doors(cmd2)=   
  @inv8  d·d obstructed_door   generic_door_state(d)=OPEN 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act3 isolated_door    
  end 
 
  event commandOpenDoors refines commandOpenDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @guard doors   generic_door 
      @guard1 generic_door_state[doors]={CLOSED} 
      @guard2 cmd_type   {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd   COMMAND command 
      @guard4  cmd1·cmd1 command   command_state(cmd1) EXECUTED doors command_doors(cmd1)=  
      @grd4 doors    
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd) doors 
      @act3 command   command   {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd) cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event commandCloseDoors refines commandCloseDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @guard doors   generic_door 
      @guard1 generic_door_state[doors]={OPEN} 
      @guard2 cmd_type   {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd   COMMAND command 
      @guard4  cmd1·cmd1 command   command_state(cmd1) EXECUTED doors command_doors(cmd1)=  
      @grd4 doors    
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd) doors 
      @act3 command   command   {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd) cmd_type 
  end 
 
  
  event updateSuccessOpenDoorCmdState refines updateCmdState 
    any cmd 
(a) Variables, invariants
  end 
 
event commandIsolationDoors refines otherCommandDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors   generic_door 
      @grd1 cmd_type   {ISOLATE_DOORS,REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS} 
      @grd2 cmd   COMMAND command 
      @grd3  cmd1·cmd1 command  
                command_state(cmd1) EXECUTED 
             doors command_doors(cmd1)=  
      @grd4 doors    
      @grd5 cmd_type = ISOLATE_DOORS   (doors isolated_door =   ) 
      @grd6 cmd_type = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS   isolated_door    
              doors isolated_door   
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd) doors 
      @act3 command   command   {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd) cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event updateIsolationCmdState refines updateCmdState 
    any state cmd 
    where 
      @grd cmd   command 
      @grd1 state   COMMAND_STATE {START,EXECUTED} 
      @grd2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @grd3 command_type(cmd)  
                {ISOLATE_DOORS,REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS} 
      @grd4 (command_type(cmd) = ISOLATE_DOORS  
              ( d·d command_doors(cmd)   d  isolated_door))  
              (command_type(cmd) = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS  
              ( d·d command_doors(cmd)   d  isolated_door))  
              state = FAIL 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) state 
  end 
 
  event executedLogCmdState refines updateCmdState 
    any cmd 
    where 
      @guard3 cmd   command 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd) {FAIL,SUCCESS} 
    with 
      @state state = EXECUTED 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) EXECUTED 
  end 
 
  event openDoorAutomatically refines openDoorAutomatically 
    any ds cmd platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @guard ds   generic_door (isolated_door   locked_doors) 
      @guard1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @guard2 generic_door_state[ds] {OPEN} 
      @guard3 cmd   command 
      @guard4 command_type(cmd)   {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard5 command_state(cmd)=START 
event executedLogCmdState refines updateCmdState 
    any cmd 
    where 
      @guard3 cmd   command 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd) {FAIL,SUCCESS} 
    with 
      @state state = EXECUTED 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd) EXECUTED 
  end 
  
 event isolateDoor 
    any d cmd 
    where 
      @grd d   generic_door isolated_door  
      @grd1 cmd   command 
      @grd2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @grd3 d   command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd4 command_type(cmd) = ISOLATE_DOORS 
      @grd5 generic_door_state(d) {OPEN, CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 isolated_door  isolated_door   {d} 
  end 
 
  event removeIsolatedDoor 
    any d cmd 
    where 
      @grd d   isolated_door 
      @grd1 cmd   command 
      @grd3 d   command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd4 command_type(cmd) = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS 
      @grd2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @grd5 generic_door_state(d) {OPEN, CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 isolated_door  isolated_door   {d} 
  end 
 
  event addDoor extends addDoor 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor extends removeDoor 
  end 
end 
 
(b) Some events in GCDoor M2
Figure 6.27: Excerpt of machine GCDoor M2
Following the steps suggested in Sect. 3.5.2, we create the instantiation renement for
emergency carriage doors as seen in Fig. 6.29. As expected, the generic sets and con-
stants are replaced by the instance sets existing in contexts CarriageDoors C0 and
CarriageDoors C1. Moreover, generic variables are renamed to t the instance and be
a renement of abstract machine CarriageDoors. The same happens to generic events
addDoor and removeDoor.
Comparing the abstract machine of the pattern GCDoor M0 and the last renement of
our initial development CarriageDoors, we realise that they are similar but not a perfect
match. CarriageDoors events contains some additional parameters and guards result-
ing from the previous renements. For instance, event closeDoors in CarriageDoors
(Fig. 6.30(b)) contains an additional parameter cds compared to event closeDoors inChapter 6 Case Study 155
context CarriageDoor_C0 
 
constants PLATFORM DOOR_SIDE PLATFORM_SIDE CLOSED OPEN  
           DOOR_CARRIAGE  
 
sets DOOR DOOR_STATE CDV SIDE CARRIAGE  
 
axioms 
  @MetroSystem_C1_axm1 partition(DOOR_STATE, {OPEN}, {CLOSED}) 
  @MetroSystem_C1_axm2 PLATFORM   CDV 
  @Train_C1_axm2 DOOR_CARRIAGE   DOOR   CARRIAGE 
  @Train_C1_axm3  c·c ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}]   
  @Train_C2_axm4 DOOR_SIDE   DOOR   SIDE 
  @Train_C2_axm5 PLATFORM_SIDE   PLATFORM   SIDE 
  @Train_C2_axm6 PLATFORM    
end 
 
(a) Context CarriageDoors C0
context CarriageDoor_C1 extends CarriageDoor_C0 
 
constants MANUAL_PLATFORM MANUAL_INTERNAL AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR  
START FAIL SUCCESS EXECUTED OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS OPEN_LEFT_DOORS  
CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS ISOLATE_DOORS REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS 
 
sets OPEN_DEV COMD_ST COMD_TYPE COMD 
 
axioms 
 @axm1 partition(OPEN_DEV, {MANUAL_PLATFORM}, {MANUAL_INTERNAL}, 
                                                     {AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR}) 
  @axm2 partition(COMD_ST, {START}, {FAIL}, {SUCCESS},{EXECUTED}) 
  @axm3 partition(COMD_TYPE,{OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS},{OPEN_LEFT_DOORS}, 
                   {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS}, {CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS},{ISOLATE_DOORS},   
                  {REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS}) 
end 
 
 
(b) Context CarriageDoors C1
Figure 6.28: Parameterisation context CarriageDoors C0 plus additional context
CarriageDoors C1
INSTANTIATED REFINEMENT IEmergencyDoor M2
INSTANTIATES GCDoors M2 VIA GCDoor C0 GCDoor C1
REFINES CarriageDoors /* abstract machine */
SEES CarriageDoors C0 CarriageDoors C1 /* instance contexts */
REPLACE
SETS GEN CARRIAGE := CARRIAGE DOOR := DOOR
DOOR STATE := DOOR STATE SIDE := SIDE
OPENING DEV ICE := OPEN DEV COMMAND STATE := COMD ST
COMMAND := COMD COMMAND TY PE := COMD TY PE
CONSTANTS GEN DOOR CARRIAGE := DOOR CARRIAGE
OPEN := OPEN PLATFORM := PLATFORM
CLOSED := CLOSED PLATFORM SIDE := PLATFORM SIDE
:::
RENAME /*rename variables, events and params*/
VARIABLES generic doors := carriage doors generic door state := carriage ds
EVENTS addDoor := allocateCarriageTrain removeDoor := removeCarriageTrain
END
Figure 6.29: Instantiated Renement IEmergencyDoor M2
GCDoor M0 (Fig. 6.30(a)). Some customisation is tolerable in the generic event to en-
sure that the instantiation of GCDoor M0.closeDoors renes CarriageDoors.closeDoors
by adding a parameter that match cds and respective guard grd13.
The customisation can be realised by a (shared event) composition of event
GCDoor M0.closeDoors with another event that introduces the additional parameter
cds and guard cds = carriage ds. The monotonicity of the shared event composition
allows the composed pattern to be instantiated as initially desired. Another option is
to introduce an additional step: the last machine of the renement chain before the156 Chapter 6 Case Study
machine GCDoor_M0 sees GCDoor_C0 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 generic_door   DOOR 
  @inv2 generic_door_state   generic_door   DOOR_STATE 
 
event openDoors 
    any ds platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @grd ds   DOOR 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 ds    
      @grd6 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state generic_door_state   (ds {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any ds 
    where 
      @grd ds   DOOR 
      @grd1 ds   dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd3 ds    
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state generic_door_state  
                                       (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event addDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds   generic_door =   
      @grd2 ds     
      @grd3 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door   generic_door   ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state   generic_door_state  
                                       (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds   generic_door 
      @grd2 ds     
      @grd3 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd4 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE [{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door   generic_door   ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state    
                          ds generic_door_state 
  end 
 
(a) Event GCDoor M0.closeDoors
machine CarriageDoors sees Train_C4  
 
variables carriage_door carriage_ds  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_carriage_door carriage_door    (DOOR) 
  theorem @typing_carriage_ds carriage_ds    (DOOR   DOOR_STATE) 
  @Carriage_M1_inv1 carriage_door   DOOR 
  @Carriage_M1_inv2 carriage_ds   carriage_door   DOOR_STATE 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act13 carriage_door    
      @act14 carriage_ds    
  end 
 
  event openDoors 
    any occpTrns platform ds  
    where 
      @typing_platform platform   CDV 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd2 occpTrns    (CDV) 
      @grd3 platform   PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform   (occpTrns   PLATFORM) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd11 ds   dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds carriage_ds  (ds {OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any ds cds  
    where 
      @typing_cds cds    (DOOR   DOOR_STATE) 
      @typing_ds ds    (DOOR) 
      @grd11 ds   dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd13 cds = carriage_ds 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds carriage_ds   (ds {CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Event CarriageDoors.closeDoors
machine CarriageDoorsInst_M0 refines CarriageDoors  sees CarriageDoors_C0  
 
variables carriage_door carriage_ds  
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act13 carriage_door !" 
      @act14 carriage_ds !" 
  end 
 
  event openDoors refines openDoors  
    any occpTrns platform ds  
    where 
      @typing_platform platform # CDV 
      @typing_ds ds # !(DOOR) 
      @grd2 occpTrns # !(CDV) 
      @grd3 platform # PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform # (occpTrns " PLATFORM) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd11 ds # dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    with 
      @t t # TRAIN 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds!carriage_ds$ (ds%{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors refines closeDoors  
    any ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds # !(DOOR) 
      @grd11 ds # dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
    with 
      @cds cds = carriage_ds 
      @t t # TRAIN 
      @closed closed # BOOL 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds!carriage_ds $ (ds%{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain refines allocateCarriageTrain  
    any c ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds # !(DOOR) 
      @typing_c c # CARRIAGE 
      @grd14 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE&[{c}] 
      @grd15 ds"dom(carriage_ds)=" 
    with 
      @t t # TRAIN 
    then 
      @act3 carriage_door ! carriage_door ' ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds ! carriage_ds ' (ds%{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeCarriageTrain  
    any c ds  
    where 
(c) Event CarriageDoorsInst M0.closeDoors
Figure 6.30: Event closeDoors in the pattern and instance; they dier in the param-
eters, guards and witnesses
instantiation (in our case study, machine CarriageDoors) is rened. The resulting re-
nement machine (CarriageDoorsInst M0) renes the rst instantiation machine (i.e.
CarriageDoors v CarriageDoorsInst M0 v EmergencyDoors M0) \customising"
the instantiation. Therefore the additional parameters (and respective guards) can dis-
appear by means of witnesses as can be seen in Fig. 6.30(c). Ideally we aim to have a
syntactic match (after instantiation) between the pattern and the initial instantiantion.
Nevertheless a valid renement is enough to apply the instantiation.
An instance machine EmergencyDoor M2 (Fig. 6.31) is similar to GCDoor M2 apart
from the replacements and renaming applied in IEmergencyDoor M2 (cf. Figs. 6.27,
Fig. 6.29 and Fig. 6.31). That machine can be further rened (and decomposed) intro-
ducing the specic details related to emergency doors. The instantiation of the service
doors follows the same steps.
Statistics: In Table 6.3, we describe the statistics of the development in terms of vari-
ables, events and proof obligations (and how many POs were automatically discharged
by the theorem prover of the Rodin platform) for each renement step. Almost 3/4 of
the proof obligations are automatically discharged.
This case study was carried out under the following conditions:
• Rodin v2.1
• Shared Event Composition plug-in v1.3.1Chapter 6 Case Study 157
machine EmergencyDoors_M2 refines EmergencyDoors_M1  sees CarriageDoors_C1  
 
variables carriage_door carriage_ds isolated_door locked_doors door_opening_device obstructed_door 
command command_doors command_type command_state  
 
invariants 
  @inv1 isolated_door ⊆ DOOR 
  @inv2 !cmd,d·cmd " command ∧ command_type(cmd)"{OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS}  
           ∧ d " DOOR ∧ d " command_doors(cmd) ∧ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS  
           ∧ d # isolated_door$ carriage_ds(d)=OPEN 
  @inv3 !cmd,d·cmd " command ∧ command_type(cmd)"{CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS}     
           ∧ d " DOOR ∧ d " command_doors(cmd) ∧ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS  
           ∧ d # isolated_door$ carriage_ds(d)=CLOSED 
  @inv4 !d·d"isolated_door ∧ d " dom(carriage_ds)$  carriage_ds(d)"{OPEN, CLOSED} 
  @inv5 !cmd1,cmd2·cmd1"command ∧ cmd2"command ∧ cmd1≠cmd2  
            ∧ command_state(cmd1)≠EXECUTED  
            ∧ command_state(cmd2)≠EXECUTED $command_doors(cmd1)∩command_doors(cmd2)=%  
  @inv6 !cmd,d·cmd " command ∧ command_type(cmd)=ISOLATE_DOORS ∧ d " DOOR  
            ∧ d " command_doors(cmd) ∧ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS $ d" isolated_door 
  @inv7 !cmd,d·cmd " command ∧ command_type(cmd)=REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS  
            ∧ d " DOOR ∧ d " command_doors(cmd) ∧ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS $ d# isolated_door 
  @inv8 !d·d"obstructed_door $ carriage_ds(d)=OPEN 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION  
    then 
      @act3 isolated_door &% 
  end 
 
  event commandOpenDoors refines commandOpenDoors  
    any doors cmd cmd_type  
    where 
      @guard doors ⊆ carriage_door 
      @guard1 carriage_ds[doors]={CLOSED} 
      @guard2 cmd_type " {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd " COMD∖command 
      @guard4 !cmd1·cmd1"command ∧ 
command_state(cmd1)≠EXECUTED$doors∩command_doors(cmd1)=% 
      @grd4 doors ≠% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)&doors 
      @act3 command & command ∪ {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)&cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event commandCloseDoors refines commandCloseDoors  
    any doors cmd cmd_type  
    where 
      @guard doors ⊆ carriage_door 
      @guard1 carriage_ds[doors]={OPEN} 
      @guard2 cmd_type " {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd " COMD∖command 
      @guard4 !cmd1·cmd1"command ∧ 
command_state(cmd1)≠EXECUTED$doors∩command_doors(cmd1)=% 
      @grd4 doors ≠% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)&doors 
      @act3 command & command ∪ {cmd} 
(a) Variables, invariants       @act4 command_type(cmd)!cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event commandIsolationDoors refines otherCommandDoors  
    any doors cmd cmd_type  
    where 
      @guard doors ⊆ carriage_door 
      @guard1 cmd_type  
" {ISOLATE_DOORS,REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd " COMD∖command 
      @guard4 #cmd1·cmd1"command  
                    ∧ command_state(cmd1)≠EXECUTED 
                $doors∩command_doors(cmd1)=% 
      @grd4 doors ≠% 
      @grd5 cmd_type = ISOLATE_DOORS & (doors∩isolated_door = % ) 
      @grd6 cmd_type = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS & isolated_door≠%  
                ∧ doors∩isolated_door≠% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)!START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)!doors 
      @act3 command ! command ∪ {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)!cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event updateIsolationCmdState refines updateCmdState  
    any state cmd  
    where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
      @guard state " COMD_ST∖{START,EXECUTED} 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard5 command_type(cmd)  
                         " {ISOLATE_DOORS,REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS} 
      @grd3 (command_type(cmd) = ISOLATE_DOORS  
               ∧ ('d·d"command_doors(cmd) ∧ d (isolated_door))  
               ∨ (command_type(cmd) = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS  
               ∧ ('d·d"command_doors(cmd) ∧ d "isolated_door))  
               & state = FAIL 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)!state 
  end 
 
 
  event updateSuccessOpenDoorCmdState refines updateCmdState  
    any cmd  
    where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard5 command_type(cmd)"{OPEN_LEFT_DOORS,OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS} 
      @guard4 #d·d"command_doors(cmd)∧ d(isolated_door$carriage_ds(d)=OPEN 
      @grd6 command_doors(cmd)∖isolated_door≠% 
    with 
      @state state = SUCCESS 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)!SUCCESS 
  end 
 
  event updateFailOpenDoorCmdState refines updateCmdState  
    any cmd  
    where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
  event executedLogCmdState refines updateCmdState  
    any cmd  
    where 
      @guard3 cmd ! command 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd)!{FAIL,SUCCESS} 
    with 
      @state state = EXECUTED 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)"EXECUTED 
  end 
 
 
  event isolateDoor 
    any d cmd  
    where 
      @guard d ! carriage_door∖isolated_door 
      @guard1 cmd ! command 
      @guard2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard3 d ! command_doors(cmd) 
      @guard4 command_type(cmd) = ISOLATE_DOORS 
      @guard5 carriage_ds(d)!{OPEN, CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 isolated_door" isolated_door ∪ {d} 
  end 
 
  event removeIsolatedDoor 
    any d cmd  
    where 
      @guard d ! isolated_door 
      @guard1 cmd ! command 
      @guard3 d ! command_doors(cmd) 
      @guard4 command_type(cmd) = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS 
      @guard2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard5 carriage_ds(d)!{OPEN, CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 isolated_door" isolated_door ∖ {d} 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain extends allocateCarriageTrain  
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain extends removeCarriageTrain  
  end 
end 
!
(b) Some events in EmergencyDoor M2
Figure 6.31: Excerpt of instantiated machine EmergencyDoor M2
• Model Decomposition plug-in v1.2.1
• Instantiation was done manually (currently tool support is not available).
• ProB v2.1.2
• Camille Text Editor 2.0.1
Although we are interested mainly interested in safety properties, the model checker
ProB [141] proved to be very useful as a complementary tool during the development
of this case study. In some stages of the development, all the proof obligations were158 Chapter 6 Case Study
Variables Events ProofObligations=Auto
TransitiveClosureCtx     10=10
MetroSystem C0     5=3
MetroSystem C1     0=0
MetroSystem M0 7 10 75=64
MetroSystem M1 10 13 17=17
MetroSystem M2 12 17 78=57
MetroSystem M3 12 17 24=22
Track 4 10 0=0
Train 7 14 0=0
Middleware 1 4 0=0
Train M1 9 16 74=52
Train M2 13 21 155=79
Train M3 12 21 65=24
Train M4 14 21 119=89
LeaderCarriage 9 21 0=0
Carriage 5 11 0=0
Carriage M1 6 11 28=21
CarriageInterface 4 11 0=0
CarriageDoors 2 5 0=0
CarriageDoorsInst M0 2 5 2=1
GCDoor M0 2 5 6=6
GCDoor M1 9 15 81=80
GCDoor M2 10 22 170=153
Total 909=678(74:6%)
Table 6.3: Statistics of the metro system case study
discharged but with ProB we discovered that the system was deadlocked due to some
missing detail. In large developments, these situations possibly occur more frequently.
Therefore we suggest discharging the proof obligations to ensure the safety properties
are preserved and run the ProB model checker to conrm that the system actually is
free from deadlocks.
6.14 Discussion: Conclusions and Lessons Learned
We modelled a metro system case study, starting by proving its global properties through
several renement steps. Afterwards, due to an architectural decision and to alleviate
the problem of modelling and handling a large system in one single machine, the system
is decomposed in three sub-components. We further rene one of the resulting sub-
components (Train), introducing several details in four renements levels. Then again,
due to the number of proof obligations, to achieve separation of aspects and to ease the
further developments, we decompose it into two sub-components: LeaderCarriage and
Carriage. Since we are interested in modelling carriage doors, sub-component Carriage
is rened and afterwards decomposed originating sub-component CarriageDoors. Ben-
eting from an existing generic development for carriage doors GCDoor, we consider
this development as a pattern and instantiate two kind of carriage doors: service and
emergency doors. Although the instantiation is similar for both types of doors, the
resulting instances can be further rened independently. Using generic instantiation, we
avoid having to prove the proof obligations regarding the pattern GCDoor: GCDoor M0,
GCDoor M1 and GCDoor M2 (in the overall 257 POs). This gure only considers the
instantiation of emergency doors (the instantiation of service doors would imply twiceChapter 6 Case Study 159
the number of POs).
From the experience of other developments involving a large number of renements lev-
els or renements with large models, the development tools reach a point where it is not
possible to edit the model due to the high amount of resources required to do it (or it
is done very slowly). The decomposition is a possible solution that alleviates this issue
by splitting the model into more tool manageable dimensions. Following a top-down
approach, developed models become more complex in each renement step. Neverthe-
less by applying decomposition, we alleviate the consequences of such complexity by
separating concerns (architecture approach), decreasing the number of events and vari-
ables per sub-component which results in models that are more manageable from a tool
point of view. Moreover, for each renement, the properties (added as requirements)
are preserved. Using generic instantiation, we avoid proving the pattern proof obliga-
tions GCDoor. Therefore we reach our goal of reusing existing developments as much as
possible and discharge as little proof obligations as possible. Even the interactive proofs
were relatively easy to discharge once the correct tactic was discovered. This task would
be more dicult without the decomposition due to the elevated number of hypotheses
to considered for each PO. Nevertheless we believe that the eort of discharging proof
obligations could be minimised by having a way to reuse tactics. In particular when the
same steps are followed to discharge similar POs.
In a combination of renement and instantiation, we learned that the abstract machine
and the abstract pattern do not necessarily match perfectly. In particular, some extra
guards and parameters may exist resulting from previous renements in the instance.
Nevertheless the generic model can still be reused. We can (shared event) compose the
pattern with another machine in a way that the resulting events include the additional
parameters and guards to guarantee a valid renement. Another interesting conclusion is
that throughout an instantiation, it is possible not to use all the generic events. A subset
of generic events can be instantiated in opposition to instantiate all. This a consequence
of the event renements that only depend on abstract and concrete events. Nevertheless
this only applies for safety properties. If we are interested in liveness properties, the
exclusion of a generic event may result in a system deadlock.
With this case study we aim to illustrate the application of decomposition and generic
instantiation as techniques to help the development of formal models. Following these
techniques, the development is structured in a way that simplies the model by sepa-
rating concerns and aspects and decreases the number of proof obligations to be dis-
charged. Although we use Event-B, these techniques are generic enough to suit other
formal notations and other case studies. Formal methods has been widely used to val-
idate requirements of real systems. The systems are formally described and properties
are checked to be preserved whenever a system transition occurs. Usually this result
in complex models with several properties to be preserved, therefore structuring and
reusability are pursued to facilitate the development. Lutz [114] describes the reuse of160 Chapter 6 Case Study
formal methods when analysing the requirements and designing the software between
two spacecrafts' formal models. Stepney et al. [177, 178] propose patterns to be applied
to formal methods in system engineering. Using the Z notation, several patterns (and
anti-patterns) are identied and catalogued to t particular kind of models. These pat-
terns introduce structure to the models and aim to aid formal model developers to choose
the best approach to model a system, using some examples. Although the patterns are
expressed for Z, they are generic enough to be applied to other notations. Comparing
with the development of our case study, the instantiation of service and emergency doors
corresponds to the Z promotion, where a global system is specied in terms of multiple
instances of local states and operations. Although there is not an explicit separation of
local and global states in our case study, service and emergency doors states are con-
nected to the state of CarriageDoor and we even use decomposition, instantiation and
refactoring (called meaning preservation refactoring steps in Z promotion) to t into a
specic pattern. [177] suggests template support and architecture patterns to be sup-
ported by tools, something that currently does not happen. We have a similar viewpoint
and we would like to address this issue in the future. Templates could be customised
according to the modeller's needs and selected from an existing list, perhaps categorised
as suggested in [177].
Butler [44] uses the shared event approach in classical B to decompose a railway system
into three sub-components: Train, Track and Communication. The system is modelled
and reasoned as a whole in an event-based approach, both the physical system and
the desired control behaviour. Our case study follows a similar methodology applied
to a metro system following the same shared event style. Moreover we introduce more
requirements regarding the trains and the carriage doors, expressed through the use of
decomposition and generic instantiation.Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter we wrap up the contributions of this thesis and outline our objectives for
the future. We aim to introduce reusability and modularity mechanisms when developing
system specications in particular large systems that become cumbersome to manage
when scaling. For that we propose the use of composition, decomposition and generic
instantiation to facilitate the development of large systems. We use the Event-B formal
notation and the Rodin platform for the development of these techniques and respective
tool support. We separate the conclusions and future work into three main topics giving
more detail about each as follows.
7.1 Composition
Based on the close relation between action systems and Event-B plus the correspon-
dence between action systems and CSP [53], we dene our Event-B composition with an
event-based behaviour. Shared event composition is proved to be monotonic by means of
proof obligations. Consequently sub-components can be further rened independently.
Renement in a \top-down" style for developing specications is allowed including the
generation of POs. During composition, sub-components interact through event pa-
rameters by value-passing. We extend Event-B to support shared event composition,
allowing combination and reuse of existing sub-components through the introduction
of composed machines. Required static checks are dened and POs are generated to
validate the composition. Such an approach seems suitable for modelling distributed
systems, where the system can be seen as a combination of sub-components.
Currently we have developed a plug-in that allows shared event composition using Event-
B in the Rodin platform. Some of the proofs to be generated are also generated in the
included machines. By identifying the similarities between proofs, we have established
that we can reuse proof obligations and reduce the eort of discharging proof obligations
161162 Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work
that are already done in the included machines. The shared event composition tool gen-
erates a new (composed) machine to ensure the validity of the composition using the
already existing validation scheme for machines (generation of proof obligations). In the
future the composed machine generation should be optional since this validation should
be done directly over the composition le. Although the shared variable composition
was not in the initial plans for this thesis, the close relation with our work suggested
a deeper understanding of that style. During that study, we discovered a close relation
between the rely/guarantee composition for VDM and the shared variable composition
for Event-B that is also mentioned in Hoang and Abrial's work [90]. It should be possible
to create a correspondence between these two approaches and we intend to investigate
this in the future. Schneider et al [159] dene a CSP semantics for Event-B as described
in Sect. 1.5.6. Following that work, we dene as future work the derivation the CSP
semantics for Event-B machines to dene the composition of machines in terms of traces,
failures, divergences and innite traces. A paper was accepted for the B workshop run-
ning in parallel with FM 2011 (International Symposium on Formal Methods) [161] and
another to FMCO 2010 (International Symposia on Formal Methods for Components
and Objects) based on shared event composition [164] and we gave a presentation about
this work in the Rodin Workshop 2009.
To summarize, we list the future work for composition below:
• Generation of proof obligations for shared event composition directly rather than
indirectly by expanding machine compositions.
• Further investigation on reuse of proofs obligations in the Rodin platform.
• Can rely/guarantee for VDM be applied to (Abrial) shared variable composition
for Event-B?
• Adding enabledness POs when available for the Rodin platform.
• Derivation of CSP semantics for Event-B machines described by Schneider et
al [159] to dene the composition of machines in terms of traces, failures, di-
vergences and innite traces.
7.2 Generic Instantiation
The generic instantiation work was a result of the achievements towards composition and
decomposition. The possibility to have patterns that can be reused in another develop-
ments seems very attractive while creating specications in particular in a top-bottom
style. Event-B supports generic developments but lacks the capacity to instantiate and
reuse those generic developments. As a solution, generic instantiation is applied to
patterns and as an outcome instantiated machines are created and parameterised. AnChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 163
instantiated machine instantiates a generic machine, is parameterised by a context and
the pattern elements are renamed/replaced according to the instance. In a similar style,
an instantiated renement instantiates a chain of renements reusing the pattern proof
obligations assuming that the instantiated proof obligations are as valid as the pattern
ones. By quantifying the variables, constants and types we ensure that pattern proof
obligations remain valid when instantiating. A renaming plug-in was developed sup-
porting the renaming of Event-B elements and respective proofs. Optimisation at level
of proof renaming will be investigated in the future as it may become a slow operation
for large proof trees. A paper was accepted at ICFEM 2009 (International Conference
on Formal Engineering Methods) [163] describing this work. In the future, we intend
to have tool support for generic instantiation as described in Chapter 3. With larger
and relevant cases studies we should improve the tool and publish a paper with the re-
sults and conclusions. Moreover a library of patterns could be provided when modelling,
divided according to the categories are suggested in [178].
To summarize, we list the future work for generic instantiation below:
• Optimisation of proof renaming
• Tool development in collaboration with ETH Zurich.
• Application of a large case study to and test the scalability and improve the tool.
• Denition of a categorised pattern library and customisable templates.
• Writing and submitting a paper as a continuation of the initial study describing
the tool support and conclusions of application of a case study.
7.3 Decomposition
There is a need for modularisation and reuse of sub-components in order to model
large systems and manage better the respective POs. Event-B lacks a sub-component
mechanism. Thus we propose to tackle that problem through the decomposition of
a system by their events or variables. The shared variable (state-based) approach is
suitable for designing parallel algorithms while the shared event (event-based) is suitable
for message-passing distributed systems [45]. Following any of these two approaches, the
parallel components of a distributed system can be rened and decomposed separately
without making any assumptions about the rest of the system. The shared variable
style relies on the work of Abrial and Hallerstede [15] where variables are shared and
exists the notion of external events. Butler [45] suggests the shared event decomposition
where events are partition through the sub-components and the interaction occurs via
shared parameters. The work developed by Butler in [40] for action system is strongly164 Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work
related with the same approach for shared event decomposition in Event-B [45] as both
approaches are state-based formalism combined with event-based CSP.
We have collaborated in the tool support development for the decomposition technique
in the Rodin platform, being responsable for the shared event approach development.
The tool allows the semi-automatic decomposition in a shared variable and shared event.
An initial study of such work has been accepted as a workshop paper for the ABZ 2010
conference [165] and an extended version of that paper was published in the journal
Software: Practise and Experience expressing our results [166]. With the application of
more case studies, we should have more results and conclusions that can be published.
As described in Chapter 4, the decomposition tool has been widely used with positive
feedback. Some improvements on the tool have been suggested and we intend to carry
them out in the future. A large case study based on some real requirements is described
in Chapter 6 and shows a practical implementation of the technique, the possible com-
bination with generic instantiation and respective tool support. To summarize, we list
the future work for decomposition below:
• Tool development and improvements.
• Extension of the composed machine plug-in to support the shared variable com-
position in order to store the decomposition conguration.
• Application of a large case study to test scalability.
• Writing and submitting a paper with the results of the application of decomposition
in scalable systems.
7.4 Future Work
In the previous sections we described the future related to each technique that we studied
in this document. Although they are powerful techniques that help the formal modelling
of large and/or complex systems, there is still plenty to be studied and researched when
it comes to the reusability of models. In particular, there is a need to decrease the
user's eort when developing models, in particular, for the reuse of proofs. From our
own experience, discussions with other formal developers and even for the industrial
companies that use formal methods, often the time spent discharging proofs is greater
than the time spent modelling the system itself. The same model can be developed in
many dierent manners but the generated number of proofs and the ease to discharge
them vary. Therefore although the outcome may be the same, the properties to be proved
may be harder to achieve. This situation somehow suggests the need for guidelines
on how to achieve the same goal in a simpler, cleaner and possible easier in terms of
discharging proofs. These guidelines could be arranged by some modelling patterns thatChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 165
tend to occur even when dierent kind of systems are being developed. We intend to
research these modelling patterns and come up with practical guidelines that can be
easily applied to existing developments (in a way, it is a dierent continuation path
from generic instantiation).
The reuse of proofs is another topic that also requires further study. Currently the
Rodin platform allows the reuse of existing proofs to be applied to other proofs but these
usually fail if the structure of the proof is slightly dierent. We need more powerful proof
patterns that can be applied that are less sensitive to the structure. The modelling tactics
often are repeated throughout a development and consequently results in similar kind
of proof obligations to be discharged. Ideally once these kind of proofs are discharged,
that proof tactic should easily be applied to the rest of the family of proof obligations.
What happens at the moment is cumbersome where the user has to redo and re-apply
the proofs steps instead of tackling more interesting and challenging proofs. This topic
is quite broad but we intend to investigate to come up with more possible reuse of proofs
techniques.
More recently, code generation [67] has been proposed for Event-B following the path
of classical B. But this approach is more exible as it allows the user to dene tasking
machines [68] to dene how the model can be implemented. Tasking machines can be
periodic, triggered by an event or happen only once (one shot). Moreover the implemen-
tation allows the denition of tasks that model or simulate the environment (Environ
machine) and the denition of data that can be accessed by dierent threads (Shared
machine). The communication and implementation of these dierent machines use the
shared event composition to structure them in one single place. Another powerful option
is to dene the implementation data structure according to the target language to be
implemented. As future work, we intend to extend the existing theory plug-in [115] to
allow the mapping of new (or existing) theories into executable code. The intention is
to let the user dene new Event-B data structures (since they are not xed) and map to
the corresponding implementation for the specic target language. At the moment only
Ada and C are supported, although in the future other target languages will supported.Bibliography
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